Overview
One day after the attempted coup in Niger in late August, Algeria deployed two air patrol squadrons to support the Nigerien junta – a move that marks Algiers’s first foreign deployment since 1973 and a notable shift from its historical non-interventionist policy. The deployment reflects Algeria’s broader effort to secure its southern border, rebuild relations with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) (comprised of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso), and regain influence amid growing regional and external competition. Niger is particularly important to Algeria as it occupies a central position in Algeria’s economic and energy ambitions and is its closest diplomatic partner in the AES. At the same time, Morocco, a regional rival, is expanding its economic and diplomatic presence across West Africa and promoting alternative energy corridors. As Algeria adopts a more assertive Sahel policy, its competition with Morocco could complicate US relations with both states, fragment regional counterterrorism cooperation, and increase political and commercial risks surrounding major infrastructure and energy projects.
Algeria’s Interests and AES Reengagement, Explained
Algeria has sought to rebuild relations with the AES as part of a broader effort to reclaim leadership in what it has traditionally viewed as its sphere of influence. The withdrawal of US and French military support from AES member states intensified competition among regional and external actors, and Algeria fears an erosion of its influence. Reengagement with the AES could therefore secure Algeria’s role as the leading political and security actor in the Sahel and deny Morocco, its longstanding geopolitical rival, a foothold in the region.
This rapprochement has not been without obstacles. Relations between Algeria and Niger deteriorated in April 2024 following Algeria’s deportation of Nigerien migrants. Ties with the broader AES bloc suffered further after Algeria shot down a Malian drone in April 2025, prompting all three AES members to recall their ambassadors from Algeria. Despite these setbacks, Algeria-Niger relations warmed following Tiani’s visit to Algiers in February 2026. An Algerian delegation then visited Burkina Faso to discuss cooperation in mining and hydrocarbons. Mali, the most skeptical of renewing ties, eventually restored diplomatic relations with Algeria in July. This culminated in Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga’s visit to Algiers last month to discuss the worsening regional security environment and potential avenues for renewed cooperation.
Niger is also a critical node in Algeria’s planned Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline. The $13 billion project aims to transport Nigerian natural gas to Europe via existing infrastructure in Algeria and Niger. In June, subsidiaries of Algeria’s state-owned energy company, Sonatrach, signed three memoranda of understanding with Niger's national oil company, SONIDEP, covering seismic surveys, drilling, fuel distribution and training. Because Niger is indispensable to the pipeline, the project’s success is contingent on the country being relatively politically stable and secure. Morocco has reportedly attempted to leverage concerns over Niger’s worsening security conditions to discourage Nigerian participation and promote its competing Atlantic pipeline initiative. As a result, protecting the Tiani government is not only a security objective for Algiers but also a strategic imperative in its broader competition with Rabat.
Against this backdrop, Algeria’s deployment and extensive publicization of its support for the Tiani government is intended not only to reassure Niamey, but also to signal to the broader AES that Algeria is a reliable security partner. Days before the attempted coup, Algiers delivered four helicopters, ammunition, and other equipment to the Nigerien military. For Mali’s junta leader, Assimi Goita, whose government faces the most severe deterioration in security conditions among the AES states, Algeria’s willingness to rapidly provide military assistance offers a tangible demonstration of its value as a partner. Algeria’s deployment of military assets where Burkina Faso and Mali were unable (and likely unwilling) to do so also increases the value of a security partnership with Algeria among AES leaders.
Morocco’s Power Play in the Sahel
As Algeria seeks regional security and support for its Trans-Saharan Pipeline, Morocco has advanced a competing vision for regional integration through its African Atlantic Gas Pipeline (also called the Morocco-Nigeria Gas Pipeline). The $25 billion project will link Nigerian energy extraction from the Gulf of Guinea to Europe through the coastal West African states. Construction of the pipeline has gained momentum and backing from European and West African states, particularly as energy markets remain volatile due to the Iran war and growing conflict in Yemen. For the AES, the pipeline also possesses considerable economic value. The AES’ withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States left them with fewer partners from which to import energy. Moreover, Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, launched in 2023, seeks to grant the Sahelian states access to Atlantic trade through its Dakhla Port.
Morocco has also leveraged its growing economic influence to advance its diplomatic objectives. Western Sahara remains a highly contentious dispute between Algiers and Rabat. Morocco controls most of the territory and advocates for an autonomous arrangement under Moroccan sovereignty, while Algeria backs the Polisario Front, which seeks an independent Sahrawi state. All three AES members recognized Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara last year, a move Algiers likely viewed as a stark indication of its declining influence.
In the security sphere, however, Algeria appears to be Niamey’s preferred partner. Although Nigerien defense officials visited Morocco last year to discuss greater military ties, Rabat’s ties to France drew scrutiny from the Tiani junta. This reportedly led to a suspension of intelligence cooperation between the Direction Générale de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure, Niger’s external intelligence agency, and Moroccan intelligence in August 2025.
Implications for US Strategy
The intensifying rivalry between Algeria and Morocco presents challenges for US strategy in the region. Washington has increasingly relied on Morocco as a stable regional partner and as a platform for security cooperation, intelligence sharing, and engagement with African states. At the same time, Algeria remains an important security actor with significant influence along the southern Mediterranean and in the Sahel. If Algeria expands intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Niger and the wider AES bloc, it could acquire greater leverage over the strategic orientation of those governments. Such influence may discourage AES participation in Moroccan-led security cooperation initiatives. For leaders such as Tiani, Algerian support could be viewed as a safeguard against future internal challenges, making alignment with Algiers more attractive than deeper cooperation with Rabat.
For the US, this complicates Africa Command’s recent initiative to position Morocco as a regional hub for military education and training as part of a strategy to counter rising jihadist violence. In July, Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces signed an agreement with AFRICOM to construct a drone training facility to enhance regional counterterrorism capabilities. Yet Algeria’s growing influence over AES governments may limit their willingness to participate in programs perceived as advancing Moroccan regional ambitions. The result could be a more fragmented security landscape at a time when jihadist violence continues to spread across the Sahel.
Risks to Businesses
The effectiveness of Algeria’s emerging security role remains uncertain. While the deployment to Niger demonstrates political resolve, Algeria has limited experience sustaining military operations beyond its borders. Unlike Russia, which has developed an extensive security presence and network of partnerships across the Sahel, Algeria lacks a proven record of long-term expeditionary engagement.
Should Algeria pursue closer coordination with Russia to protect shared political, economic, or infrastructure interests in Niger, businesses operating in the region could face heightened operational, compliance, and reputational risks. Increased overlap between Algerian and Russian security activities could complicate investment decisions and potentially expose firms to evolving sanctions or regulatory concerns. Conversely, failure to stabilize Niger could weaken confidence in the feasibility of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and disrupt investment into the project. The project’s failure would strengthen Morocco’s regional influence, but intensify regional competition as Algeria seeks other means of cementing its position as the lead power in the Sahel. A lack of coordination between Algeria and Morocco in US-backed joint counterterrorism training or operations could weaken the regional response to jihadist insurgencies. This, in turn, could enable militants to expand further throughout Niger, posing additional risks to operating the country’s energy infrastructure and mines.
