Overview
On September 17th, the US announced the pending sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has long sought the purchase, but it has proven controversial for critics in Washington concerned with Saudi Arabia’s ties to China and consequences for Israel’s qualitative military edge. Washington’s agreement to sell Riyadh the world’s most advanced multirole stealth fighter would make it the first Middle Eastern country other than Israel to operate the aircraft. And occurring against the backdrop of an escalating US-Iran war, the sale could have significant implications for the regional balance of power, Gulf defense independence, Iranian security perceptions, US-Gulf partnerships, and the operating environment for regional businesses and international commodities.
Contents of the Deal, and Next Steps
Following weeks of reports of an incoming deal, the US Department of State recently announced an intended Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Saudi Arabia. The proposed sale comprises 48 F-35A Lightning II fighter jets, and related equipment, for $24.3 billion. The notification kicks off a Congressional review process that gives the legislature 30 in-session days to disapprove the sale with a joint resolution, which is subject to presidential veto. Congress has never successfully blocked an FMS via resolution of disapproval, although these measures have been passed and vetoed. This occurred most recently in 2019, when President Trump vetoed multiple resolutions blocking sales to Saudi Arabia (and the UAE) following the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. If the F-35 sale is not blocked, the contract will move ahead, and the Kingdom will take delivery of its first jets in three to five years, achieving full readiness in five to seven years.
Why Riyadh Wants F-35s, and why the US Wants to Sell Them
Saudi Arabia has sought, unsuccessfully, to purchase F-35s for over a decade. A sale has almost occurred repeatedly: twice during his first term, President Trump signaled that the US was close to selling the aircraft to Saudi Arabia, but the deals went nowhere. At the end of President Biden’s term, the US and Saudi Arabia almost inked a comprehensive defense agreement, which would have included F-35s and other commitments, in exchange for Saudi normalization with Israel. However, the deal fell apart following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel in 2023.
The Saudi desire for F-35s is multi-faceted. First and foremost, the F-35 is the stealthiest multirole fighter jet in the world and well-suited to missions including aerial battle, ground strikes and reconnaissance (making it more versatile than the stealthier F-22 Raptor). Saudi Arabia sees the F-35 as a good operational fit given its strong focus on air power, a matter of historic prestige as well as strategy. Air superiority has long been important in the region, in part because the US has historically supplemented regional navies. That calculus has only sharpened given the new war with Iran, which has underscored the importance of air superiority and offensive strike capabilities.
But perhaps most importantly, Washington and Riyadh have long seen closer military cooperation and major FMS as a key way to solidify and expand the bilateral relationship. For Saudi Arabia, investment in American defense technology is a way to signify its commitment to Washington, as well as create a pretext for continued military interaction in the form of training, maintenance, and greater interoperability. For the US, Saudi purchases of US defense technology keep the Kingdom within its military orbit, preventing drift towards Russia or China (which Washington sees as its major great power competitors in the Middle East). The ongoing US-Iran war has underscored the need to reinforce the bilateral relationship. The Gulf states have borne the brunt of Iran’s attacks, and the US is eager to signal military commitment to its partners. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has been accused of charting a separate path from the US and the UAE with regard to issues including engagement with Iran, partnership with Israel, and oil production. The Kingdom is happy to signal alignment with the US by procuring a US system that precludes some military cooperation with Russia or China.
The Trump administration also considers FMS a helpful boost to the American defense industry. Especially in his first term, President Trump sought large FMS as a policy to strengthen the US’ major defense producers. New sales of F-35s also bring down the high per-unit cost of the program –$82.5 to 92 million each making the jets among the most expensive globally. Finally, the White House sees sales of advanced tech as a way to boost the independent capabilities of major defense partners, a key goal as the US seeks to reduce its military commitments worldwide.
Lingering Concerns: Chinese Tech and Israel’s QME
Significant concerns remain in Washington. Chief among them is the potential for Chinese espionage; Riyadh has a close defense partnership with China and uses its technology throughout its basic infrastructure. A recently-leaked Defense Intelligence Agency report raised concerns about whether the US could maintain a secure site for the F-35 technology due to Chinese military access to Saudi bases and Saudi Arabia’s extensive use of Chinese technology in telecoms infrastructure. The report notes that the US may ask Saudi Arabia to limit military cooperation with China and to remove certain technologies from defense applications – a difficult ask given that Gulf countries have historically seen such requests as an infringement on their sovereignty. Concerns have sharpened in recent weeks as the extent of rising Saudi-Chinese military cooperation has become clear; last week, reports claimed that Saudi Arabia used a Chinese Dongfeng 15 missile in a strike on the Houthis in Yemen, which would have marked the first confirmation that Saudi has purchased Chinese missiles (long suspected by the US) and the first deployment of the Dongfeng 15 in the Middle East.
The other challenge is the implication for Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). The US’ obligation to protect Israel’s regional military superiority is codified into law in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 and builds upon decades of US commitments to defending Israel against regional threats. While US-Israeli relations have shifted in recent years, many in Washington remain vehemently opposed to degrading the QME. Israel is likely especially perturbed that, unlike in previous proposals, the sale does not include a quid pro quo normalization with Israel (although it may be a part of the recent US-Saudi nuclear agreement). Similarly, there has been no discussion of potentially selling a stripped-down version of the jets to the Kingdom, as was reported during a potential 2020 sale to the UAE. Jerusalem is reportedly already planning to seek more advanced weaponry from the US as compensation, with reports from Israeli media suggesting space-based weapons, indigenous production of interceptor aircraft, or bunker-buster munitions.
What the Sale Means for the Region
After years of speculation and near-misses, the long-sought sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia will have an impact on the Middle Eastern balance of power and the strategic landscape there. The aircraft, given its long production time, will not have an immediate impact on military capabilities in the region. However, the sale already speaks volumes about the evolving US-Saudi relationship. Like the nuclear cooperation agreement announced in July, the US is accepting some risks to approve the sale, with no concrete concessions (like normalization with Israel) in exchange. While the US has cast both deals as a win, they may speak more to Washington’s efforts to reclaim influence and trust damaged by the Iran war.
The contract is also already prompting regional shifts: the UAE, which has looked for F-35s on the same timeline as Saudi Arabia, will likely renew its requests, which will heighten concerns of technology leak to China. The sales could also exacerbate growing Saudi-Emirati competition, already playing out in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. Israel’s reported efforts to seek very advanced weaponry may make Iran feel more threatened, amping up incentives for Iran to retain military leverage and seek a nuclear weapon. F-35 deployment could also bring about greater defense independence for Saudi Arabia and the US’ other Gulf partners, a catch-22 for the US: while Washington has long wanted its Gulf partners to handle more of their own defense, it also fears them pursuing disparate or even competing priorities. These potential implications portend a more fragmented security landscape featuring more empowered players with sometimes disparate objectives. This could create an even more difficult-to-predict operating environment for regional business and international commodities, with protracted risks to international shipping, energy markets, and Gulf investment outflows.
On the upside, greater security capability in the Gulf could permit the US to offload more responsibilities to its partners, potentially increasing security (if Gulf capitals coordinate – never guaranteed) and allowing the US to refocus its attention elsewhere. Boosted demand for US defense articles is also a benefit to the US defense industrial base, parts of which are struggling to keep up with Iran war expenditures. Of course, the sale is not yet set in stone. The process can be halted by the president at any stage before delivery – in 2021, a similar deal to sell F-35s to the UAE as part of its normalization with Israel was tabled after its announcement (but not formal approval) over Chinese espionage concerns. Similarly, a new administration could halt the sale at any point.
