Overview
Cheap and commercially available drones are being widely adopted by organized crime groups in Latin America to enhance their illicit activities. Rapid innovation by cartels and guerrilla groups is creating an ever-shifting landscape of threats, posing risks to public security and territorial integrity. Drones in the price range of $600-$1200 USD are retrofitted with explosives, surveillance equipment or narcotics trafficking payloads, giving gangs unprecedented capabilities. The weaponization of these technologies is accelerating: while 670 instances of weaponized drone events have been recorded in Latin America in the past eight years, more than 72% of these events occurred between January 1, 2025, and August 21, 2026.
As regional governments rush to adapt, new risks are emerging for citizens and businesses from the proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), including collateral damage in populated urban areas and new risks to supply chains and fixed infrastructure as criminal capacities evolve. These risks are even more prevalent in contexts where state capacity is already weak, are compounded by the increasing use of drones by private, non-state actors with limited regulatory oversight, and raise the need for updated regional risk assessments and protocols. While many uncertainties remain, it is already clear that aerial conflict in Latin America has reached a point of no return, as regional governments increasingly look to import more advanced capabilities from the US and abroad.
Aerial Innovation Expands Capabilities of Organized Crime
Drones are increasingly being used by organized criminal groups across the region in various capacities. In Mexico, drone use by cartels was initially adopted to facilitate drug trafficking by carrying narcotics. This supplements other more established on-the-ground trafficking methods but only allows for limited payload sizes in kilograms rather than tons. Mexican cartels have also rapidly innovated broader uses for drones, outpacing the government response due to their lack of institutional constraints. Drones have been increasingly weaponized, especially in western Mexico where groups like the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) use them to target civilians in rival territory. Beyond kinetic attacks, they are using the technology for reconnaissance and counter-UAS to target rival drone operations. Further, criminal groups are embedding individuals in conflict zones like Ukraine to gain firsthand training and knowledge transfer of battlefield innovations.
Criminal groups in Brazil, which largely emerged as prison gangs that have expanded into sophisticated transnational operations, have also adopted new uses for drones. Prison smuggling is one such use case; over the past decade, Brazilian authorities have reported drones being used to drop narcotics and cellphones into prison facilities. In Rio Grande do Sul, police confiscated 43 drones in 2019 that were involved in prison smuggling operations, but failed to identify the group responsible. By their nature of being unmanned, this technology reduces the risk of identification for criminals, a major advantage despite their limited payload capacity. In addition to prison smuggling, drones in Brazil are increasingly used in favelas for surveillance, tracking of law enforcement presence, and kinetic attacks, posing a high risk of civilian collateral damage. During Rio de Janeiro’s landmark 2025 favela raid under Operação Contenção (Operation Containment), the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) deployed drones equipped with improvised explosives against more than 2,500 security personnel in what became the deadliest police operation in the city’s history.
In Colombia, drones are expanding armed groups’ ability to maintain territorial control by allowing them to project power across wider terrain. By adopting recent innovations from the battlefield in Ukraine, like modifying commercial drones with more lethal capabilities, guerrilla groups like the ELN and FARC dissident factions are now more effectively able to attack security forces and challenge the Colombian government’s authority in remote regions; drone activity is highly concentrated in the coca-growing Cauca region in Colombia’s southwest and on the border with Venezuela. Colombia in particular is becoming a testing ground for cutting edge technologies, including fiber-optic-guided munitions that are resilient to jamming, night-vision drones, thermal imaging and 3D-printed components. Guerrillas also employ swarm attacks by hovering drones in high quantities to undermine public confidence in government control and psychologically intimidate citizens. These aerial capabilities, which not long ago were out of reach to non-state actors, are redefining the reality of asymmetric warfare in Colombia’s longstanding struggle against guerrillas.
Regional Governments Ramping Up Responses to Evolving Threats
USSOUTHCOM established its Autonomous Warfare Command in April, aimed at employing unmanned systems to counter threats through collaboration with regional partners. Latin American governments are now collaborating with the US and each other to adapt to the evolving security environment. One prime example is Operation Aguila Alta, a bilateral anti-drone operation launched on August 31, 2026, between the US and Mexican governments on their shared border between San Diego and Tijuana. Prior to announcing the operation, USSOUTHCOM reported intercepting more than 300 UASs in 2026. Putting that in perspective, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detected over 42,000 near-border UAS flights in fiscal year 2025 and over 37,000 in fiscal year 2026.
Brazil and Colombia have both launched similar initiatives of their own. After a Colombian army battalion was attacked by the ELN with drones, killing 7 soldiers, Colombia’s defense ministry announced the launch of the Escudo Nacional Antidrones (National Anti-Drone Shield) program worth $1.68 billion, which began early this year to implement warning centers, interceptors, and a centralized command-and-control platform. In May, Brazil launched the Coordenadoria de Operações com Aeronaves Não Tripuladas (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations Coordination Unit) under the civil police, expanding drone use for intelligence gathering operations.
Across the region, there is growing demand for imports of autonomous aerial technology. In August, a US statement of intent gave Mexico’s SEDENA access to the US digital drone marketplace (this has also been extended to Argentina and Panama). Colombia is currently in talks with an Indian supplier for the procurement of anti-drone systems, while expanding security cooperation with the US under the recently elected administration. Colombian forces participated in the Scarlet Dragon exercises in the US in September, which included a focus on drone and counter-drone operations. This month, the US moved MQ-9 Reaper drones from Africa to Colombia and Ecuador. MQ-9s are advanced UAVs worth up to $50 million. A quarter of the US fleet has been destroyed in the war with Iran, making the transfer to Latin America a reflection of the US administration’s high prioritization of Latin America.
Emerging Risks
As governments craft institutional responses to the rapidly shifting security landscape, legal frameworks are also adapting. In the US, the Department of Homeland Security approved Counter-UAS authorities for CBP under 6 U.S. Code § 124n. This approval covers anti-drone operations along the entire US-Mexico border and an area extending 100 miles inland from the border. Mexico has also adapted new legal frameworks around drone use, with the aim of directly targeting “droneros.” Federal penalties in Mexico for illegal drone operations were strengthened in 2024 to include prison sentences of up to 10-20 years. However, the lack of sufficiently comprehensive legal frameworks continues to hinder governments’ abilities to counteract emerging aerial threats.
In this shifting risk environment, criminal groups are continuously innovating new and more effective technologies. Currently, cartels are largely relying on commercially available drones that they then modify for trafficking or lethal strikes. Cartels are increasing the effectiveness of this technology by expanding payload sizes and resilience to counter-drone systems. They are also diversifying their designs by converting less conventional types of drones, including large agricultural drones. More recent innovations include first-person view (FPV) one-way attack drones and improved cross-border countersurveillance capabilities.
With organized crime and regional governments racing to expand aerial capabilities in the region, there is a growing risk of civilian casualties. In Haiti, where armed gangs now control much of the capital, Port-au-Prince, 1,243 people were killed by drone strikes across 141 operations over an 11-month period last year. Rights groups reported numerous victims in these strikes who were not known to be members of criminal groups, including children. Drone strikes against Haitian gangs are not only being conducted by government forces, but also increasingly by private contractors, in which cases the legality of their use is even less clear.
As global conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East continue to push the boundaries of cheap drone proliferation, these weapons will find demand from both governments and gangs in the Western Hemisphere. Battlefield knowledge is also being increasingly exported to new conflict zones, serving as a catalyst for instability across the globe, but especially in Latin American regions where longstanding conflict zones are petri dishes for drone innovation.
For businesses, drone proliferation creates new vulnerabilities for supply chains and shipments of valuable goods, as criminal hijacking operations are supplemented by expanded surveillance and cargo tracking capabilities. Companies with fixed assets that are targets for disruption will require updated security assessments for operations in high-risk areas, as well as increased investment in security protocols, enhanced monitoring systems, and crisis response frameworks.
