Overview
This piece is the first in a two-part series covering Niger’s security partners and the implications for US strategic objectives in the region.
On August 28-29, military officers and their units attacked Air Base 101 and other strategic locations in Niamey in a failed attempt to overthrow General Abdourahamane Tiani, who himself seized power in a coup d’état in 2023. The attack was suppressed largely by Russia’s Africa Corps, a paramilitary group that replaced the Wagner Group, signaling both the limited capabilities of the Nigerien junta and Moscow’s deepening role in protecting allied Sahelian regimes. This security partnership exacerbates internal power struggles and could empower jihadist insurgents, fomenting greater instability. Despite major tactical defeats earlier this year in Mali, the Africa Corps’ support in defeating Niger’s latest coup attempt demonstrated Russia’s continued value as a security partner on the continent, support which will continue to pose a substantial obstacle to US efforts to counter Russian influence in the region. The replacement of US influence with actors unwilling or unable to address the root causes of political instability in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is likely to obstruct key elements of the Trump administration’s Africa strategy, particularly efforts to counter terrorism and secure critical mineral projects.
Tiani’s Most Significant Challenge to Power
Last month’s coup attempt marks Niger’s first major attempt since 2023 and comes amid heightened unrest and internal challenges for the country and its allies Mali and Burkina Faso, together AES. The scale and involvement of special forces units are also significant. The exact motivation behind the coup is unclear, but the military units responsible were reportedly led by junior officers serving in special operations units at the forefront of Niger’s counterterrorism operations, which have all sustained heavy casualties. In addition to low morale, media outlets reported resentment from military officers toward the Presidential Guard, Tiani’s original service branch, which has received preferential treatment from the government. Soldiers possibly numbering in the hundreds attacked the Presidential Palace, the national television station, and initially captured portions of Air Base 101, holding multiple soldiers hostage. Relying on suicide drones, Russian forces retook the contested locations as the government arrested the coup plotters.
Rising discontent among special forces units critical to containing the jihadist insurgency remains a decisive factor for the future of Tiani’s government. With sustained Russian assistance, it is highly unlikely the junta would be overthrown, at least over the next one to two years. But the absence of reforms addressing low morale in the military and continued gains by jihadists are likely to exacerbate internal grievances and produce security gaps exploited by insurgents. This, in turn, could expand Jama’at al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) areas of influence and increase the number of violent attacks in or near the capital, elevating the risk of collapse.
Russia’s Africa Corps: Leveraging Regime Protection to Maintain Influence
Russia’s entrenchment in the Sahel and provision of counterterrorism assistance stem from Moscow’s efforts to secure access to natural resources and diversify partnerships amid diplomatic isolation from the West following the invasion of Ukraine. In Niger, Russia is seeking to expand energy and mining cooperation, strengthening its position in global uranium supply chains. More broadly, the Africa Corps has deepened its presence across West Africa to provide logistics support to ongoing operations in the AES countries. Russia’s security cooperation agreement with Togo, for example, has expanded Moscow’s access to the Port of Lomé, which Russia used in July to ship arms to Mali for the first time.
However, Moscow’s security-for-resources model has faced significant challenges as the Africa Corps struggles to repel insurgencies waged by JNIM and ISSP across all three AES countries. JNIM’s April offensive in Mali exposed significant shortcomings in the Africa Corps’ counterterrorism capabilities: JNIM seized key cities in Mali’s north, assassinated the Malian defense minister, and blockaded energy convoys. The Africa Corps’ success in protecting the Tiani junta may restore confidence in Moscow among the AES governments, preserving Russia’s security-for-resources partnerships despite its limited success against jihadist groups.
The AES: An Alliance of Non-Credible Security Commitments
The coup attempt also exposed the limitations of the AES. Not only was Air Base 101, the organization’s headquarters, attacked for the third time this year, but neither Burkina Faso nor Mali deployed forces to defend the Nigerien government, despite the AES’ mutual defense provisions against armed rebellions. Niger reportedly requested assistance from Burkina Faso specifically, but no help was provided, and the AES only released public statements condemning the coup after it had been put down. Despite the three countries’ rhetoric of self-reliance, the AES is unable to secure its territory from insurgent groups, much less protect itself from internal political strife, without extensive external support.
Niamey’s response to the coup has inflamed tensions with Western nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), from which Niger and the other AES countries withdrew to sever ties with entities perceived as colonialist projects. The Nigerien government accused France, Benin, and other ECOWAS members of orchestrating the coup, continuing its self-imposed isolation from cooperation with Western nations and African organizations. Distrust of the West could stymie Washington’s attempts at rapprochement with the AES members, especially if Russia remains a trusted guarantor for regime stability and Niger resists diversifying its security partnerships.
The AES’ lack of joint defense capabilities and estrangement from ECOWAS has undermined regional counterterrorism responses and prevented intelligence sharing with the coastal West African states. This security gap has made it more difficult for Benin and others to address cross-border jihadist threats emanating from AES territory. In addition, these vulnerabilities create an opening for Russia to deepen its existing security ties across the region, complicating US efforts to maintain influence.
Implications for US Strategic Objectives and Risks to Businesses
Regime stability in the central Sahel is increasingly contingent upon the presence of Russian forces, changing the primary appeal of Russian security cooperation from counterterrorism assistance to leadership protection. The Africa Corps continues to prove its value to the military juntas even as jihadist groups make gains, making it more difficult for Washington to persuade the AES governments that Western security partnerships offer a viable alternative.
This presents a difficult dilemma for the US. The Trump administration has made some progress in restoring intelligence cooperation with Mali, but Niger remains a more elusive target for greater security cooperation given Tiani’s notably anti-Western orientation, which helped him gain support among broader segments of the military, and growing dependence on Russia. Reengaging the Nigerien military or intelligence services through Mali may also be difficult if the AES cannot provide the mutual defense it claims to offer and a rift emerges between the Sahelian states. Meanwhile, continued US distance would leave Russia better positioned to consolidate its role as the region’s primary external security partner.
The consequences extend beyond counterterrorism. The Trump administration’s efforts to secure access to critical minerals depend in part on its ability to establish credible security and economic partnerships. Niger is a major uranium producer on the continent, but political instability and deteriorating security have already disrupted the country’s mining sector. Foreign mining companies face several overlapping risks. Infighting within the military could enable JNIM and ISSP to expand its operations and target mining sites, increasing operating costs and the risk of kidnapping, a method commonly used by terrorist and criminal groups to obtain substantial ransoms from governments and businesses. If Niger experiences another coup, it is unclear how a successor junta would regulate existing mining agreements and treat foreign investors. A transition from one military government to another could also create a chaotic environment involving competing political authorities and third-party intermediaries, complicating the movement and export of uranium.
