Overview
Recent gains in Chinese economic influence across Africa highlight gaps in current US Africa strategy, indicating that the current level of engagement may be insufficient to fully counter Beijing’s presence. China’s strategy toward Africa has shifted from lending to investments in strategic industries, including through recent acquisition of a major lithium site in the DRC and opening general preferential access to China’s market to improve African exports. By contrast, the Trump administration’s “trade not aid” strategy has caused a rift in relations with certain African nations, who view the nature of US dealmaking as overly transactional. China’s foothold in the continent continues to pose substantial obstacles to US efforts to increase supply chain integration. Businesses will likely navigate greater economic uncertainty as great power competition intensifies. Without significant inroads in countering Chinese influence over key partners, US mining companies could struggle to expand operations in the region. Moreover, lagging US investment across Africa’s growing industries risks ceding more influence to Chinese companies.
The US Pivot to “Trade Not Aid”
The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) advocates for a transition from a “foreign aid paradigm” to one centered around investment and growth. Pursuant to this, the US made significant cuts to aid channeled through USAID and NGOs. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which grants eligible Sub-Saharan African nations duty-free access to American markets, also lapsed in September 2025 after 25 years of duty-free exports, reflecting the US’ new trade policy of reciprocity. Eventually, Congress reauthorized AGOA in February 2026, but only for one year.
Another policy at the forefront of US-Africa engagement is the American First Global Health Strategy (AFGHS). The AFGHS provides countries with direct US investment into their healthcare industry in exchange for the host country gradually increasing its own financial commitment to the sector. Twenty African nations have signed memoranda of understanding with the US. These bilateral health strategies are ostensibly meant to avoid overhead costs from old NGO implementation partners, but reportedly are interlinked with other bilateral initiatives like minerals access.
Under the US’ pivot to an investment-focused strategy, it has supported infrastructure projects through the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Arguably DFC’s most crucial project is a $533 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to upgrade the Lobito Corridor, a strategic railway that connects the DRC’s minerals sector to Angola’s Lobito port, opening Kinshasa to Atlantic trade. The project is one of Washington’s strongest countermeasures against Chinese-controlled logistics corridors, and the security of its mineral supply chains will depend in part on the project’s success.
The View from African Nations
The renewal of AGOA brought temporary relief to African economies impacted by “Liberation Day” tariffs and aid cuts, but the act was only extended for one year, reigniting uncertainty as to how the US intends to support sustainable, long-term growth in Africa. Nigeria and Kenya, traditionally close US partners, have sought to diversify their trade partnerships as a result. Notably, Nairobi finalized a trade deal with China, granting 98% of its exports duty-free access to China, despite US pressure to suspend negotiations, underscoring the challenge of reassuring African governments that Washington is the preferable trading partner.
Others have pushed for more intra-African trade to offset the cost of tariffs and lessen dependence on external partners. George Elombi, President of the African Export-Import Bank, called on African nations to expand intercontinental trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area. Diversification efforts have been taken due to concerns over US credibility, even if intra-African trade is not mutually exclusive with US objectives in the region, such as economic growth.
While many have signed health MOUs with the US, other countries, particularly those critical to the global critical minerals supply chain, have rejected the framework. Zambia, a major supplier of copper and cobalt, objected to the linkage of cooperation in healthcare to critical minerals access, viewing it as exploitative. Zimbabwe, the continent’s largest lithium producer, withdrew from negotiations for the same reason, and also argued the level of US access to its health data was intrusive.
Both cases illustrate the limits of a deal-based approach to healthcare. This is particularly consequential given Lusaka and Harare’s close relationship with China—ties with ideological roots dating back to the Cold War. Inadvertently alienating the two may provide Beijing with an opening, obstructing future US mineral deals. China’s equivalent to the AFGHS, the “Health Silk Road,” provides medical aid and construction of healthcare facilities, which has largely been well received by African governments, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Beijing’s Counter: Investment and Free Trade
Meanwhile, China has become further entrenched in the region. Historically, zero or low-interest loans with generous repayment terms were the primary means of engagement. African governments found this preferable to borrowing from the West, whose loans are often conditional upon factors such as protecting human rights. Through this, China became the primary backer of major energy and infrastructure projects. Angola, an emerging geopolitical player in the global energy market, received nearly 70% of its loans from China in 2024, reinforcing a longstanding strategic partnership that could be difficult for the US to penetrate. The partnership was emblematic of China’s infrastructure-for-natural resources model implemented across the continent; hence the strategy being dubbed the “Angola Model.”
Since the pandemic, however, the Angola Model became unsustainable as African countries continued to struggle with repayment and debt restructuring, prompting overall Chinese lending to sharply decline. Even so, China has preserved its access to Africa’s energy and mineral deposits by shifting strategies to the “Hunan Model,” named after Hunan Province, a major hub for China-Africa commercial ties. Under this model, China invests in greater industrial integration with Africa to solve labor, capital, and infrastructure bottlenecks to embolden commercial exchange. Foreign direct investment rose almost tenfold between 2003 and 2024. China has built or invested in one or more terminals at 61 port facilities in 30 African countries, cementing its position as the continent’s largest trading partner and elevating its overall standing in the region.
Moreover, just days after the renewal of AGOA, Beijing announced 53 African countries (excluding Eswatini due to its diplomatic ties with Taiwan) would be eligible for duty-free access to Chinese markets effective May 1. While this zero-tariff measure is expected to affect only a modest share of African exports to China—primarily agricultural goods—and is unlikely to address Africa’s widening trade deficit with China, it has been interpreted as a signal of goodwill by China to the international community that China’s trade approach is the opposite to the Trump administration’s more protectionist policies. Amid global market volatility stemming from the Iran war, it is also likely China will accelerate its transition to renewable energy, deepening its ties with lithium exporters in Africa and intensifying great power competition.
Another dimension of China’s strategic advantage in Africa is that it has invested across a broad range of sectors at a faster pace and in greater amounts than the US, especially in the tech and telecommunications sectors. More than $2 billion has been spent on Chinese facial recognition and surveillance technology in 11 countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda. In addition to building Africa’s new “smart cities,” China has led the continent’s AI development. China announced 20 digital infrastructure projects, many of which promote AI-driven modernization of agriculture, that will be in development until 2027. By contrast, US efforts to export AI to Africa are limited. Major American tech companies already have AI R&D initiatives in Kenya and other countries, but there is no coordinated approach from Washington to facilitate the expansion of these projects and leverage them to negotiate economic agreements.
Risks Remain in Current US Africa Strategy
Where US engagement stagnated, China has deepened ties with countries integral to the global economy and regional stability. As African nations try to hedge between great powers or increase alignment with one power over the other, businesses may contend with uncertain investment conditions and a turbulent security environment. The NSS identifies African economic development and expanded US trade and investment as central to advancing US-Africa relations, but some African governments view the current US model of engagement as inaccessible and unreliable. The short-term renewal of AGOA and continuation of Section 122 tariffs may disincentivize companies from committing long-term investments into African countries and deter American manufacturers from diversifying their supply chains. By contrast, China’s centrally coordinated trade and investment model appears relatively predictable due to its long-term strategic orientation, but its implementation has become increasingly adaptive, reflecting shifts in geopolitical and economic conditions.
Furthermore, the outsized presence of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa poses substantial barriers to entry for US companies. Chinese SOEs dominate strategic sectors and remain the preferred partner due to the speed and scale at which they can complete roads, ports, and railways. Additionally, central to American and Chinese economic interests is critical minerals access, with Guinea and Namibia increasingly becoming flashpoints of great power competition for their bauxite and uranium deposits, respectively. This simultaneously creates opportunities to secure mining contracts but also the risk of Chinese companies crowding out competing Western investment. Beyond physical infrastructure, there remains a minimal US presence in Africa’s digital sphere, though this could change as the Trump administration seeks new avenues to expand its influence on the continent. The DFC may support greater Western investment into Africa’s tech industries, but outpacing Chinese competitors will be an uphill battle.
