Overview
Tehran’s execution of strikes against Gulf countries in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes has sent shockwaves throughout the region—Iran has targeted not only US military bases but also civilian infrastructure, including repeated attacks on Saudi’s largest oil refinery, moving significantly beyond Iran’s typical retaliatory tactics. As attacks mount, Pakistan has stepped up to remind Iran that Riyadh is not solely reliant on its security partnership with Washington. Under the strategic mutual defense agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year, aggression against one will be treated as an act of aggression against both. While the pact does not automatically commit Islamabad to direct military intervention, it adds a new layer to Saudi’s deterrence strategy beyond the traditional US security umbrella. This conflict, however, forces Pakistan to navigate a delicate balance between honoring its commitments to Riyadh and avoiding further instability along its already volatile western border.
Saudi-Pakistan Defense Relations
The Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense agreement, signed in September 2025, formalized decades of security and defense cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan has long stationed forces in Saudi Arabia for training, advisory, and security purposes, including the deployment of approximately 15,000 personnel to defend Saudi territory during the Iran-Iraq War and about 13,000 personnel during the First Gulf War. In turn, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly provided Pakistan with substantial financial support to aid Pakistan’s fragile economy—such as direct cash deposits, deferred oil payments, and major long-term investments—making Riyadh one of Islamabad’s key sources of external financing. Moreover, Saudi Arabia hosts the largest Pakistani diaspora community in the world (over 2.5 million), making Pakistani expats in the Kingdom the largest source of remittances to Pakistan and an important contributor to Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure and development.
The September defense agreement was reportedly the result of years of discussion, driven by both countries’ desire to diversify their defense partnerships amid pressing regional threats and growing doubts about Washington’s security commitments. For Saudi Arabia, Iran remains its primary security challenge, as it seeks regional dominance over Riyadh and continues to employ proxy groups to carry out attacks on Saudi interests. Riyadh has historically viewed the US as its main security guarantor; however, Washington’s shifting strategic focus toward the Asia-Pacific region and its muted response to Iran-linked Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, as well as the Iranian and Israeli strikes on Qatar last year, have increasingly cast doubt on US reliability in the region. Shortly after Israel’s airstrike on a Hamas meeting in downtown Doha in September 2025, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) activated its joint defense mechanism, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. However, this move was widely seen as a symbolic display of regional solidarity rather than a genuine call to action.
For Pakistan, the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021 following US troop withdrawal created a significant source of instability along its western border. Attacks on Pakistani soil by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—which uses Afghanistan as a safe haven—have surged since Taliban seized power in Kabul, prompting Pakistan late last month to declare an open war against the Afghan Taliban government. Moreover, the suspension of most US military aid to Pakistan allocated to support Pakistan’s counterterrorism capabilities since 2018 has further deepened Islamabad’s sense of separation from American security support, reinforcing its need to strengthen alternative defense relationships. Growing instability on its western border adds to Pakistan’s long-running tensions with neighboring India, which erupted last May into the most intense military crisis between the two in decades.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s mutual defense pact reflects a shift in regional security thinking, as the two pursue layered partnerships to address growing threats. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it aims to deepen defense cooperation and strengthen joint deterrence, with both sides pledging to treat “any aggression” against one as aggression against both. The scope of what qualifies as “any aggression” remains unclear, as is whether the agreement places Saudi Arabia under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. Regardless, the pact further anchors Saudi defense ties to a regional nuclear power and reduces overreliance on a single external guarantor. For Pakistan, it enhances its geopolitical relevance within the GCC, where it already maintains several defense cooperation arrangements. Importantly, it is not designed to supplant Washington’s role in Saudi Arabia’s defense framework, but rather to reduce Riyadh’s dependence on a single guarantor.
Escalation Pathways: From Symbolic Support to Intervention
As Iran continues launching barrages of attacks across the region in retaliation for the joint US-Israeli operation, a senior Pakistani official on Tuesday made the first public acknowledgment that the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense agreement could apply to the ongoing war with Iran. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated Islamabad had warned Tehran over the weekend not to attack Saudi Arabia, citing the defense pact between the two countries. In response, Dar said, Iran sought assurances Saudi territory would not be used as a launchpad for attacks against it—which Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had already given in late January, just as President Trump began beating the war drums (albeit before widespread Iranian retaliation in the Gulf was envisioned).
One escalation pathway currently at play is an offramp through reinforced deterrence. Unlike the UAE—which has borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation in the Gulf—Saudi Arabia has faced fewer missile and drone attacks. Dar has attributed this lighter bombardment to the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense agreement. In this view, the pact forces Tehran to consider the risk of provoking conflict on its eastern border with Pakistan, dramatically increasing the potential costs of any attack on Saudi Arabia. However, Riyadh has still suffered significant strikes on critical infrastructure with both domestic and global ramifications, including the Prince Sultan Air Base, the US embassy, and Aramco’s Ras Tanura oil refinery. Despite these attacks, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly called for dialogue with Tehran, and Saudi officials have reportedly urged Gulf allies to avoid escalatory steps that could trigger a broader, prolonged conflict—one that might also draw in Iran’s proxy groups. Should Iranian strikes on Riyadh remain comparatively limited, Pakistan is unlikely to provide more than its current symbolic support and with the possibility of expanding current intelligence sharing mechanisms, while avoiding direct kinetic action involvement.
The second path involves Pakistan’s indirect involvement. Frustration is mounting across the region as Iranian attacks continue, and concerns are growing that hostilities could spiral into another protracted “forever war” in the Middle East. While GCC members have yet to alter their official defense postures, they have repeatedly stated they reserve the right to respond to any violation of their sovereignty. Riyadh has declared it may take “all necessary measures,” including military action, to defend itself. Taken together, these statements suggest that if current trends persist, kinetic action—whether coordinated among the GCC states or unilaterally by Riyadh—remains a distinct possibility. Such a move would certainly test the limits of Islamabad’s security commitments to Saudi Arabia. It could be drawn into providing direct but limited support, such as air defenses, logistics, and naval deployments to support Riyadh’s offensive without complete entanglement.
A third possible path to escalation would involve direct Pakistani intervention if an Iranian attack were to cause a major disruption to Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure—particularly damage that severely reduces refinery capacity over the long term or inflicts significant financial losses, undermining Saudi economic stability. In such a scenario, Islamabad might feel compelled to intervene militarily to safeguard Saudi economic resilience and, by extension, Pakistan’s own financial security. For Pakistan, direct military intervention would require it to weigh its national interests against those of Saudi Arabia first, likely only drawing Pakistan in if kinetic action aligns with Islamabad’s priorities. For example, despite pressure from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for Pakistan to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in April 2015, Pakistan’s parliament turned it down and instead focused on diplomacy and balancing relations with Tehran.
Domestic Constraints and Broader Implications
Despite the ambiguous implications of the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense agreement, Pakistan’s willingness to activate combat for Riyadh against Iran remains limited, though it is arguably more plausible than in previous years. Beyond its desire to avoid entanglement in a regional war, Islamabad faces significant domestic constraints. The economy continues to struggle with weak regulatory mechanisms, modest growth, high unemployment, and investor reluctance. Entering a new conflict would further strain finances and military resources, especially as Pakistan is already engaged in operations against the Afghan Taliban. Fighting on two fronts while cash-strapped would leave Pakistan dangerously exposed and undermine its domestic stability.
Even without direct intervention, any spillover from the Iran conflict into Pakistan’s western Balochistan province could fuel separatists, further jeopardizing multi-billion-dollar projects in the province such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Reko Diq. Sectarian dynamics add another layer of sensitivity: roughly 20% of Pakistan’s population are Shi’a Muslims. Following the US-Israeli strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, nationwide mourning for Ayatollah Khamenei quickly turned into unrest, including attacks on US embassies and the burning of a UN office. Taking a decisive side in this conflict could provoke further unrest, renew tensions with another neighbor, and destabilize Pakistan’s already fragile political landscape.
The Saudi-Pakistan defense pact adds a new layer to regional escalation dynamics. By expanding deterrence networks, it brings more actors into the security equation but also increases the risk of miscalculation—potentially prompting Tehran to adopt a preemptive posture toward Islamabad even if Pakistan is not directly involved in the conflict. The agreement broadens Pakistan’s exposure to potential wartime crises, which could further erode investor confidence. At the same time, Pakistan’s growing and cost-effective defense industry could benefit from strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia. The pact may lead to increased procurement, training contracts, joint ventures, and enhanced credibility in global defense markets—opening opportunities across the GCC and beyond. Ultimately, how Islamabad and Riyadh define the scope and limits of their cooperation will be a pivotal test of Pakistan’s ability to position itself as a significant player in Middle Eastern and wider regional security architecture.
