Overview
The first several months of the Trump administration have featured a return to the president’s signature whiplash policymaking. Washington’s flurry of new tariffs has seized global headlines and dominated agendas in the world’s capitals, leaving little room for more expansive strategic maneuvering. With attention largely trained on pressing issues like the looming trade war, ending the war in Ukraine, and the reignited Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, other lower-grade flashpoints escaping global focus risk boiling over—with impacts for the global economy including disrupted supply chains, conflict spillover, and a general increase in uncertainty.
Africa: Simmering Conflicts in the Congo and Sudan
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo risks further escalation and regional spillover. Fighting between the Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels escalated rapidly in early 2025 as the rebel group managed to seize major cities in the DRC’s east. Separately, political violence has persisted around the capital of Kinshasa following the hotly contested reelection of President Felix Thsisekedi in 2023, which international observers consider likely fraudulent. While the fighting has been marked by periods of calm—in an optimistic sign, the Congo and M23 announced a fragile ceasefire earlier this week following talks in Qatar—the conflict continues to hold significant potential for further escalation within the Congo or in the Great Lakes region more broadly, and both sides have not yet agreed on confidence-building measures toward a substantive agreement. The DRC already represents one of the largest and deadliest humanitarian crises in the world, and escalation encompassing the broader Great Lakes region would be reminiscent of the Second Congo War, which began in 1998 and is widely considered the world’s deadliest conflict after World War II, claiming between an estimated 3 to 5.5 million lives. If so, the conflict may elevate within the US foreign policy agenda: The DRC has requested increased security cooperation in exchange for exclusive mineral rights, which the US is reportedly considering.
In Sudan, the country’s civil war is entering its third year. The government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—which have battled for control of the country since failing to integrate forces after jointly overthrowing Omar al-Bashir in 2019 —are essentially stalemated in a conflict that has killed up to 150,000 since April 2023 and displaced about 14 million. International observers have continuously characterized the war as spiraling out of control. While the RSF has been partially pushed out of Khartoum, its control of western regions like Darfur and the declaration of a parallel government—cemented in Nairobi in February—risks a protracted stalemate or Libya-style split of the country into spheres of influence. If both sides maintain a warfighting posture, risks of a full state disintegration—bringing with it a regional refugee crisis and further haven for regional terrorist groups—looms, as does supply chain disruptions of natural resources like gold and gum arabic.
Asia: Myanmar’s Civil War, South China Sea Clashes, Kashmir Attacks, Tensions in the Korean Peninsula
Four years after Myanmar’s military coup, the civil war between the government and several rebel groups remains destructive—but not decisive. The junta-led government, which controls less than a quarter of Myanmar’s territory, teetered in mid-2024 before receiving the diplomatic support of China, which had wavered on supporting junta leader Min Aung Hlaing over damage to Myanmar-China trade. Today, the military is strengthened but decidedly on the back foot—armed groups control a majority of the country, including some of Myanmar’s crucial rare-earth mineral mines and, along with them, the country’s $1.4 billion rare-earth oxide trade with China. A major earthquake earlier this month shook up the status quo, with both the government and rebel groups still struggling to fully respond adequately to the quake, which has killed almost 4,000 and caused significant infrastructure damage. Perhaps most pressingly, the first general elections since the 2021 coup—which China demanded in return for supporting Hlaing—have been announced for some time in the next 10 months. While Beijing hopes that the polls will dilute Hlaing’s power and grant some legitimacy to the junta-led government, it is likely that they will only further whip up tensions in the divided country, providing new pretext for rebel gains or post-election violence in government-controlled areas.
Various hotspots in the South China Sea could spark escalation in the coming months, prominently including increased tensions around Taiwanese independence, or US-China maritime confrontation. A less-watched flashpoint that could emerge is a China-Philippines clash, borne of years of friction over disputed territory in the South China Sea. Clashes between Beijing and Manila have escalated in recent years as the Philippines has aligned itself more closely with the US and Chinese assertiveness in the region has increased. Last summer, a Chinese vessel and a Philippine supply ship collided near the hotly contested Second Thomas Shoal of the Spratly Islands, and just last week the Chinese navy “expelled” a Philippine warship around the Scarborough Shoal of the same island chain—just days before the US and the Philippines commenced the annual Balikatan—a major, three-week military exercise—the first in President Trump’s second term. A higher-intensity clash between Beijing and Manila, such as one resulting in Philippine casualties, could prompt Manila to invoke its defense pact with the US, drawing the US directly into a maritime conflict in the contested waterway, although it has refrained from doing so in the past despite multiple high-level altercations with Chinese vessels. The US would walk a difficult line between signaling continued commitment to the region while avoiding an escalatory spiral.
Longstanding India-Pakistan tensions in Kashmir could also erupt—and are doing so even now. While violence has declined since India revoked the region’s autonomous status in 2019, sporadic clashes persist. Just this week, gunmen killed at least twenty-six and injured seventeen civilians at the popular tourist destination of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir’s Resistance Front, an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility for the attack; in response, India closed its main crossing with Pakistan, suspended a critical water-sharing treaty in place since 1960, and accused Islamabad of facilitating terrorism. Pakistan denied links to the attack and responded with sweeping retaliatory measures, announcing plans to suspend the bilateral Simla Agreement of 1972, which normalized Indo-Pakistani relations following the 1971 war. Despite years of relative calm in Kashmir, the attack and subsequent steps—prominently the ending of the Simla Agreement, but also India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, which Pakistan characterized as “an act of war”—signals a sharp escalation and potentially foreshadows a resumption of open conflict in the region. The last major assault in 2019 sparked an air battle that stopped short of all-out war.
Finally, the ever-tense Korean peninsula could also be on track for heightened conflict this year. Last year saw North Korean leader Kim Jong Un setting out a new, more confrontational foreign policy as he abandoned the goal of peaceful reunification with South Korea and, at the end of 2024, signed a mutual defense pact with Russia that will send some 10,000 North Korean soldiers to fight in the Russia-Ukraine war and result in other undetermined benefits for Pyongyang. After a failed round of nuclear diplomacy under the last Trump administration, Kim has backed off nuclear tests—more calculating that deterrence has been established rather than any success by the international community in discouraging nuclearization—but has built up Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program and stepped-up naval exercises around the peninsula. US intelligence suggests that Putin may have promised Kim fighter jets or enhanced ballistic missile technology. In Seoul, uncertainty rules as South Koreans doubt the US’ commitment to the country’s defense, and upcoming elections appear likely to induct new leaders who are less interested in aligning with US regional policy. Analysts warn the coming year will see increased calls for Seoul to develop its own nuclear arsenal in self-defense, which could significantly raise the temperature in the region. With Pyongyang emboldened and even armed by a stronger partnership with Moscow and lines of communication between the two Koreas now cut off, the coming year will bring heightened risks of escalation and miscalculation.
Middle East: Ceasefire Collapse in Lebanon and a Power Vacuum in Syria
In Lebanon, two factors could lead to conflict reigniting in the near to medium term. First, Hizballah’s November ceasefire with Israel—reached after the armed group suffered significant losses in its war with Israel, including the death of longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah—has come under increasing strain as Israel has stepped up airstrikes in southern Lebanon and cemented its intention to maintain a physical presence there for the long term. While Israel’s efforts in southern Lebanon are ostensibly meant to prevent imminent security threats and Hizballah’s reconstitution, Jerusalem is increasingly emboldened to pursue maximalist goals in its regional operations given the support—whether tacit or simply due to a lack of rebuke—of a friendly White House eager to avoid entanglement in the Middle East. Second, the country teeters on the edge of a financial collapse and humanitarian crisis, a fragile position it has held for several years. Hizballah’s retreat from the Lebanese government, although it brings with it several positives (such as the potential availability of foreign funds including from Saudi Arabia, which has shunned the Hizballah-led government for years), has also created something of a power vacuum. As Lebanon’s government works to solidify its control over former Hizballah areas and pull the country out of a downward monetary spiral, heightened tensions with Israel could set off renewed conflict with what is left of Hizballah, further tipping the country towards failed state status and further spreading regional conflict.
Syria, too, is at a delicate moment. In the months following the ouster of dictator Bashar al-Assad, the interim government—led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, representative of the US-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—has struggled to consolidate its territorial control, assimilate various armed factions, and convince domestic and international audiences that an orderly transition to a democratic government is underway. There are significant roadblocks along the way: there have been various outbreaks of violence, including a days-long attack on the Alawite minority (to which the Assad dynasty belongs) that Sharaa failed to shut down quickly, either due to lack of control or a lack of desire to prevent violence against the group. The US is seriously considering beginning a drawdown of troops in the northeast, where a small counterterrorism force is tasked with preventing ISIS from reconstituting. Israel has stated its intent to occupy for the long term a large swath of southern Syria seized in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall. Syria has, for decades, served as a safe harbor for various terrorist groups and malign actors. With HTS and Sharaa struggling to assert internal control and convince both Syrians and regional actors of the legitimacy of its governance, the state is at high risk of slipping into open conflict once again, enabling the reconstitution of ISIS and bringing active conflict once again to its neighbors' borders.
