Overview
The Iran war is reshaping Gulf states’ security calculus, forcing them from reluctant neutrality into active defense and, in some cases, offensive action against Tehran. The conflict has strained US-Gulf relations, heightened doubts about American reliability, and exposed Gulf infrastructure to unprecedented Iranian attacks. Post-war, Gulf leaders will seek a managed coexistence with Iran while avoiding extremes of a hostile regime or destabilizing collapse, and may reassess alliances—including closer coordination with Israel or alternative security arrangements to counterbalance Israel and Iran. China and Russia, with strong ties to both Iran and Gulf states, could emerge as influential mediators, potentially reducing US dominance in the region, though their roles face practical and geopolitical obstacles. The war’s outcome will be decisive in shaping the future balance of power in the Middle East.
Gulf States: An Unwelcomed War
Arab Gulf leaders are conflicted by this war. They did not want hostilities against Iran to resume and were not consulted by the US in advance, resulting in frustration and disappointment with the security partnership with the US and the lack of consideration of Gulf interests.
Gulf leaders are also angry at Iran for having shattered the détente in place since 2023 by launching missile and drone attacks, terrorizing Gulf citizens and damaging critical infrastructure. The Gulf states attempted to stay out of conflict, a position that they hoped would have protected them from implication in the crossfire. Initially, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar refused to allow their territory or airspace to be used for offensive operations. Iran’s strategy, however, deliberately made the Gulf states primary targets to create leverage over the US, aiming to push Gulf leaders to press the US to step back from the conflict.
Now in the fourth week of the war, the Gulf states are increasingly unable to sit on the sidelines as costs mount. The UAE alone has intercepted hundreds of ballistic missiles and nearly 2,000 drone attacks. Qatar, which has traditionally played the role of mediator with Iran, has suffered the most damaging attacks on its energy infrastructure, including the Ras Laffan LNG production facility, the world’s largest. Iran has launched a barrage of attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, where many of the kingdom’s oil refineries are located. In response to escalating attacks, US partners have been pressing Washington for additional help in supporting their defensive shield. They have reversed their earlier stance and given the US greater operational access to military bases in their territory, including Saudi Arabia opening King Fahd Air Base to American forces.
Additionally, several Gulf countries are moving from a defensive to an offensive posture, projecting a desire to shape the war’s outcome and protect their national and economic security. Saudi Crown Prince and de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman has recently changed his views and now sees the US military campaign as a “historic opportunity” to eliminate Iran as a threat. The UAE is cracking down on Iranian financial networks that have long served as an economic lifeline for the heavily sanctioned Iranian regime. Qatar, however, is doubling down with its call for an end to the conflict without conditions.
Gulf Threat Perceptions and Regional Balance of Power
When the war concludes, Gulf states will need to define new terms for their relationship with Iran. Geographic proximity and the priority Gulf leaders place on regional stability—essential for economic development—necessitate a managed coexistence. The outcome of the war and the nature of Iran’s post-war leadership will shape Gulf threat perceptions and their options for future engagement. Gulf leaders fear two extremes: a hostile, capable regime in Tehran intent on controlling Gulf waterways, or a regime collapse that creates a security vacuum and widespread instability.
Hardliners in Iran are already pushing for a new status quo in the Persian Gulf. Tehran seeks to expel U.S. forces from the region and impose transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leaders cite the Suez Canal as a precedent, overlooking the fact that neither the Strait of Hormuz nor the Persian Gulf fall within exclusive economic zones.
Gulf states also question the depth and reliability of U.S. security commitments. Past inconsistencies have fueled doubts about Washington’s role as a dependable partner. Recent events have reinforced these concerns: perceived Gulf influence in Washington has prompted Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure. If the war ends with only a ceasefire, leaving Iran’s revolutionary doctrine intact and its capacity to rearm unchallenged, Gulf states may seek alternative security arrangements.
In the post-war landscape, Gulf states will reassess their relationship with Israel, whose military remains the strongest in the MENA region and capable of projecting power into the Gulf. The UAE and Bahrain have normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, while other Gulf states have not. If Iran is seen as a continuing threat, closer coordination with Israel under a regional security framework may emerge as a viable option. Conversely, if Israel’s role in initiating the conflict is viewed negatively and Iran’s post-war regime is weakened, Gulf states may pursue strategies to counterbalance both Israel and Iran.
Opening for China and Russia as Trusted Mediators
In the post-war period, there may be an opportunity for China and Russia to take advantage of political uncertainty to advance their influence in the Gulf region and to challenge US global leadership. China and Russia have avoided direct intervention in the Iran war, preferring to provide political support from a distance. However, both countries have strategic partnerships with Iran and have provided a range of economic and military assistance to the Islamic Republic. Beijing and Moscow have influence with Tehran as long-time partners and as strategic competitors of the US.
In addition, Beijing and Moscow also have good relations with the Gulf states. Well before the Iran war, Gulf states began diversifying their political and economic relationships to become less dependent upon the US.
For example, Russia’s relations with the Gulf states significantly changed when it joined OPEC+ in 2016, transitioning from competition to strategic energy cooperation. This partnership opened up increased investment, defense ties and diplomatic cooperation. The Russian Direct Investment Fund established joint projects with Gulf sovereign wealth funds and cooperation subsequently expanded beyond the energy sector. Closer ties paid off for Moscow during the Russia-Ukraine war, with the Gulf states remaining neutral, never joining Western sanctions against Moscow.
China and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Partnership agreement in 2022, expanding their relationship beyond energy-for-goods exchange to a multifaceted relationship covering trade, technology and security. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner. The UAE upgraded its strategic partnership with China in 2018, focused on economic diversification, technology and energy.
In a significant sign of its developing strategic, rather than purely economic, influence in the region, Beijing in 2023 brokered a security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which effectively stabilized cross-Gulf relations until June 2025. The security agreement, reached without US or European mediation, was a surprise diplomatic breakthrough that was initially dismissed by the US as political theatre. However, the agreement led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, the reopening of the Iranian embassy in Riyadh and the resumption of Saudi diplomatic operations in Tehran. Détente brought to an end Iran’s open encouragement of Yemeni Houthi attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure, and Iran reportedly requested that Riyadh stop supporting militant Sunni groups operating inside Iran. The détente surprisingly weathered the Gaza war but began to unravel during the 12-day Iran war.
Building on these partnerships, there could be an opening for China and Russia to step forward as trusted mediators between Iran and the Gulf states in the post-war period. They have shared interests in keeping the waterways open to commercial shipping and projecting their political power and influence in the Middle East. Inserting China and/or Russia into Gulf security would resonate with hardliners in Tehran who would interpret it as a step forward in reducing US influence in the Gulf.
However, there are obstacles to an increased Chinese or Russian role in the Gulf. China has long preferred an economics-first footing in the Gulf, and may continue avoiding risks of entanglement. Russia has embraced military deployments to extend Moscow’s sphere of influence, but is currently preoccupied by the Ukraine war. For both countries, more engagement with Gulf states could create tensions with Tehran, if the Islamic Republic of today continues to exist, and vice versa – a strategic balancing act they have thus far mostly avoided by hedging between the two sides. The US and Israel would likely resist potential alternative security arrangements that do not protect their interests, but their reactions would depend on the character of the post-war Iranian government and whether China’s or Russia’s role is as mediator or security guarantor.
Implications for Businesses
The Gulf states will be changed by the war. Reopening of the airways and waterways to commercial traffic will have an immediate, positive impact on trade. But the Gulf states’ brand as luxurious safe havens in a volatile region has been shattered. Foreign investors will be more mindful of regional risks, which could slow some of the ambitious economic development plans. Economic recovery may be sluggish in oil and gas exporting countries, first due to a need to repair damaged infrastructure and later by a drop in demand for their molecules as their customers adopt de-risking strategies to reduce reliance on Gulf oil and gas.
Post-war security architecture will also shape the business environment. While a peace agreement and stabilization would open up new business opportunities, especially if accompanied by the unwinding of Iran sanctions, a more likely outcome is a cessation of hostilities accompanied by new security arrangements to manage tensions without resolving the underlying disputes. Businesses would need to navigate complex political risk that could create new winners and losers, depending on changes in regional power dynamics and great power competition. There should be no expectation that there will be a return to business as usual in the Gulf.
