Overview
On October 6, the European Commission proposed reforms to the EU enlargement process and the EU itself to enable four new frontrunners to join the bloc: Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Specifically, the Commission calls for new Accession Treaty safeguards to hold candidates accountable to reforms and a new “gradual integration” approach allowing members to participate in EU initiatives, including potentially the Single Market, as reforms are completed and before Treaty ratification. EU member states have increasingly voiced support for increasing flexibility in the accession process but remain skeptical of surrendering their cherished vetoes over foreign policy decisions. Moreover, Ukraine – whose accession is driving much of the enlargement debate – disapproves of limiting its agricultural exports to the Single Market, creating a potential obstacle to the Accession Treaty safeguards. Failing to reform the accession process makes enlargement improbable, creating downside risks for the EU’s agency and investment conditions in candidate countries. On the upside, gradual integration of countries like Ukraine could unlock industrial capacity for the EU.
The Commission’s Envisioned Enlargement Reforms, Explained
Momentum for adding new members to the European Union is growing. In a tour of Western Balkan candidate countries in late September 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Montenegro could finish its EU reforms by early 2027, and Ukraine, Moldova, and Albania will be offered “roadmaps” to sequence the end of accession negotiations, possibly within a few years. Moreover, the Commission is currently drafting a final Accession Treaty for Montenegro, reviving the prospect of a new member state since Croatia joined in 2013. Potential enlargement to 31 member states could expand the bloc’s geopolitical weight and industrial capacity but risks deepening dysfunctional decision-making or creating economic convergence shocks. Confronting those problems, the Commission has released a Communication proposing internal EU reforms to prepare for a new enlargement wave, enabling a nimbler EU in a multipolar world order.
There are three envisaged initiatives that would grant the Commission greater speed and flexibility to close EU negotiations. First, as mentioned, are the roadmaps for the “most advanced” EU candidates. These roadmaps would provide an informal “anchor” to sequence a candidate’s alignment across 33 policy areas (i.e., the EU reform “chapters”) and improve synergy between the Commission and candidate governments. These timetables are not inherent requirements and can be flexibly adjusted. The first roadmaps are slated for reveal on October 28.
Second, the Commission proposes strengthening “safeguards” within new Accession Treaties. The idea here is to prevent prospective EU members from backsliding on their membership obligations. New members will not be allowed to veto some Council decisions on advancing new EU candidates (e.g., Montenegro cannot block Albania and extract bilateral concessions because it joins first). For three years after accession, the Commission also seeks to codify consequences if a member state backslides on internal market rules, migration management, and anti-corruption cooperation. To ensure compliance, the Commission proposes establishing a monitoring regime for candidates between signing and ratifying their Accession Treaty. In the event of “serious” democratic backsliding in the first 15 years of membership, the Commission proposes the right to suspend a new member’s voting rights and EU budget funds without undergoing the current unanimity process defined by Article 7 of the Maastricht Treaty. These safeguards intend to prevent a “Hungary” scenario, where a member state can buck its obligations with the protection of one other member.
Third, the Commission embraces “gradual integration,” meaning a candidate can participate in EU initiatives as they make relevant reforms, before ratification of Accession Treaties. The idea behind gradual integration is to institutionally “lock-in” accession and improve a candidate’s institutional capacity to comply with EU rules. Once all reform negotiations are provisionally closed, a member state could become a non-voting observer in the European Council, shadow a portfolio in the European Commission, and send an observer delegation to the European Parliament. Candidates could also possibly participate in some or all sectors in the Single Market. The Commission would decide a candidate’s readiness to participate in relevant initiatives based on annual “gradual integration dialogues,” presumably submitting a proposal for the approval of EU members.
In terms of institutional reform, the Commission proposes greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV). Under QMV, a measure must receive support from 55% of EU states comprising 65% of the bloc’s total population. The Commission recommends QMV particularly for foreign policy decisions, including intermediate EU accession steps, such as the opening and closing of chapters, while maintaining unanimous ratification for Accession Treaties. To assuage skeptics, the Commission points to several alternatives to national vetoes that already exist. These include enhanced cooperation (where at least nine EU members participate in their own initiatives, like the euro), the emergency brake provision (where the Council of Ministers escalates discussions to heads of government in the European Council), and constructive abstentions (where member states do not block an EU initiative but are not required to join, such as with the €90 billion Eurobonds-backed loan to Ukraine).
The Adoption Outlook
The Commission’s proposals are the first step into potentially transforming how the EU operates, but it is up to EU member states to decide what to do with them. The European Council meeting on October 15-16 will offer the first reactions as to which of the proposals are feasible.
Some initiatives do not require member state approval to begin. For example, the Commission can negotiate reform roadmaps and Accession Treaties on its own; only opening and closing chapters and ratifying Treaties require unanimity. Gradual integration must be approved by the Council of Ministers, but there already appears to be coalescence behind the idea; Germany and France, typically the leading enlargement skeptic, have jointly endorsed gradual integration and Accession Treaty safeguards in June white papers. Convincing EU member states to surrender their foreign policy vetoes is the least feasible request because changing voting procedure requires unanimity, but it is not unprecedented. To stabilize the EU’s enlargement of 12 member states from 2003-2007, several policy areas were devolved from unanimity to the legislative “co-decision” process between EU Councils of Ministers and the European Parliament, which required lengthy Treaty changes. No Treaty change is needed now to increase QMV.
One key challenge will be defining expectations for Ukraine, whose candidacy is driving the impetus behind enlargement reform. Unlocking Kyiv’s EU membership is widely viewed by the bloc as a strategic necessity to stabilize a political settlement to the war, promote economic recovery, and integrate European capital into Ukraine’s defense sector. However, admitting war-torn Ukraine, whose GDP per capita is about 32% of the EU average, could lead to capital flight, migration flows, and dumping of agricultural goods. The Commission, seeking to circumvent a veto from agrarian Poland and Romania, suggests discussion of “targeted arrangements” to “limit financial support and market access” to Ukraine’s agricultural products (i.e., possibly extending the current quota regime) and instead incentivize Ukrainian exports in legacy markets outside Europe. Kyiv has suggested it will not accept any restrictions on its Single Market participation. A compromise may be necessary because Kyiv’s political buy-in will be essential to convincing the bloc to loosen enlargement rules.
Another challenge is the EU’s budget negotiations, which could impact gradual integration’s feasibility. One relevant proposal for the EU budget is to simplify member state financial packages into single envelopes instead of various programs, thereby increasing the EU’s control over cash if member states or candidates backslide on their obligations. The Commission also envisions a Global Europe Fund with annual spending of roughly €28.5 billion to support EU candidates’ administrative capacity, infrastructure connectivity, and potential transition to full EU budgetary rights—thereby directly impacting the operational depth of “gradual integration.” As it stands, budget negotiations remain tense. Large recipients of agricultural funds, like France and Poland, disagree with the single envelope scheme, possibly undercutting the Commission’s leverage over potential candidates’ backsliding. Net contributors, like Germany and the Netherlands, argue that the budget should remain roughly the same size as 2020-2027, potentially undercutting available cash for the Global Europe Fund, although the Fund itself is relatively uncontroversial. Negotiations will likely remain difficult due to upcoming elections in Spain, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy.
The Risk Outlook
If enlargement rules do not change, EU enlargement would not be impossible but highly improbable. Without a credible path to membership, candidates may not take the reform process seriously. In the case of Ukraine, remaining outside of the EU could undermine a political settlement to the war. The EU would risk stranding potential investment opportunities in Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans, whose industrial stock remains ripe for integration with European industrial champions. On the upside, if gradual integration becomes a reality, the EU could witness Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine as new de facto participants in the Single Market within the next four to ten years, adding $274.35 billion in GDP and 43 million consumers. Concretely, that ensures EU standards across economic sectors, simplifying the compliance environment for industrial joint ventures, procurement bids, and energy infrastructure investment. It would also presume improved prevention and prosecution of corruption, ensuring a level playing field in new member states. The IMF predicts that increased market efficiencies in newer Central and Eastern European member states have improved their GDP per capita by an average of 30%, and existing EU members have increased their income per capita by 10%.
