Overview
Global shipping has come under greater pressure as strikes from the Houthis in Yemen threaten maritime commerce in the Red Sea. Discussions over securing these waterways often emphasize stability on the Arabian Peninsula, but instability on the African side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait may prove just as consequential. As internal political fragmentation, interstate rivalry, and war continue to shape the Horn, the region is emerging as an increasingly important factor behind Red Sea security. If these challenges remain unaddressed, further disruptions to Red Sea commerce could occur, impacting energy markets and trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Against this backdrop, the US has increased engagement with countries in the Horn of Africa. This month, Massad Boulos, senior White House advisor for Arab and African affairs, met with Eritrean and Somali representatives in Cairo to discuss regional security initiatives, the exact details of which are unknown. If renewed US engagement does not also address competing regional alignments and deep internal political divisions, efforts to safeguard maritime trade through cooperation with security partners in the Horn are unlikely to succeed. Conversely, a more stable Horn of Africa—or one that avoids a wider regional conflict—could provide a more reliable security arrangement in the Red Sea post Iran war.
Competing Regional Alignments Undermine Red Sea Security Cooperation
Rather than converging around a common maritime security framework, Horn states are increasingly prioritizing bilateral security partnerships aimed at balancing against one another. These competing regional alignments increase the risk of interstate conflict and proxy warfare while simultaneously obstructing efforts to build a cooperative security framework for the Red Sea. Such arrangements complicate US engagement by reinforcing opposing regional ambitions, reducing opportunities to resolve political and military conflicts to promote stability in the Red Sea.
The emergence of regional blocs has altered the foreign and defense policies of Horn states. Egypt has deepened political, economic and security cooperation with Eritrea and Somalia to counterbalance Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. At the center of this rivalry are disputes over both the Nile River and access to the Red Sea. Cairo views Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a direct threat to its long-term water security. Additionally, Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive pursuit of Red Sea access, including through strengthening ties with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, has alarmed both Egypt and Somalia.
Eritrea, a longstanding geopolitical rival of Ethiopia, has also criticized statements by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed suggesting that the lack of Red Sea access for landlocked Ethiopia constitutes an existential issue. Asmara interpreted these statements as threats to Eritrean sovereignty. Moreover, the two back opposing sides in the Sudan war. Ethiopia aligns with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has received training within Ethiopian territory and allegedly smuggled arms through the country; Eritrea supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to counter Ethiopia. These diplomatic alignments have become increasingly visible. While Massad Boulos met with Eritrean and Somali representatives in Cairo this month to discuss regional security, Egyptian and Eritrean officials separately discussed bilateral economic and security cooperation. Both sides emphasized that the security and governance of the Red Sea is solely the responsibility of coastal states, a position that implicitly excludes Ethiopia from regional decision-making in opposition to Addis Ababa’s growing interest in maritime access.
Additional Obstacles to Stability
Another source of insecurity is political fragmentation within states, which increases the risk of civil war and the expanded presence of non-state actors. Somalia is the most salient example of this dynamic, as its federal system is undergoing a period of significant political strain. Tensions between Mogadishu and federal member states threaten to undermine the country’s ability to contribute to regional security. Recent clashes between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)-aligned forces and Puntland authorities occurred following attempts by the FGS to extend Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term. Puntland and other opposition actors have resisted these efforts, fearing greater centralization of power and reduced autonomy.
Continued political fragmentation could weaken Somalia’s maritime security capacity, complicate international engagement, and create additional space for militant groups and criminal networks to exploit instability along the Somali coast. The Islamic State-Somalia and al-Shabaab have already exploited these political divisions, expanding territorial control amid a decline in international funding for the African Union's counterterrorism mission in the country.
Compounding these conflicts are middle power rivalries. In northern Somalia, local disputes are becoming increasingly intertwined with broader Saudi-Emirati and Israeli-Turkish competition, creating new risks of instability in the Gulf of Aden. Israel formally recognized Somaliland (allegedly with Emirati support) and has sought to establish a presence in the territory to monitor Houthi activity, while the UAE is reportedly constructing a military base at the Port of Berbera. By contrast, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have aligned themselves with Mogadishu largely in response to perceived gains in Israeli and Emirati influence. Following Israel’s recognition, Saudi Arabia signed a security cooperation agreement with Somalia and is reportedly training 5,000 Somali soldiers. Meanwhile, Türkiye remains Mogadishu’s largest arms supplier and has extensive economic interests in sustaining that partnership, recently launching an offshore oil exploration mission along the Somali coast. Similar dynamics have emerged in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Abu Dhabi has deepened ties with Addis Ababa allegedly to provide greater military support to the RSF in Sudan. This has prompted Cairo to facilitate talks between Asmara and Riyadh to deepen security ties, emulating the Saudi-Pakistan defense cooperation deal.
Finally, the capacity and political willingness of African partners to actively enforce freedom of navigation in the Red Sea remains uncertain. Djibouti is a critical security partner, hosting the US’ only military base on the continent at Camp Lemonnier. However, in 2024, Djibouti did not allow the US to conduct offensive operations against the Houthis, fearing retaliation. Another factor complicating US-Djibouti relations is its hosting of a Chinese military base, which could also alter Djibouti’s calculations in supporting US-led maritime security initiatives. Similarly, it remains unclear whether Somalia and Eritrea would be willing to participate in joint Red Sea security operations. Involvement would likely be strictly limited to counterpiracy missions. A future closure of the Bab el-Mandeb by the Houthis or attacks from another actor likely require a broader coalition of external powers to assist in reopening the strait.
Prospects of Stability and Risks
Competing regional alignments risk deepening existing political divisions rather than strengthening regional security. Continued fragmentation of state authority, particularly in Somalia, creates greater space for terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and other non-state actors to expand their operations. Additionally, the proliferation of foreign arms, especially low-cost drones, elevates the threat towards commercial vessels and ports.
An Al-Shabaab resurgence is particularly concerning because the group has previously demonstrated the ability to exploit governance vacuums and establish control over coastal infrastructure. The group’s seizure and administration of the port of Kismayo from 2008 to 2012 is a key example of how weak state authority can enable militant groups to threaten regional trade routes and coastal economies. More recently, concerns have grown over the resurgence in Somali piracy, which is increasingly aided by al-Shabaab, and the expansion of arms trafficking with the Houthis. The growing intersection of terrorism, piracy and illicit trafficking networks risks further eroding maritime security in the region, potentially increasing the costs and risks associated with transiting the Bab el-Mandeb and reinforcing incentives for vessels to seek alternative routes.
Beyond Somalia, renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would further undermine regional security cooperation and divert military resources away from maritime security. A wider interstate conflict could also intensify proxy competition among regional powers, further entrenching competing security blocs and making coordinated Red Sea security arrangements increasingly difficult. Rather than serving as a stable partner in securing the Bab el-Mandeb, the Horn could instead become another arena of regional confrontation.
The consequences of continued instability extend well beyond the Horn itself. Major disruptions to commercial and energy flows through the Bab el-Mandeb would significantly affect European and African importers while reducing export revenues for Gulf states. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in 2024 increased shipping times by ten days or more and contributed to an approximately 50 percent decline in trade transiting the Suez Canal. A deterioration in security driven by interstate conflict or expanding violence from non-state actors would create similar disruptions, further increasing costs for energy exporters. Moreover, major disruptions to the fertilizer industry are likely to occur, exacerbating food insecurity in Somalia and Sudan.
Exact details of Boulos’ meeting with Eritrean and Somali officials remain undisclosed, but current US strategy has prioritized bilateral economic and security partnerships rather than pursuing a comprehensive regional strategy. However, should recent engagements produce initiatives that address regional rivalries and political fragmentation, stability across the Horn would substantially improve, in turn raising the prospects for sustained maritime security. Stronger regional cooperation and more cohesive state institutions would also limit the operating space of non-state actors and create the political conditions necessary for a cooperative maritime security framework.
