Overview
The military juntas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have failed to repel jihadist insurgencies, embroiling the Sahel and neighboring West African countries in conflict, risking regional conflict spillover and complicating the US’ Africa strategy, especially as the war in Iran demands increased attention. Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the dominant terror threat in the region, has consolidated extensive territory in Mali and Burkina Faso and demonstrated growing sophistication in its operational planning and execution, while the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) continues to escalate violence and gain territory, also posing a threat to regional security. Seeking long-term stability in the region (and continued access to its critical minerals deposits), the US has pushed for a renewal of intelligence sharing and security cooperation agreements previously severed by the juntas’ coups d’etat. But dismantling JNIM and ISSP networks and capabilities will require long-term capacity building, and Washington’s attention and resources are being shifted towards the escalating war in Iran. Should the juntas collapse, conflict spillover into the coastal West African states is likely to intensify, risking further disruptions to global trade and complicating US efforts to access the region’s critical mineral deposits.
Surge in Terrorism Exposes the Region’s Weak Institutions
Perceived failures of Western-backed regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to combat jihadists triggered a series of military coups from 2020 to 2023. Blaming insufficient assistance from France and the US for the rampant insurgency, the junta leaders pledged to restore order and formed new partnerships with Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. Russia became the most active external power in the region, deploying its Wagner Group, eventually rebranded as the Africa Corps, to fight in Mali and train Burkinabe and Nigerien forces. In addition, the junta leaders withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), arguing the organization is pro-colonialist, and formed its own bloc: the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Despite years of Russian assistance, however, the security situation has only worsened since the military juntas came to power. In 2024, slightly over half of all terrorism-related deaths occurred in the Sahel. JNIM and ISSP have successfully capitalized on the limited capabilities of ECOWAS members and the AES’ Unified Force to increase the sophistication of their operations and seize broad swaths of territory. In January, ISSP fighters used drones, small arms, and mortars to attack Niger’s Dori Hamani International Airport and military Airbase 101, the AES’ headquarters. JNIM launched one of its most sophisticated operations in Burkina Faso, where it controls up to 60% of the country, reportedly mobilizing hundreds of militants to attack military and civilian targets in multiple provinces.
Rising regional instability prompted ECOWAS military chiefs to meet in Sierra Leone last month to discuss cooperation with the AES and establishing a 2,000-strong counterterrorism force by the end of 2026. But given the rate at which JNIM is consolidating territory and influence, it is unlikely that a force that takes that long to be operational will be able to effectively respond. Furthermore, questions remain about how the force will be financed, and whether the participating states have adequate air assets and intelligence collection to conduct counterterrorism operations. Should the AES refuse to coordinate due to continued political differences, the force will face even greater obstacles. Successful operations therefore may require long-term external assistance, training, and mediation between ECOWAS and the AES.
The View from Washington
US strategy in the Sahel and West Africa has long emphasized combatting the spread of jihadist groups. Prior to the military coups, the US maintained a small troop presence in Niger to monitor terrorist activity and train Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe forces. The military regimes severed cooperation with the US and France shortly after seizing power, and in 2024 the Nigerien junta expelled the US from two airbases critical to counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. As the Sahelian governments appeared on the verge of collapse, the Biden administration sought to contain the spillover effects of the conflict by implementing the Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS), a 10-year plan in which the US would collaborate with West African governments to improve security force responsiveness and aid governments at the national and local level in addressing social grievances commonly exploited by terrorist groups. Secondly, the military coups caused an unprecedented expansion of Russian influence in the Sahel, forcing the US to also contend with foreign power competition.
Preventing a jihadist-controlled Sahel and containing the influence of rival foreign powers remain the driving forces for US diplomacy and military engagement in the region. A key difference is that the SPCPS’ objective of improved local governance has largely been sidelined, as the current administration has focused on enhancing military and intelligence capabilities of regional partners. The extent to which the Trump administration is willing to assist and train regional forces is not yet clear, but the US has taken initial steps in repairing relations with the military juntas due to the surge in violence in Mali. The US removed sanctions targeting three senior Malian officials last month and is reportedly finalizing an agreement with Bamako that would permit US intelligence collection in Malian airspace. Washington has had comparatively less success with Burkinabe and Nigerien officials, who continue to view the US with suspicion. The US-Mali agreement is a positive development, but the US would need to engage with all three AES states for intelligence collection to be comprehensive. Additionally, considering the resilience of JNIM and limited capabilities of ECOWAS and the AES, lasting regional stability may require greater military and financial commitments than are currently feasible or politically desirable.
The US may aim to utilize intelligence cooperation to secure critical mineral contracts and decrease the influence of Russia and China. The AES has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russian forces, which continue to act like mercenary forces with narrow areas of engagement as opposed to a security cooperation force. China is less active in the security sphere but remains prevalent in regional critical mineral value chains, most notably in Guinea, which holds approximately 25% of the world’s known bauxite reserves—a key input in automotive, aerospace, and construction industries—10% of the world’s iron ore, and newly discovered lithium reserves. The US may attempt to emulate its security-for-minerals model with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In that case, the US pledged security assistance, such as a train and equip mission, to help the DRC reassert control over Rwanda-backed rebels in the Great Lakes region. In exchange, the DRC plans to grant increased mining concessions and equity in export infrastructure.
Risks to Stability in the Sahel, and US Interests There, Persist
Serious obstacles to Sahel stability and greater US engagement remain. Terrorist groups are entrenched there: since 2019, JNIM has expanded into Gulf of Guinea states to build a sophisticated network capable of undermining state authority throughout the region and deterring militaries from launching counterterrorism operations. JNIM militants exploit grievances of local populations, particularly in isolated areas where West African governments lack presence. In doing so, the jihadists have constructed a “proto-state” extending from the AES members to most of the coastal West African nations. Over the last five years, JNIM has established resilient terror cells and logistics hubs, allowing it to repeatedly engage security forces in Benin and Togo.
The Iran war has also created new challenges. High energy prices and inflation are likely to have a significant impact on AES countries. Niger and Mali are net importers, with Bamako particularly dependent on imported refined petroleum. JNIM continues to close transit corridors and attack fuel trucks in Mali to isolate it from regional trade partners. Against the backdrop of a turbulent global economy, JNIM’s economic warfare could prolong energy scarcity and induce food insecurity, thereby strengthening anti-regime sentiment and recruitment efforts. The withdrawal from ECOWAS excludes the AES members from any economic protections the organization may implement. Moreover, the war will prevent Iran from its previous security cooperation with the AES, which may look to alternatives (like Russia or the US) to fill the gap.
Another issue is potential attacks against ports along the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM’s attacks on critical economic sectors may expand to port cities to dissuade ECOWAS members from contributing to the counterterrorism force. Alternatively, goods transported from the port and through the Sahel could be destroyed or seized by jihadists. Togo’s Port of Lomé is a vital logistics hub and the continent’s fourth busiest container port, making the country a focal point in Russia’s bid for regional dominance. Last year, Moscow ratified a security cooperation agreement in exchange for unfettered port access. While a troubling development, the security partnership is unlikely to curb the mounting violence from JNIM against Togolese soldiers and civilians. Successfully countering jihadists would solidify the US’ position as the more effective security partner and safeguards the Port of Lomé against Russian influence. Nonetheless, US forces may also struggle to fully uproot JNIM and ISSP on an asymmetric battlefield.
