Overview
President Trump has dramatically reshaped US military policy in Central and South America, escalating US operations there to engage in a newly militarized and internationalized armed conflict against drug cartels, or what seems to be a revival in tone and posture of both the war on drugs and on terror. Distinct from historic US operations against drug trafficking in the region, the Trump administration has conceptualized its fight against cartels as a counterterrorism operation – changing the rules of engagement and, potentially, the parameters for success. Along with escalating military confrontation with the Maduro regime in Venezuela, this represents a significant strategic shift in thinking in Washington – one that may result in reasserted US leadership in a historic sphere of influence increasingly contested with Russia and China and stem the flow of drugs into the US, or create heightened escalation and risks of open conflict in Latin America.
In a raft of orders immediately following his inauguration, President Trump issued Executive Order 14157, designating cartels and other organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). In the months since, the White House has repeatedly referred to cartels and their members as “narco-terrorists” and characterized the US as in “armed conflict” with the groups. In September, FBI Director Kash Patel put a fine point on the shift, saying that the Trump administration will “treat [Latin American drug cartels] like the al-Qaedas of the world.” Practically, this shift broadens the range of countermeasures available to the president. Strategically, it – and similar moves in the intervening months – underlies the shifting conception of illicit drug flows from a public health emergency to the new phase of the war on terror.
What the US Wants in Venezuela
The nexus of the Trump administration’s engagement in Latin America is Venezuela, where US strategy is part criminal interdiction of drug flows, part regime change, and part war on terror. Enmity toward Venezuela and its strongman dictator President Nicolas Maduro is not unique to the current president: successive administrations have viewed the Maduro government as illegitimate due to repeated election tampering, in addition to being a strategic rival in the region for its close relationships with Russia, Iran and other competitors. But the move to something close to open conflict with Venezuela under the auspices of drug interdiction is new, and underpinned by framing the war on drugs as a counterterror operation, demanding counterterrorism tactics and a War on Terror-like military operation.
In September, the US initiated its first in an ongoing series of airstrikes on vessels in the Caribbean alleged to be involved in cartel trafficking (as of Wednesday, the campaign had killed some 66 people in 16 airstrikes). Over the last few months, President Trump has repeatedly suggested that land strikes are next; directed the Pentagon over the summer to identify potential targets (news outlets last week reported on leaked targets, largely military installations and ports); authorized the CIA to undertake unspecified covert actions within Venezuela; massed US military assets in the Caribbean, like the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier strike group; and has reportedly increasingly entertained discussions with advisors around actively seeking to oust Maduro. While reports claimed President Trump was wavering on direct strikes this week, further escalation in some form is likely.
The majority of these actions are based upon the argument that, as president of Venezuela, Maduro is the kingpin of cartel activity there, an assessment many regional analysts dispute. Accordingly, some see President Trump’s ambition to counter illicit drug flows as a mere pretext to influence regime change in Venezuela and project power throughout Latin America. Indeed, Venezuela does not produce fentanyl and is not a part of the primary cocaine trafficking pipeline to the US, which goes through Colombia and the Pacific Ocean.
Disagreements around the validity of Maduro’s status as a cartel kingpin misunderstands US conception of “narco-terrorism.” The Trump administration’s “war on drugs” doctrine envisions disparate elements – the fentanyl trade, violent drug cartels, and autocratic anti-US governments – as part of one, interconnected threat to US national security. This broad conception grants significant leeway for US operations and targeting in the Latin American theater.
The Broader Anti-Drug Theater
While Venezuela is the proving ground for this new engagement, it is not the only site for brewing the war on narco-terrorism. The White House has repeatedly raised the possibility of using force in Mexico to counter drug trafficking there (prompting serious alarm in Mexico City). Most recently, leaked reports detailed a mission that would utilize drones (operated by US troops within Mexico) to strike drug cartel sites and members. President Sheinbaum denied these reports. Washington has also designated cartels in Mexico, Ecuador and Haiti, in addition to Venezuelan gangs, unlocking sanctions, asset freezes and, crucially, use-of-force options there as well. In early September, the US decertified Venezuela, Bolivia and Colombia for failing to meet counternarcotics obligations, a move that increases US leverage over aid, trade and security cooperation. The US did issue a waiver to Colombia, enabling the continued flow of aid but leaving the possibility of a further rebuke open.
Risks of the New War on Drugs
In initiating a new phase of US anti-drug strategy in Latin America, the Trump administration is seeking to more effectively disrupt flows of drugs, impose heightened costs on drug cartels, and put pressure on leaders, like Maduro, who are assessed to be enabling, directing or profiting from the flow of illicit drugs. The upside risks of these efforts are apparent: success would disempower a regional rival, reduce the flow of dangerous drugs into the US, and demonstrate American power in a historical sphere of influence that is increasingly in contention with great power competitors China and Russia.
Nonetheless, there are significant downside risks. The build-up in Venezuela is alarming to Caracas and even regional partners, like Mexico, who fear for their own territorial sovereignty if the precedent of direct US intervention is set. The prospect of the return of full-scale American interventionism in Latin America is widely unwelcome in the region. Currently, US policy around unseating Maduro seems to center on an effort to heighten internal pressure on the president in the hopes that the Venezuelan populace or, most importantly, military will withdraw support for the regime and remove Maduro. Further pressure on Maduro may also be a mixed bag. Maduro has long invoked US intervention in Latin America to buoy his image and contribute to anti-US sentiment, and continued attacks would lend credence to these arguments. Strikes inside Venezuela itself could further bolster Maduro’s projected image as the defender of Latin American sovereignty, as well as provide a pretext for going after political enemies for alleged collaboration with the US – already a common tactic.
There are economic consequences for instability in the Caribbean and South America as well. If the US does not de-escalate in the region, continued strikes could negatively impact fishing, shipping and tourism, especially if regional concerns continue to mount these strikes do not avoid civilians. Operations against the Maduro regime that result in disruption or stoppage of Venezuelan oil production could spike global oil prices by 10-20%, per sector analysis.
The new strategy in Latin America has exacerbated domestic divisions. The head of US Southern Command resigned in mid-October, just one year into a three-year appointment, in what some are seeing as a sign of discontent. Unclear legal authority has also sparked criticism and partisan backlash: the White House did not initially offer any interpretation of the legal framework for its boat strikes in the Caribbean, and the justification offered this week in a classified memo was called “thin” by Senate Democrats. Yesterday evening, the Senate narrowly voted down a war powers resolution that would have required the president seek approval from Congress before taking military action against Venezuela, with two Republicans breaking party lines.
The framing of the fight against drug cartels as a war on terror also potentially sets up a long-term framework for these operations. The Global War on Terrorism is often characterized as a “forever war” – one with no decisive conditions for its conclusion, and that the US is still fighting in various corners of the world. Establishing a new war on narco-terrorism risks the US once again becoming bogged down in protracted counterterrorism operations, with all the risks and opportunity costs (such as the long-desired pivot to China) of a long war.
The Trump administration is not unaware of the risks of a more forceful approach to countering security threats in its southern neighborhood, evidenced by President Trump’s recent statements expressing doubt about direct strikes on Venezuela. It is clear that the administration’s threat perception on drugs, crime and anti-Americanism emanating from Latin American is driving a revival of the Monroe Doctrine, or at least some new iteration of it. This new policy, which includes a war on narco-terrorists is still taking shape. The change in military posture and its legal basis, coupled with tensions from the new US trade policy that deploys tariffs as a coercive tool, is feeding uncertainty on US intentions and how neighboring states will respond, increasing risks of miscalculations.
