Overview
In just under a year, US President Trump has taken several steps to revamp the rules of US influence on the global stage, from tariffs to anti-drug policy and, yes, foreign elections. The US is embracing an especially muscular foreign policy, with the White House increasingly asserting its own preferences despite a longstanding custom of nonintervention—or at least, less explicit influence. From Buenos Aires and Tegucigalpa to Warsaw and beyond, heightened US influence operations are challenging international norms and tying domestic political fortunes to American strategic priorities and geostrategic tensions, with implications for foreign governments and multinational businesses alike.
Washington Deepens Its Political Reach
The US’ efforts to influence foreign elections have been on display in several recent polls—perhaps the most high-profile being the contested presidential election in Honduras. On November 26th, President Trump endorsed Nasry “Tito” Asfura, the right-wing National Party candidate, over his centrist opponent Salvador Nasralla, saying that the US could work with Asfura to combat “narcocommunists.” Days later, he upped the ante by posting on social media that the US could cut aid to the developing country if Nasralla were to win. After the already razor-thin polls returned slow results with slight margins (in large part due to the country’s mountainous terrain and low connectivity, which leads to slow vote counting), President Trump accused Honduras of rigging the results and warned that there would be “hell to pay.” Nasralla has denounced the intervention and argued that US comments have already damaged the credibility of the eventual results.
Washington has employed the strategy elsewhere in the past several months: in October, the Trump administration promised billions in financial aid to Argentina, both meant to stabilize the country’s economy and peso amid an inflationary spiral but also to give political breathing room to Trump ally President Javier Milei ahead of midterm elections seen as a referendum on Milei’s unorthodox economic reform campaign. Milei’s La Libertad Avanza party, which had been trounced in Buenos Aires legislative elections just a month before, ultimately won a surprisingly decisive victory with over 40% of the popular vote. The case followed the June example of Polish presidential elections, in which conservative Karol Nawrocki won a razor-thin runoff following months of vocal support from the Trump administration. In the months prior, Nawrocki visited the White House (rare for an unelected candidate from any country), the conservative group CPAC hosted a meeting in Poland, and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem urged Poles to vote for Nawrocki—suggesting that military ties between the US and Poland, which hosts 10,000 US troops, could deepen if he was elected.
The explicit goal of these efforts has sometimes been nebulous: in Honduras, Argentina and Poland, the US was not seeking to achieve a discrete policy goal via the election of an ally, like the approval of a specific trade or security deal. The White House appears to value the election of ideological allies more than seeking collaborators on discrete policy issues. President Trump’s brand of politics is personalistic, valuing relationships with leaders with whom he can deal personally and ideologically.
President Trump’s intervention has often had mixed results, despite the cases discussed above. New US policies in his early term (more so than direct attempts to influence elections) fostered something that pundits called the “anti-Trump bump,” wherein centrist leaders benefited from pushing back on the White House’s trade policies, and right wing candidates who either received Trump’s endorsement or associated themselves with Trump were punished at the ballot box for their ideological and stylistic similarities to the American president. In Canada and Australia, most prominently, centrist candidates reversed their polling to triumph over conservative ones, delivering a scathing rejection to Trump-style politicians like Pierre Poilievre and Peter Dutton. More subtle impacts were seen in national elections in Singapore and Germany, both of which held elections very shortly after President Trump’s inauguration. In both, the victors’ call for stability and recognition of a reorganizing world order prevailed against a chaotic global backdrop.
Interventionism as US Policy
The practice appears to have been cemented into policy in President Trump’s recently released National Security Strategy (NSS). The document, which serves as a general statement of purpose for the US’ geopolitical perspective and objectives, lays out a fairly explicit embrace of “patriotic European parties” (i.e., the far right) to help Europe “correct its current trajectory” of declining economic and military power. The NSS attributes European foreign policy constraints to a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” that underpins unchecked migration and “civilizational erasure.” Further, the document calls explicitly for “cultivating resistance” in European nations and celebrating “the growing influence of patriotic European parties”—a call for action as well as a statement of tacit support. Across the pond, transatlantic partners interpreted this as an implicit threat to support revisionist far-right parties if they do not adhere to Washington’s interests.
There will be ample opportunities for the US to demonstrate its new rules of engagement in foreign elections in the coming year. Elections are slated in parts of Britain and Germany next year, and there is an ever-present possibility of snap national elections in France, all of which will have impacts on the EU’s political center of gravity. In all three, nationalist parties—Reform UK, the Alternative for Germany and the National Rally—look poised to make gains at the expense of ruling centrists. Hungarian parliamentary elections will be closely watched amid rising concerns of Budapest’s democratic backsliding and alignment with Russia, but also a competitive center-right and pro-EU challenger. If the Trump administration intervenes on behalf of Orban, this could (as in the Honduran case) support claims of invalid results and further compromise trust in domestic institutions.
In Latin America, Colombia will also have presidential elections in the spring: while incumbent Gustavo Petro is barred from running, Petro’s clashes with Trump over the US’ increasingly bellicose Venezuela policy over the implication of Colombian citizens (a spat leading to US sanctions against him) will certainly be at issue in the race, as will immigration—both high-priority issues for the Trump administration. Finally, the Brazilian election will likely cause sparks in the bilateral relationship—leftist incumbent President Lula da Silva, who President Trump has repeatedly condemned for his “witch hunt” against former President Bolsonaro (recently convicted for orchestrating a coup), will likely run against Bolsonaro’s son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, and others. The White House has already employed secondary tariffs in the summer in an attempt to pressure Brazil to drop charges against Bolsonaro, and may do so again to influence other domestic issues.
The Risks
The strategy document, alongside other examples of the Trump administration expanding the US’ traditional reach in global geopolitics, signals a broader rethinking of Washington’s traditional place in the world order and how to achieve its goals. Unburdened by historic norms around the customary ways to exert influence on the global stage, the US is drawing back from traditional avenues of power. Washington is embracing bullish avenues to achieve its goals, from making clear its preferences in foreign elections to seeking ownership stakes in industrial and rare earths companies to projecting military power in the Western Hemisphere.
Washington’s conception of a longer arm of American influence will have implications for the global business community as well as the US’ bilateral relations; heightened politicization of domestic polls could lead to abrupt political shifts and backlash for American companies operating in foreign markets, or vice versa, and Washington’s broader use of economic tools could create volatility in trade and investment conditions. As domestic political outcomes rise to the level of national strategic concern in Washington, multinationals will require a more granular understanding of local political dynamics and Washington’s potential reaction.
