Overview
On November 4, South Africa held municipal elections with significant implications for the country's future political direction and international relationships. The African National Congress (ANC), the country's longstanding incumbent party, suffered historic losses and received 30.75% of the vote—less than a third of total votes and 14 points below its results in 2021 local elections. Meanwhile, the center-right Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest opposition party and ANC's main partner in the Government of National Unity, finished second with 24.65% of the vote. DA-affiliated councilors won greater support across urban areas and key economic hubs.
The results not only underscore the expanding role of opposition parties in local governance but raise questions about the ANC's ability to maintain its dominance in the central government, potentially opening the door to a DA-led coalition after the 2029 general elections. Should municipal leaders from the DA succeed in addressing voters' grievances, the next general election could become considerably more competitive. A future DA-led coalition at the national level could modernize South Africa's infrastructure, expand foreign investment and rebalance relationships with the US, China and other international partners. However, increased political fragmentation could stall the implementation of DA-backed economic reforms, potentially reducing investor confidence and leaving longstanding infrastructure issues and policy uncertainty unaddressed.
The Decline of South Africa's Liberation Party
The ANC's crippling losses in this election cycle follow years of declining support. Founded in Nelson Mandela's liberation movement, the ANC historically commanded overwhelming electoral support and governed with a parliamentary majority for three decades after the end of apartheid. That dominance began to erode amid corruption scandals, weak economic growth and deteriorating public services. In the 2024 general election, the ANC lost its parliamentary majority for the first time, forcing it to enter a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the Democratic Alliance and several smaller parties. Since then, the ANC has performed worse in successive election cycles.
Several issues have either discouraged South Africans from voting or mobilized them to vote for alternative parties. Central to public frustration is the lack of basic service provision and aging infrastructure. Much of the country suffers from acute water shortages (roughly one third of the country's supply is lost due to burst pipes), recurring power outages and failing sanitation systems. Other major concerns are high living costs, rising unemployment (which increased to 33.7% in third quarter 2026), violent crime and migration.
Poor governance and corruption are particularly visible in major urban centers where infrastructure development has stalled. In Johannesburg, South Africa’s commercial capital and historically an ANC stronghold, unstable coalitions have produced 10 changes of mayor in the last decade, and the city has $13.3 billion in unspent infrastructure funds. Similar problems have afflicted municipalities across Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Eastern Cape. As a result, the DA has steadily expanded its support in major cities, while the ANC increasingly relies on support from rural provinces.
Opposition Parties Fragment South Africa's Political Landscape
The DA emerged as one of the principal beneficiaries of growing voter dissatisfaction with the ANC. Historically associated with urban, middle-class, and minority voters, the DA has spent the past decade seeking to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional base by emphasizing competent governance, economic growth, anti-corruption measures and improved public service delivery. The party frequently cites its governance record in the Western Cape province, particularly Cape Town, as evidence that better-managed municipalities can provide more reliable public services, stronger infrastructure investment and a more attractive environment for business. The DA also advocates a more market-oriented economic agenda than the ANC. While both parties support foreign investment and international trade, the DA has generally favored reducing regulatory burdens on businesses, strengthening protections for private property, expanding private-sector participation in electricity generation and infrastructure development, and pursuing reforms aimed at accelerating economic growth and job creation.
Smaller opposition parties could influence coalition politics at both the municipal and national levels. The uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) made slight gains in this year's municipal elections. Both parties advocate leftist and populist economic policies, including varying degrees of state intervention, nationalization and land redistribution, putting them at great odds with both the ANC and DA and explaining their exclusion from the GNU. ActionSA, a market-oriented party founded by a former DA member, has also gained support by campaigning on anti-corruption, immigration enforcement and service delivery reforms. None of these parties currently appear capable of governing nationally, but their support could be decisive in arranging coalitions at both the local and national level if the 2029 elections produce no clear majority. Although a DA-ActionSA coalition remains possible despite strong opposition among certain ActionSA leaders, cooperation with the MKP or EFF appears far less likely given their substantial ideological differences.
A Potential US-South Africa Rapprochement?
A DA-led coalition would likely pursue a more pragmatic and investment-oriented relationship with the US than the ANC. US-South Africa relations have significantly deteriorated amid Pretoria's deepening trade and economic engagement with China and willingness to host military exchanges and joint exercises with Russia and Iran. Another major source of tension has been the Trump administration's assertion that Pretoria has failed to adequately address violence and discrimination against white South Africans, prompting Washington to roll back health assistance and revoke South Africa's trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The DA has generally sought to avoid such ideological clashes, instead emphasizing trade agreements and foreign investment to preserve ties with Western partners. For example, the party criticized Pretoria's decision to allow Russian and Iranian vessels to participate in BRICS naval exercises off South Africa's coast. In March 2025, the DA sent a delegation to Washington amid growing tensions between Pretoria and the Trump administration. If sustained in a DA-led coalition government, such initiatives could improve prospects for restoring AGOA benefits and public health cooperation while expanding US investment and development initiatives in South Africa.
There are also important distinctions in how the DA approaches relations with China that Washington may view as beneficial to its strategic objectives on the continent. Like the ANC, the DA seeks to maintain South Africa's commercial partnership with China. However, the party has demonstrated a greater willingness to diversify the country's international partnerships, even at the risk of creating tension with Beijing. In March 2025, the DA criticized South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation for its decision to downgrade the Taipei Liaison Office in Pretoria, arguing that the move prompted Taipei to restrict exports of silicon semiconductor chips, threatening manufacturing jobs in the country. The party also defended DA Federal Chairperson Ivan Meyer after China sanctioned him for visiting Taiwan to discuss expanding trade and economic ties with the Western Cape. These cases suggest the DA is less concerned than the ANC with accommodating China’s foreign policy preferences. For Washington, a South African government pursuing a more balanced approach toward major powers could create additional opportunities for cooperation in critical minerals and other strategic sectors.
Implications for Businesses
South Africa's political trajectory is becoming less predictable but potentially more competitive. A stronger DA presence in municipal and national politics could increase pressure for reforms aimed at improving delivery of public services, modernizing infrastructure, combating crime and corruption, and attracting foreign investment. Such changes could be particularly beneficial for firms operating in energy, manufacturing, logistics and critical minerals, as these sectors have been constrained by unreliable infrastructure and policy uncertainty.
A DA-led coalition would not fundamentally alter South Africa's economic relationship with China, which remains one of the country's largest trading partners and investors. However, the party's willingness to diversify South Africa's international partnerships could create new opportunities for US and other firms seeking access to strategic sectors. At the same time, if the DA pursues a trade agreement, investment framework, or other forms of economic cooperation with Taiwan, China could respond with additional sanctions against DA leaders or reduce economic engagement, potentially complicating the operating environment for Chinese firms and projects in the country.
The ANC nevertheless remains a prominent force in national politics, and a DA-led government is far from assured. The party continues to face challenges expanding support among black South Africans, who comprise the vast majority of the electorate, and its reform agenda could be constrained if the MKP, EFF, or other smaller parties gain influence ahead of the 2029 general election. Should the ANC retain leadership of the next government, South Africa's foreign policy is likely to remain broadly consistent, preserving close ties with China and continued engagement with Russia and Iran despite tensions with Washington. Political fragmentation could produce legislative gridlock and delay the passage of much-needed economic reforms. The GNU has periodically struggled with consensus, as Parliament failed to pass a budget three times in 2025 due to opposition from the DA to tax hikes.
