Overview
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is seeking a greater role in international security and defense supply chains while also pursuing a more self-reliant defense posture. South Korea's expanding defense partnerships reflect a broader effort to translate its growing defense-industrial capacity into political influence and reduce strategic vulnerabilities amid intensifying US-China competition. Yet as Lee advocates for “peaceful coexistence” with North Korea, Pyongyang's continued military development and deepening cooperation with Russia underscore the potential limits of this approach. Together, these trends create new opportunities for defense-industrial and security cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, but raise uncertainty about the Korean peninsula’s longer-term security environment.
Seoul Navigates a Contested Security Environment
Since taking office in June 2025, the Lee administration has sought to balance its relations with the US and China while deepening ties with middle powers to reduce its dependence on either country for security or economic stability. Although the US-South Korea alliance remains strong, with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth praising Seoul’s efforts to increase defense spending, the Trump administration’s more transactional approach to foreign policy has encouraged Seoul to diversify its strategic partnerships. That perception has been strengthened by Washington’s position that South Korea assumes primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, articulated in the 2026 National Defense Strategy, as well as President Trump's decision to scale back the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in August.
Lee has also notably departed from the hardline approach to North Korea taken by his predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol. At the UN General Assembly last month, Lee proposed a three-pillar policy to facilitate a “peaceful coexistence” with Pyongyang, advocating for renewed US-North Korea talks and suggesting sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze on Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
So far, Seoul’s calls for renewed dialogue and engagement have had minimal impact on Pyongyang’s missile tests and military development. North Korea removed all references to reunification in its constitution and continues to reject calls for denuclearization, conducting ballistic missile tests and advancing its sea-based nuclear deterrent. Shaping Pyongyang's calculus are lingering tensions stemming from the Yoon administration, deteriorating relations with Japan, and expanding technical and military cooperation with Russia. The Kim regime likely views its partnership with Moscow as a major strategic advantage, reducing its incentive to participate in talks with the US or South Korea.
With engagement efforts toward North Korea yielding few tangible results and uncertainty surrounding US policy persisting, Seoul is building up its domestic capabilities. South Korea tested its first domestically produced hypersonic glide vehicles this month, marking a notable advancement in its missile capabilities. Seoul has also sought to accelerate the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the US-led Combined Forces Command to the South Korean military, a process that has spanned multiple presidencies, but the Lee administration has especially pushed for. However, US military officials, including the former commander of US Forces Korea, have cautioned that Seoul has not yet attained all military capabilities necessary to assume OPCON, particularly in missile defense and critical C5ISR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).
Deepening Defense Cooperation with Middle Powers
In its pursuit of greater strategic autonomy and deterrence, the Lee administration has leveraged defense-industrial development to advance diplomatic objectives and strengthen global influence. Prior to Lee’s tenure, South Korea saw a substantial increase in arms exports along with initiatives aimed at strengthening defense-industrial capacity. These initiatives began following the Russia-Ukraine war and substantially deepened Seoul’s defense ties with Europe, which needed alternative suppliers to quickly replenish depleted stockpiles and to rapidly boost military capabilities. Amid intensifying US-China strategic competition, however, the Lee administration has increasingly framed these efforts as part of a broader hedging strategy. Pursuant to this strategy, the Lee administration has deepened ties with Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian middle powers to diversify its defense and economic relationships without diminishing its defense alliance with the US. Moreover, the Lee administration has expressed willingness to aid partners in building their domestic defense industries, presenting another avenue for Seoul to expand its influence.
Following a years-long trend of South Korean governments advancing security partnerships with Indo-Pacific nations, the Lee administration upgraded its special strategic partnership with Indonesia to a special comprehensive strategic partnership in April, South Korea’s highest level of bilateral ties short of a formal alliance. As part of this partnership, the two countries agreed to proceed with joint production of the KF-21 fighter jet, a program more than a decade in development, while expanding defense-industrial cooperation to include anti-tank guided missile systems and ammunition. The deal helps secure Seoul’s interests in Indonesia, including access to critical minerals and LNG, as South Korea's traditional energy suppliers in the Gulf have faced significant disruptions. More broadly, the move reflects Seoul's effort to strengthen partnerships with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Seoul has also extended its footprint outside the Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East and North Africa, Seoul has expanded partnerships traditionally centered on energy to include arms exports, localized manufacturing, cybersecurity cooperation and other aspects of defense. In October 2026, South Korea upgraded its bilateral ties with Egypt to a strategic partnership, signing a memorandum of understanding on shipbuilding and broadening joint defense production beyond the manufacture of K-9 self-propelled howitzers, which began earlier this year. Egyptian officials also confirmed discussions over the potential sale of 36 FA-50 aircraft to Cairo. The Lee administration has pursued similar defense-industrial arrangements with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
For Seoul, strategic defense partnerships with other middle powers enhance its credibility as a reliable defense cooperation partner and support its broader effort to reduce dependence on any single security partner. For its partners, particularly in the MENA region, acquiring South Korean systems that are compatible with Western platforms improves interoperability during joint exercises while reducing exposure to the political sensitivities and potential restrictions that can accompany purchases of Chinese defense equipment (although defense cooperation with Beijing is likely to continue).
Implications for Businesses
South Korea's push for joint defense production presents opportunities for firms involved in manufacturing, systems integration, logistics, workforce development, and lifecycle sustainment. Across partnerships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Seoul has increasingly paired defense exports with technology-transfer arrangements, training, and long-term maintenance support. This approach aligns with regional efforts to develop indigenous defense industries and could generate demand for industrial infrastructure, engineering services, supply-chain integration, and advanced manufacturing capabilities. However, commercial opportunities will depend on whether political agreements and memorandums of understanding translate into funded procurement programs.
As South Korea's strategic partnership with Egypt expands to include shipbuilding and maritime cooperation, the security of the Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping routes will be of even greater importance for Seoul. Building on the Cheonghae Unit's long-standing anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, future cooperative frameworks with Cairo could focus on maritime domain awareness, technology transfers in unmanned systems, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Such initiatives would advance Seoul's interest in safeguarding the maritime corridors through which much of its trade and imported energy flow. Recent disruptions to regional shipping and energy markets have only heightened the importance of these routes for South Korea's economic security. Greater South Korean support in preserving freedom of navigation and regional capacity-building could help reduce insecurity and uncertainty for commercial vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb or Strait of Hormuz.
In addition to its growing security interests abroad, Seoul must also contend with evolving security challenges on the Korean peninsula. Obstacles to Lee’s peaceful coexistence policy could increase pressure on Seoul to demonstrate that its military can independently execute critical military capabilities as it works toward assuming OPCON. This, in turn, could shape South Korea’s procurement priorities, generating demand for technologies integral to enhancing C5ISR capabilities, including secure communications, command-and-control systems, AI, and unmanned platforms. However, specific procurement contracts will depend on military modernization priorities and the US and South Korea’s assessments of progress toward OPCON transfer requirements.
