Overview
In two weeks, Israelis will vote in a deeply consequential election amid prolonged regional war, rising domestic divisions, and a messy electoral map. Ahead of the October 27 vote, recent polls show a near-tie. Neither the Netanyahu bloc nor the opposition reliably reaches the 61 of 120 Knesset seats needed for a coalition, so the bargaining after election day may matter more than the vote itself. The opposition’s security policy differs little from Netanyahu’s, and the election is not a referendum on the country’s broader security posture. Instead, it centers on domestic accountability and governance. A change of government would be most felt domestically, touching issues like the military draft for Ultra-Orthodox men, the judiciary’s role, and the tone and mechanics of post-war Gaza diplomacy. The outcome will also impact Israel's global diplomatic and economic relationships, intensifying or ameliorating reputational and regulatory risks amid rising European condemnation and US tensions at the leadership level.
The State of the Race
Polls ahead of the upcoming elections show a fractured electoral map. The latest N12 News poll puts the Netanyahu bloc at 49 seats, opposition parties at 54, and Arab parties at 13. Both main blocs fall short of 61, which leaves the Arab parties, whom neither side treats as a straightforward coalition partner, holding the balance.
Likud, Netanyahu’s party, remains competitive, but has fallen from 32 seats in the November 2022 elections to roughly 20 today. The opposition is divided among several leaders. Gadi Eisenkot, the former IDF chief of staff, has surged, and his Yashar party now polls at 23 seats. Pollsters disagree on whether he has peaked, so any single survey deserves caution. Polls indicate only 2% of voters remain undecided.
The rest of the map matters as much as the frontrunners:
- Right and religious bloc: Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir’s ultranationalist Otzma Yehudit at 8 seats, Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism at 6, and the Ultra-Orthodox parties: Shas at 8 and United Torah Judaism at 7.
- Opposition: Former prime minister Naftali Bennett’s Beyachad at 13 seats, Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu at 9, and Yair Golan’s Democrats also at 9.
- Arab parties: The Joint List at 8 seats and Ra’am at 5.
- Threshold risk: Several new parties hover near the 3.25% threshold for entry into the Knesset, most notably the right-nationalist Amcha Israel and the centrist Reservist-Economy party. Whether they cross it could swing the balance by several seats.
On the question of prime minister selection, Eisenkot is the opposition’s strongest head-to-head candidate against Netanyahu. The N12 News poll shows him leading Netanyahu 43% to 35%, but a personal lead is not a parliamentary majority.
Bennett and Lieberman have both said they will not govern with Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s camp, meanwhile, has made Eisenkot’s supposed dependence on Arab votes a campaign theme. The government also tried to bar Arab parties from running, an attempt that the Supreme Court unanimously overturned. The constraint on Eisenkot is nonetheless real: recent polling finds that a majority of Israeli Jews oppose including an Arab party in the government.
The Shadow of the War
This is Israel’s first election since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the third anniversary has shaped the campaign’s final stretch – not to mention the shadows of the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. Major fighting has largely subsided: imperfect ceasefires that are acceptable to Israel hold in Gaza and Lebanon, and Jerusalem’s part in open hostilities with Iran has ended. Voters are therefore judging a record, not reacting to an emergency.
That cuts both ways. Netanyahu can present himself as the leader who fought Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, and he retains a reputation as a security-first politician. His vulnerabilities are just as real: the failure to prevent the Hamas attack, his ongoing corruption trial, strains with the Trump administration, his dependence on far-right partners, and his handling of the Iran war.
The opposition’s central argument is accountability for Netanyahu. His rivals hold the government politically responsible for October 7 and demand a state commission of inquiry chaired by a Supreme Court justice. Eisenkot, who lost a son and a nephew in Gaza, is campaigning on the charge that Netanyahu was warned of a possible attack and failed to protect Israelis. Netanyahu has tried to shift blame to the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
The domestic strains of the war are equally important. The Supreme Court struck down the old exemption framework for Ultra-Orthodox conscription, a longtime political third rail. By delaying implementing the court’s ruling, the coalition suffered real political damage, spawning new right-wing parties that drew off voters angry about the exemption. Likud has adjusted its message to recapture these voters: it now calls for greater Haredi, or ultra-Orthodox, enlistment and has opened the door to legal consequences for draft evaders, a notable shift for a party that relies on Haredi parties to govern. Analysts point out that this is a tactical move by Likud ahead of the elections, but that if it remains in power, this position will not hold.
What Would Change Under Each Frontrunner?
A Netanyahu-led government would mean continuity, probably with added pressure from the right. In practice, that means Netanyahu-style security policy and rejection of a Palestinian state under current conditions. On the domestic front, Justice Minister Levin’s effort to weaken the courts’ influence over judicial appointments would very likely continue. The coalition would again depend on the Ultra-Orthodox parties, whose draft demands collide with Likud’s new rhetoric. Whatever Likud’s platform says, coalition talks would determine actual Haredi draft policy. Netanyahu has also resisted a judge-led inquiry into October 7 in favor of a political commission, so an independent investigation is unlikely under him.
Leading opposition figures do not fundamentally disagree with Netanyahu on foreign and security policy, and none oppose Israel’s wars in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran. A change of government would show up chiefly in the courts, the draft, the October 7 inquiry, and relations with Washington and the mediators. An Eisenkot-led government would change style and process more than strategy. He has ruled out a Palestinian state during his premiership and, like Netanyahu, would maintain significant security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.
The differences are narrower but real. On Gaza, Eisenkot is prepared to accept the spirit of the Trump framework, in which partial Hamas disarmament unlocks partial reconstruction, rather than demanding full disarmament first. He also promises closer engagement with mediators and greater receptiveness to international criticism, though without a major change in Gaza strategy. On Iran, he has floated a US-enforced “kill zone” around Iran’s remaining enriched uranium and would insist on keeping the freedom to strike strategic threats, even under any agreement with Syria. Domestically, military service and an October 7 inquiry are core planks, and he would be unlikely to depend on the Ultra-Orthodox parties.
What to Watch
Polls deserve skepticism, especially in this cycle. Three variables could matter more than any survey:
- Turnout: It is unclear whose get-out-the-vote operation will prove more effective, among Jewish and Arab voters alike.
- The threshold: With several small parties near 3.25%, any party falling short, on either the left or the right, could flip the outcome.
- Coalition arithmetic: The Arab parties’ role, and the Jewish parties’ stated red lines, will shape which coalitions are possible.
Where This Leaves Us
The election could be best understood not as a verdict on Israel’s security posture, which both camps largely share, but as a referendum on accountability and governance. The most likely outcome is not a clean win but a drawn-out coalition-building, in which red lines, such as Bennett’s and Lieberman’s refusal to serve under Netanyahu or the Jewish public’s resistance to Arab-party participation, count for more than headline seat totals. If those constraints prove unbreakable, a deadlock and new elections in spring 2027 are a genuine possibility. Whoever finally governs, the contest over the draft, the judiciary, and the October 7 inquiry will likely outlast the vote itself.
The likelihood of continuity – especially in Israel’s external security posture – means the polls will probably have little impact on Israel’s regional relationships and ongoing conflicts. Nonetheless, a Netanyahu coalition (once again largely dependent on far-right coalition partners) could exacerbate rising tensions between Israel’s leadership and President Trump. Despite beginning the Iran war together, the US has increasingly taken issue with Israeli persistence in Lebanon and elsewhere, which has prolonged a war that Washington wants to end. An Eisenkot or other coalition could provide a fresh opportunity for dealmaking at the interpersonal level, even as Israeli policy remains largely unchanged.
Continuity in Israel’s security policy could also spell continued risks for Israel’s relationship with Europe. The recent UK-led effort to impose trade bans and sanctions on entities and individuals enabling the acceleration of Israel’s West Bank settlements has already created reputational and regulatory risks for international businesses, and a continuation of current policy – which is likely under almost any potential government – could escalate these concerns.
