Overview
On October 19, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Samarkand, Uzbekistan, to attend the C5+1 Ministerial Meeting, a forum through which the US seeks to deepen engagement with the host nation and the other four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Secretary, who came with a delegation of roughly 200 American business leaders, emphasized that expanding the US' footprint in Central Asia is a "priority" as China expands its commercial ties and Russia maintains influence. A US strategy in Central Asia centered on development-for-minerals deals could help operationalize cooperative frameworks that have struggled to generate major commercial outcomes. Greater American involvement in mining, processing and supporting infrastructure would not only strengthen supply-chain resilience but also create new opportunities for businesses. Nevertheless, companies will have to contend with geopolitical competition, governance concerns, and infrastructure constraints that continue to shape the region's business environment.
Central Asia's Critical Minerals Landscape
The region possesses a diverse array of critical minerals and rare earth elements, with Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan leading regional expansions and diversification of mining, refining and transport. Global demand for critical minerals from the region is most closely tied to Kazakhstan, which has the most developed and internationally integrated mining sector of the five states. Kazakhstan possesses 25% of global uranium reserves, 95% of chromium reserves, and substantial copper, lithium and rare earth reserves. Most recently, Kazakhstan has sought to increase its exports of processed rare earths by launching domestic refining of antimony, an element used in flame retardants, batteries and semiconductors.
Transportation infrastructure is also more developed in Kazakhstan than in the other Central Asian states. The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, or Middle Corridor, is an emerging multimodal trade route linking East Asia and Europe through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. The route has become increasingly central to the region's export strategy to reduce transit through Russia and thereby sanctions exposure. Cargo volume along the Middle Corridor increased fivefold over the past seven years, rising from 0.8 million to 4.5 million tons. In 2023, 64% of Kazakhstan's uranium exports to Western markets were transported via the Middle Corridor.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan seeks to make its mining sector more accessible to international capital and aims to significantly expand annual copper and uranium exports to 500,000 and 10,000 tons, respectively, by 2030. Among Uzbekistan’s recent initiatives to further integrate into the global mining economy are the Uzbekistan National Investment Fund listing in London and its Tashkent International Financial Centre, a special economic zone. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have less diverse resource profiles by comparison, although Tajikistan possesses notable antimony reserves.
Shifts in the C5+1 Model Amid Rising Geopolitical Competition
The US has engaged Central Asian nations through C5+1 summits over the past decade on a variety of issues, but the focus has shifted toward critical mineral cooperation amid heightened great power competition and supply chain securitization. Established in November 2015, the C5+1 is a diplomatic channel designed to foster cooperation between the US and all Central Asian states in trade, development, and security, among other areas. Complementing this is the B5+1 Forum, the business counterpart through which the private sector can negotiate contracts on minerals, processing, logistics and services. Despite annual forums being held since 2016, progress in moving beyond diplomatic engagement toward concrete investment agreements and development projects has been incremental.
As US-Central Asia engagement slowly grew, Chinese investment surged. The Central Asian mining industry continues to predominantly export to Chinese and Russian markets. China is closely partnered with Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s state nuclear company, and remains a major destination for Kazakh uranium exports, importing roughly 30% of total shipments. Enhancing local processing capacity has been a central focus for all five states, which China addresses by leading construction of copper smelting, tungsten processing, and other non-ferrous metal facilities in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Central Asian businesses also maintain exposure to Russia. Mineral exports still rely on Soviet-era infrastructure, and while Middle Corridor trade is expanding, Kazakhstan continues to export minerals through Russia despite international sanctions. Between January and April 2026, seven million tons of Kazakhstani cargo, including ferrous metals, transited Russia. Railway, road, and port upgrades are financed by Chinese and Russian capital, further entrenching their influence.
To counter this, the US has leveraged several avenues to encourage investment and financing for regional transportation and infrastructure projects, seeking to translate dialogue into projects with measurable outcomes. In June, Ben Black, CEO of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), met with Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss increasing strategic investment in the region. The meetings resulted in the signing of a letter of interest to upgrade Kazakhstan's telecommunications infrastructure and the launch of a bilateral investment platform in Uzbekistan to support strategic projects, including those related to transport, logistics and critical minerals. Outside of DFC-led engagement, the Trump administration committed $201 million to the Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund to incentivize private investment along the Middle Corridor.
Central Asia's Emerging Role in Supply Chain Resilience
Central Asian mining could not only strengthen Washington's position relative to geopolitical competitors but also enhance supply chain resilience by providing an additional source of critical minerals if access to suppliers in other regions becomes constrained. The Trump administration's critical minerals strategy in Africa, for example, continues to face challenges, underscoring the importance of maintaining multiple suppliers for minerals and rare earths. Pervasive insecurity, corruption, and entrenchment of Chinese firms complicate US engagement in resource-rich African states, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Zambia and countries of the central Sahel.
Moreover, uncertainty surrounding the future trajectory of US-South Africa relations could place additional strain on US mineral supply chains. South Africa is the leading African exporter of minerals to the US and possesses several resources that overlap with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, including uranium, manganese and rare earths. While American mining ventures in the country continue, future opportunities are not guaranteed if Pretoria increasingly views Washington as hostile to its interests and moves closer to Beijing, potentially giving Chinese mining firms a competitive advantage over their American counterparts.
Challenges to Implementation and Implications for Business
Increased presence of American firms and greater investment in the Central Asian region presents opportunities for firms in mining, telecommunications, logistics and other sectors. As in Africa, supporting local processing initiatives may become an important element of US economic statecraft in Central Asia. Future DFC-backed projects could therefore support refineries, opening new opportunities for firms specializing in processing, logistics, energy infrastructure and related services.
Greater US financing of the Middle Corridor is also possible given the DFC's support for the Lobito Corridor, a major railway project in Africa connecting Congolese minerals to Atlantic markets. A similar approach in Central Asia could involve financing transportation infrastructure and logistics connected to the Middle Corridor, expanding export capacity while reducing dependence on Russian transit routes. However, roughly $21.4 billion in investment is required to make the corridor fully commercially viable, presenting major challenges to securing long-term financial commitments from governments and private firms.
Persistent public corruption may impact investor confidence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rank 38 and 31, respectively, on the Corruption Perceptions Index (0 to 100 score with 100 being least corrupt and 0 being most). The other three C5 countries score much lower. Regulatory reforms have been gradually implemented by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, improving investor confidence, but slower reform in the other three could impact the feasibility of cross-border infrastructure projects. Extensive trade relationships with Russia and prevalent alleged sanctions circumvention, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, raise exposure to secondary sanctions for foreign firms operating in the region. Other risks affecting the region's mining sector include dependence on aging Soviet-era infrastructure and growing water stress, with nearly 80% of Uzbekistan's water resources reliant on upstream inflows.
Despite these challenges, the Central Asian states have demonstrated a willingness to diversify their international partnerships, applying the "C5 Plus" framework to collectively negotiate with other external powers. In February 2026, Germany and the Central Asian states held the first C5+1 summit to deepen cooperation in raw materials, energy, and transport. Last year, Japan held its first leaders’ summit as part of its longstanding Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue, while the European Union upgraded its relationship with Central Asia to a strategic partnership. The growing use of C5 Plus diplomacy suggests that Central Asian states see value in engaging external partners collectively on economic issues with which they share common objectives. The normalization of collective diplomacy, in turn, could ease efforts by the US to align investment and financing initiatives with regional development priorities. This particularly benefits the mining sector, as expanding local processing and exports requires greater cross-border coordination on transportation networks and infrastructure. Moreover, the overlap in US, European and Japanese priorities regarding supply chain diversification create opportunities for joint investment.
