Overview
Qatar, and the global LNG trade, have been among the biggest losers of the ongoing US-Iran war and battle for the Strait of Hormuz. State-owned QatarEnergy previously supplied about a fifth of the world’s LNG as the world’s second-largest producer (after the US), but exports dropped to virtually zero in the immediate aftermath of the war. Although transits have rebounded somewhat, the International Energy Agency recently projected that global LNG supply will decrease by 3% in 2026, the largest-ever drop on record. With transits through the Strait still contested and, even more importantly, large-scale damage to Qatari infrastructure still unrepaired, Doha remains the most exposed of any Gulf country to long-term disruption to its main exports. With a political solution in the Strait of Hormuz nowhere on the horizon, Qatar and LNG customers are exposed to long-term supply disruptions and the ultimate reorganization of the LNG market towards other suppliers or alternative fuel sources, like coal or renewables.
Damage to Qatar’s LNG Exports: Impacts for Doha and Global Energy Markets
“Strait-locked” Qatar has been among the hardest-hit Arab Gulf energy exporters. Prior to the onset of the conflict, Qatar exported about 18.7% of global LNG supplies, just ahead of Australia and behind the US, which tops the charts at 25.3% of global supplies. Since the war began, Qatari exports dropped to nearly zero (although shipments to Kuwait continued even in the immediate aftermath), and Qatar declared force majeure on the majority of its long-term supply contracts. While LNG traffic has rebounded somewhat as the US has asserted more control of the southern Strait of Hormuz route, the increase has been modest for Doha – transits reached the highest level since the war began last month at only 30% of Qatar’s prewar transit volume.
The difficulties of transporting LNG have compounded the access issues faced by all Gulf energy producers. Unlike crude oil, which is relatively easy to transport, LNG must be transported via specialized tankers equipped with cryogenic tanks capable of keeping LNG in a liquid state at approximately -162 °C. Because these vessels are more expensive and complex than a typical crude container vessel, Qatar has been more reluctant to risk damages in Hormuz runs. While Qatar has executed ship-to-ship transfers – an increasingly popular method of disrupting Iranian targeting by obscuring vessels’ origins – LNG transfers are much more complicated than crude transfers, and Qatar delayed Strait transit attempts longer than its crude-exporting neighbors.
Beyond blocked traffic in Hormuz, physical damage to Qatar’s LNG infrastructure is an even bigger part of the disruption. In March, Iranian strikes targeting QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, its primary LNG facility, knocked out 17% of Qatar’s export capacity. The unprecedented strikes damaged two of Qatar's 14 LNG trains (independent liquefaction production units) and one of its two gas-to-liquids facilities. The damage reportedly followed Qatari attempts to deal with Iran; Doha offered Tehran an indefinite pause on LNG exports if Iran would pledge not to strike LNG infrastructure.
The damage to Doha and to global energy markets has been significant. The International Energy Agency recently projected that global LNG supply will decrease by 3% in 2026 – a seemingly small dip, but nonetheless the largest-ever drop since recording began. In July, Qatari officials estimated that the destruction of the LNG plants thus far would cost QatarEnergy $20 billion per year in lost sales and that the affected units had cost $26 billion to build. Qatar has estimated that force majeure on some long-term supply contracts could extend up to five years due to decreased output from Ras Laffan damage, casting a disruption shadow likely much longer than the war itself. Earlier this month, Polish energy major Orlen became the first customer to cancel its long-term Qatari contract after months of force majeure.
The supply crisis has mostly impacted import-dependent Europe and Asia; immediately following the war, prices spiked to roughly 200% over prewar levels. While prices have somewhat normalized (in large part due to surging US capacity and increased reliance on coal in Asia), global supply remains critically constrained, and Europe is vulnerable ahead of winter with a ban on Russian LNG coming into force in January.
Long-Term Disruption and Energy Market Reorganization
Damage to Qatar’s LNG export industry, and dim prospects for a durable political solution to the Middle Eastern conflict in the near-term, have broad implications for Qatar and the global energy market. In addition to damaging existing production capacity, the regional conflict has derailed the operation of QatarEnergy's North Field East project. The major program expansion is intended to double Qatar’s existing export capacity to 142 million tons per annum (mtpa). The project was intended to reinforce Qatar’s position as the world’s second-largest supplier and, if implemented this year, would have helped drive down global LNG prices by 2027 by tipping the market into oversupply (an outcome eagerly anticipated by LNG consumers). While the first LNG train will be ready to start operation this month – in line with the prewar schedule – its impact, with transits through the Strait still constrained, will be limited.
The question for Qatar – and for LNG consumers – is now whether the anticipated supply glut from the North Field East project will simply be delayed, or whether markets will need to reorganize away from Doha in the long term. Orlen’s cancellation earlier this month is seen as a sign by some that a reorganization is already happening. Other analysts assess protracted supply issues are unlikely to trigger contract cancellations, but that a wave of contract renegotiations is possible. Prior to war, Qatar had been relatively slow to ink new agreements due to Qatar’s rigid, long-term commitments and restrictions on resale to other markets. That rigidity was a difficult sell amid the shifting market and uncertainty of future demand prior to the war, and will only become more difficult. Either way, Qatar’s postwar export strategy will be significantly different.
If a relatively peaceful status quo is reached in the near term and Qatar is able to avoid new damage to its LNG infrastructure and get most of its prewar exports back to market, disruptions and costs for Doha could be limited. QatarEnergy retains a market advantage as an exceptionally low-cost producer with a massive vessel fleet and significant state policy backing.
If disruptions persist or worsen, however, supply shocks could exacerbate woes for customers and ultimately degrade Qatar’s position in the global energy market. Non-Qatari producers are already attempting to overtake Qatar’s position, with producers like Canada, Mozambique, Indonesia and others entering the market in force, in addition to the US dramatically ramping up production. In 2027 alone, approximately 52 mtpa of new US capacity is expected to enter the market (just 20 mtpa short of Qatar’s total annual production in the prewar period).
LNG importers’ growing reliance on coal is a sign that the market is already shifting. In Bangladesh, once a poster child for growing LNG demand, coal-fired electricity generation overtook gas-fired generation for the first time this summer. Growth in renewables and nuclear has also weakened the case for LNG. All three alternative energy sources are seen as more resistant to geopolitical shocks than LNG, lowering immediate appetite for long-term contracts. The global energy market will likely adapt to the loss of Qatari LNG (as it adapted to the loss or diversion of Libyan, Yemeni and, more recently, Russian LNG). But for Doha, for which the energy sector drives over 70% of government revenue, the market reorganization could be more existential.