Overview
Despite renewed efforts by the United States to broker peace in Sudan, the war continues with no apparent end in sight. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) recently announced that it had stopped the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from advancing further into the country’s oil-rich Kordofan region. Beyond this development, neither side has made consequential territorial gains. Fueling the war of attrition is foreign military aid, such as drone transfers, as middle powers compete to shape East Africa and the Horn. If left unaddressed, the SAF and RSF’s regional connections could spark and overlap with interconnected wars, creating widespread population displacement, a regional power vacuum, and greater insecurity in the Red Sea. Prolonged conflict in Sudan will increase the risks to Red Sea shipping, prompting diversions and higher logistics costs, and potential secondary sanctions on arms or gold traders that fund either the SAF or RSF. Failure of the US to mediate the Sudan conflict could push other powers, like China, to intervene, leading to lost influence and investment.
Spillover Into the Horn of Africa
The RSF and SAF increasingly rely on foreign partners, including Horn African states, for logistics, recruitment, and political support. Egypt, which supports the SAF, and the UAE, which reportedly backs the RSF, have not applied diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia or Eritrea to cease their involvement in the war, allowing for greater alignment between Sudanese belligerents and their respective Horn partners. Eritrea views the SAF as the most reliable actor for securing its western border. Thousands of Tigrayans, a group frequently at war with Ethiopia and a partner of Eritrea, have joined the SAF to fight in Sudan. The UAE has reportedly backed the RSF in part to protect its vast financial investments in the country, but also to prevent the rise of Islamist groups. Meanwhile, Egypt, keen on securing its border and countering Emirati and Ethiopian influence, quietly backs the SAF, allegedly supplying the group with fighter jets. In contrast, Ethiopia was officially neutral at the beginning of the Sudanese civil war, but the emergence of a regional bloc led by its two greatest rivals—Cairo and Asmara—convinced Addis Ababa that counterbalancing through alignment with the RSF was a strategic imperative.
Recent reports of an RSF training camp in Ethiopia demonstrate the centrality of foreign influence in conflict escalation. The facility is said to have the capacity to train up to 10,000 fighters. The majority of the 4,300 recruits currently being trained are Ethiopian nationals, but some recruits are South Sudanese. Allegations that the UAE financed construction of the camp and provided military instructors raise concerns over the efficacy of peace negotiations by the Quad, the informal name for the signatories of the US Joint Statement on Sudan, comprised of the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.
Ethiopia and Eritrea’s divergence on the Sudan conflict is another potential fracture in their deteriorating relationship. Since 2022, Eritrean troops have policed Ethiopia’s Tigray region as part of a fragile peacekeeping arrangement, creating accusations of violated sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia desires Red Sea access through Eritrea’s Port of Assab. Should the current tension between Addis Ababa and Asmara escalate into war, it is likely that the RSF and SAF would support their patrons. Whether that support would be political or military in nature is uncertain, but both armies are intent on maintaining foreign support. Conversely, Ethiopia could expand military aid to the RSF and prolong the war, exacerbating the refugee crisis to destabilize the borders of Eritrea and Egypt. It is possible that Addis Ababa is already pursuing this strategy, as Emirati-linked flights to Ethiopia suspected of carrying weapons have dramatically increased since November 2025.
South Sudan: A New Theater of the Sudanese War?
The looming threat of civil war in South Sudan and deteriorating relations between Juba and the SAF risk drawing the breakaway state into the Sudanese civil war. Amid worsening tensions between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Reik Machar, rebels from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) launched an offensive in the northeast in December 2025. In recent weeks, fighting has intensified between the SPLM-IO and the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces as the rebels advance towards the capital and threaten to overthrow President Kiir. South Sudan’s descent into another civil war has its own set of geopolitical implications, but the country also serves as a logistical hub for the RSF and is increasingly viewed by both the RSF and SAF as a second front in their war.
Ties between the Kiir administration and the RSF are substantial. In January, RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo met with high-ranking South Sudanese oil and security officials, signaling deeper economic and security cooperation in the RSF-controlled Heglig oil fields. Moreover, South Sudanese militias aligned with President Kiir have reportedly fought for the RSF, prompting the SAF to send supplies to the SPLM-IO. The SAF recently captured over 10 South Sudanese citizens fighting in the RSF, further straining relations between Khartoum and Juba. A South Sudanese civil war would likely be exploited by both factions, but especially the RSF, as it relies on the country to base its fighters and route supplies. In response, the SAF could seek to destabilize the Kiir administration by arming the SPLM-IO.
The Destabilizing Effect of Middle Power Rivalries
Worsening tension between the UAE and Saudi Arabia impeded progress on peace talks at the African Union Summit. Saudi Arabia, generally aligned with Egypt and the SAF, fears losing access to the Red Sea and is frustrated by the UAE’s support for the RSF. While not overtly supportive of the SAF in the past, Riyadh’s strategic outlook on Sudan has undoubtedly been altered by Abu Dhabi’s “muscular” foreign policy around the Red Sea. January’s clash in Yemen between military powers backed by each respective country has further motivated Saudi Araba to recalculate its presence and influence in the Horn. During his visit to Washington in November 2025, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reportedly urged the Trump administration to pressure the UAE to end its arms transfers to the RSF. Saudi Arabia and Egypt began denying overflight permission to Emirati aircraft in January to cut off potential RSF supply routes.
Visible clashes between Quad members negatively impact the group’s credibility. Without substantive diplomatic pressure from both the US and middle powers, regional state and non-state actors are incentivized to double down on their political demands, as the costs of armed conflict are mitigated by anticipated foreign military aid. Intensified middle power competition is the primary obstacle to negotiating peace in Sudan, as the US must contend not only with the uncompromising nature of the warring parties, but the self-interest of the mediators.
The US desires to preserve close relations with these powers and has previously hesitated to apply secondary sanctions to facilitators of Sudan’s illicit war economy. The US has previously sanctioned some UAE-based gold purchasers—the UAE’s estimated smuggling of Sudan’s gold in 2024 totals $8.8 billion under current gold prices—but the US applied only targeted sanctions against RSF commanders on Thursday in response to the October 2025 siege of El Fasher. As of now, the US does not want to antagonize any member of the Quad to maximize the chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
Peace Is Still Possible, but Risks Remain
The spillover of the Sudan conflict into neighboring countries—and potential new conflicts with overlapping actors—heightens the complexity of the war, making it even more difficult for the US to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Simultaneously, the widening rift between Abu Dhabi and pro-SAF middle powers significantly undermines diplomacy through the Quad format. The US has deemed mediation a necessity, but this may become more challenging. If South Sudan continues to slide into civil conflict, and Ethiopia’s troop build-up in the Tigray region leads to an outbreak of war with Eritrea, the entire Horn could be embroiled in simultaneous conflicts with interconnecting allegiances and middle power interests.
Regional conflict in the Horn could amplify attacks on suspected SAF or RSF supply routes, increasing the possibility of drone suicide bombings in port cities. Drone warfare has already targeted Port Sudan, adding risks to Red Sea shipping and constraining the export of oil from Sudan and South Sudan. If conflict breaks out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Port Assab could become another target for drone attacks, further increasing maritime risks, likely inducing shipping diversions from the Suez Canal, and potentially spiking maritime insurance premiums. This could redirect trade flows for US allies in the Middle East. Port Sudan’s persistent insecurity—and constrained oil exports—will reverberate through South Sudan’s foreign exchanges, intensifying the risk of a conflict there.
Failure of the US to mediate the Sudan war would show limits to American influence in the Horn of Africa. In the short term, the US may try to ramp up economic pressure on middle powers, as evident by previous secondary sanctions on UAE-based arms and gold traders that back the RSF. This will increase downside risks for businesses exposed to Sudan’s illicit economies. If US pressure fails, other powers may step in. Beijing has largely maintained a hands-off approach to the war in Sudan, but it is keen on preserving its image as a more practical and benevolent partner than the US. China will aim to preserve regional stability to protect its investments in mines, ports, and roads throughout the Horn of Africa, so Beijing may feel compelled to intervene. While hypothetical, a long-term relative decline of US influence in the region may undermine American investment.
