Overview
On December 8, 2025, Syrians marked the first anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Bashar al-Assad. The collapse of a regime that had governed for over fifty years came swiftly as rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) swept through major cities. This watershed moment ended the civil war in its previous form and opened possibilities for stability, reconstruction, refugee return, and political renewal. Yet twelve months later, despite meaningful progress in governance and institution-building, Syria remains profoundly fragile. Persistent divisions, sporadic violence, dire humanitarian conditions, economic devastation, and external interference continue to threaten the transition, with Syria's opportunity for transformation potentially narrowing—and consequences for regional stability and investors in Syria’s nascent economy.
Domestic Progress and Persistent Challenges
The Syrian Interim Government (SIG), led by Assad ousters HTS and the group’s former leader (now President) Ahmed al-Sharaa, has made substantial strides in establishing institutional foundations. In March 2025, it adopted a provisional constitution outlining a five-year transition through 2030. A new legislative body was formed and indirect parliamentary elections were conducted, though most representatives were appointed through presidential committees rather than direct voting. The SIG has also initiated transitional justice mechanisms, creating councils for civil peace, property restitution, and war crimes accountability, while conducting trials of former security personnel accused of atrocities. In September 2025, the government launched the Syrian Development Fund to mobilize resources for infrastructure repair, service restoration, agricultural rehabilitation, and returnee support. These initiatives represent the first formal transitional architecture in decades aimed at state reconstruction, justice delivery, and public services.
Security conditions have improved compared to wartime, with major combat operations such as barrel-bombing and Russian airstrikes ended. Damascus and urban centers are relatively calm. However, the security landscape remains fragmented. Armed clashes persist nationwide as government forces confront insurgent groups, pro-Assad militia remnants, and minority armed factions, particularly in the Druze communities in the south, resisting integration. Extremist violence has resurged, with a revived Islamic State conducting attacks in government-held areas, including a deadly Damascus church bombing, the first such strike in the capital since regime change. Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose severe threats; so far in 2025, at least 590 people, including children, have died from landmines, potentially making Syria's casualty rate the world's highest for a single year. The SIG does not yet control all territory or guarantee comprehensive safety, undermining confidence in long-term stability.
Approximately 2.5 million Syrians have returned since Assad's fall, with some neighborhoods showing modest recovery as returnees repair homes and reopen businesses. Yet the scale of destruction is overwhelming. Many find only ruins, and basic utilities remain dysfunctional across much of the country. Reconstruction costs were recently estimated by the World Bank at $216 billion. Most critically, 2025 has brought severe humanitarian and food security crises. Historic drought, agricultural collapse, disrupted supply chains, economic instability, and reduced international aid have pushed over 14.5 million Syrians into food insecurity. Government capacity to assist vulnerable populations remains limited, with much reconstruction dependent on individuals' out-of-pocket spending—unaffordable for many. While institutional development and return processes advance, the humanitarian reality for most Syrians remains dire.
Regional Powers and Competing Agendas
Syria has become a battleground for competing regional visions. The country's trajectory depends on whether external powers can balance their interests without reigniting conflict. Turkey seeks centralization under its influence, Israel prefers fragmentation, Gulf states pursue stable access, while Russia and Iran struggle to preserve relevance at the expense of the SIG’s stability. For Syrians, freedom from dictatorship has brought uncertainty about whether their nation will achieve unified sovereignty or remain a proxy competition arena.
Turkey has emerged as Syria's dominant external force, transforming northern Syria through troop deployments, administrative structures, and militia support. President Erdoğan pursues three objectives: preventing Kurdish autonomy along Turkey's border, facilitating Syrian refugee return, and establishing Syria as a strategic ally. By September 2025, Turkey began training Syrian forces and signaling air defense support, aiming to establish military bases. Ankara's success in backing the rebel offensive has granted unprecedented leverage in Damascus, positioning Turkey as the primary architect of Syria's political reconstruction.
Israel views Assad's removal as a strategic victory against Iran but remains wary of what follows. Since regime change, Israel has conducted numerous air and ground operations, degrading military assets and expanding its Golan Heights occupation. July 2025 airstrikes in southern Syria, officially to protect Druze communities, likely served broader strategic goals of preventing the emergence of a unified Syrian state. Recent increased IDF ground operations—101 such incursions during November alone—drew sharp US criticism. Israel's calculation is clear: a fragmented, weakened Syria is preferable to either an Iranian-aligned regime or a strong Turkish-backed Islamist government.
The Trump administration has pursued contradictory policies. In June 2025, special envoy Tom Barrack announced plans to reduce America's presence from eight bases to one. Simultaneously, the White House reportedly prepares to deploy forces near Damascus to monitor a potential Israel-Syria security pact. The US lifted sanctions mid-2025 and engaged diplomatically with Syria's leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, who visited the White House last month, as Congress prepares full CAESAR sanctions repeal in the coming weeks. American influence persists through support for Kurdish forces and reconstruction financing leverage.
Gulf monarchies rapidly pivoted from supporting Assad's 2023 normalization to embracing new leadership. In May 2025, Saudi Arabia and Qatar jointly cleared Syria's $15.5 million World Bank debt (a symbolic sum that will grant Syria greater access to international markets), and July 2025 saw a Saudi business delegation secure Damascus investment agreements exceeding $6 billion. Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar—recognize that their financial resources give them leverage to counter Iranian influence and Turkish dominance. Their pragmatic engagement seeks a stable Syria that won't export instability or extremism while preventing any single power from monopolizing Damascus influence.
Assad's downfall dealt Russia strategic, reputational, and domestic blows, damaging Moscow's regional credibility. Yet Russia has not been entirely expelled. President al-Sharaa visited Moscow in October 2025 (despite the awkward fact that ousted President Bashar al-Assad lives in exile there), and Russia maintains military base access, partly because multiple actors see value in Russia as a counterweight to other powers.
Iran suffered the most catastrophic loss. A senior IRGC commander acknowledged Assad's fall as "a very bad defeat." Syria provided Iran's land corridor to Hezbollah and a forward position against Israel. The elimination of the Tehran-Mediterranean corridor, combined with Lebanese missile depot destruction and Quds Force weakening, has dismantled the "axis of resistance." Iran's attempts to maintain influence face a new leadership unwelcoming of Iranian involvement, while continued Israeli strikes prevent Tehran from easily re-establishing its presence.
International Engagement and Accountability
International human rights organizations cautiously welcomed initial SIG accountability efforts. For the first time in modern Syrian history, some alleged wartime perpetrators have been publicly tried. Critics warn these efforts remain limited, slow, and underfunded, however. The new constitution, while progressive, concentrates presidential power and lacks adequate checks and balances. Civil society organizations report registration difficulties, bureaucratic delays, and continued security surveillance. Human Rights Watch notes that continued violence, especially against minorities and in former conflict zones, undermines the legitimacy of the transitional process. The indirectly elected parliament overwhelmingly favored male Sunni former freedom fighters, despite promises of representation for women and minorities. Amnesty International emphasizes that survivors' rights, victims' families, and marginalized communities must remain central to Syria's transition, with justice, reparations, and human rights guiding reconstruction rather than merely state security.
International donors initially responded optimistically, pledging billions for reconstruction. Results have disappointed so far. Much reconstruction relies on individual initiative. Infrastructure remains crippled; electricity, water, education, and healthcare remain unreliable or absent in many areas. Large-scale public rebuilding remains largely unfunded. The economic crisis—worsened by drought, agricultural collapse, inflation, and import scarcity—has intensified livelihood insecurity, undermining public confidence and fueling renewed displacement, poverty, and hunger. This mismatch between declared international support and actual delivery poses profound challenges: without sustained, transparent, large-scale investment, reconstruction may stall, preventing returning refugees and displaced persons from re-establishing stable lives and deepening social fractures.
What Lies Ahead
Assad's fall and the SIG's emergence represent one of the Middle East's most consequential political transformations in recent decades, potentially ending brutal authoritarian rule and sectarian civil war while offering Syrians and the international community a genuine rebuilding opportunity.
Syria stands at a crossroads. Decisions made in the coming years—regarding reconstruction approaches, justice delivery, diversity management, and institutional strengthening—will determine whether Syria becomes a stable, inclusive state or fractures into further injustice, conflict, and despair. The transitional architecture—Constitution, courts, reconstruction fund, civil society engagement—shows promise but remains incomplete. If the SIG and international partners fail to accelerate reconstruction, deliver tangible services, and eliminate impunity, backsliding risks remain high. The US role is critical in this regard. Simultaneously, the world—jaded by war failures, broken promises, and donor fatigue—may soon shift attention elsewhere. Without sustained commitment, Syria's window of opportunity could close rapidly, with serious implications for regional stability, rebuilding and infrastructure opportunities for external investors, and the regional balance of power.
