Overview
The civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed between the US and Saudi Arabia last month was a historic and long-anticipated step for the bilateral partnership. For Saudi Arabia, the deal is a move to cement long-term US partnership amid anxieties around American retrenchment, and to free up more oil for export. For the US, it is an effort to reestablish its leadership in nuclear technology (and thus, proliferation norms), create new opportunities for America’s nuclear sector, and bolster its regional standing amid ongoing conflict. But misalignments over the content of the deal have prompted concerns of a regional arms race and laid bare the diversifying strategic landscape of the Middle East, not to mention cast doubt on whether it will move forward at all. A successful deal presents upsides for the American nuclear sector and the bilateral US-Saudi relationship (a key strategic and economic partnership), but also presents risks for global proliferation. Either way, the deal sheds light on the shifting Middle Eastern security architecture, featuring accelerated hedging, multiplying mini-lateral blocs, and a reduced guarantor role for the US.
What is (and is Not) in the Deal
The civil nuclear technology agreement announced between the US and Saudi Arabia late last month represents the culmination of years of talks and Saudi aspirations. The Biden administration reportedly came close to inking a nuclear deal in the final year of his presidency (as part of a broader defense pact, potentially including normalization with Israel), and Riyadh and the Trump administration signed a preliminary agreement last fall. The final text of the deal has not been released, but it appears to constitute a 30-year technology sharing agreement under which American entities will jointly build and administer nuclear power infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia. The agreement reportedly comprises tens of billions in potential deals for American nuclear technology entities and foreign partners.
Notably, the deal does not include a “Gold Standard” agreement or accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol. The former permanently prohibits domestic enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of spent fuel, while the latter establishes the most stringent level of independent monitoring available. The deal does reportedly permit a two-year study on the feasibility of domestic enrichment, followed either by a ten-year prohibition on enrichment or domestic enrichment in a US-run “black box” facility that would limit knowledge transfer. The provision is notably weak as an anti-enrichment measure. Even if domestic enrichment is ruled out following the study and a ten-year ban is enacted, constructing a large reactor typically takes at least seven years, meaning the enrichment ban could expire relatively soon after a reactor comes online. This would leave only a limited window in which the agreement would actually constrain Riyadh’s ability to develop domestic enrichment capabilities.
In a surprise remark alongside the announcement of the deal, President Trump claimed that the deal would not move forward unless the Kingdom agreed to permanently forego domestic enrichment, and to normalize relations with Israel. The announcement, reportedly a shock to negotiators on both sides, has quickly cast doubt on the implementation of the deal. The prohibition on enrichment explicitly contradicts agreed-upon terms, and normalization with Israel is a non-starter for Saudi Arabia barring concrete commitments on a pathway to statehood for Palestine.
Global Arms Race Concerns
Critics argue that Saudi nuclear capabilities could heighten proliferation risks and accelerate a regional arms race. Their concerns stem partly from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s 2018 statement that, if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would “follow suit as soon as possible.” Although Riyadh has since sought to soften that rhetoric, its underlying logic remains: a nuclear Iran would pose an existential threat, requiring an equivalent Saudi deterrent.
The risk is amplified by worsening regional insecurity and declining confidence in the US security umbrella. States may increasingly hedge against threats, and against a growing number of nuclear-threshold powers, pursuing latent nuclear capabilities of their own. Meanwhile, global nonproliferation norms are weakening. The lapse of New START in February left the US and Russia without a bilateral nuclear arms-control framework to manage risks. Japan’s public debate around its longstanding nonnuclear principles has grown more ambiguous, while leaders in Poland, Germany, and France have openly discussed nuclear deterrence and nuclearization.
Without a permanent enrichment ban, proliferation concerns will persist. Even if the agreement collapses, Saudi Arabia is likely to pursue nuclear cooperation with China or other suppliers that have historically imposed fewer restrictions. Civilian enrichment infrastructure and expertise can preserve an eventual path to weapons-grade enrichment.
The Nuclear Agreement amid Rising Regional Great Power Competition
For both Saudi Arabia and the US, the nuclear technology deal was an opportunity to cement strategic alignment in a troubled moment for the bilateral relationship. Saudi Arabia doubts American security commitments given longstanding concerns over US regional retrenchment and a pivot to Asia, but also increasingly doubts the value of the American security umbrella following Iranian targeting since February. The US seeks to reassure Saudi Arabia and its other key Gulf partners, consolidate a pro-Israel regional bloc, and prevent strategic drift towards China. Further, the Trump administration is interested in re-centering the US as a leader in nuclear technology exports and, thus, in setting nonproliferation norms. But rather than signaling partnership, doubts over the deal have laid bare the extent of Gulf hedging amid the US’ thinning strategic dominance in the Middle East.
A Saudi commentator close to the court put it starkly in a Washington Post op-ed a week after the deal was announced: “if the US pushes too hard, Saudi Arabia could partner with China instead.” Indeed, Saudi Arabia would be only the second regional power to choose an American nuclear power architecture—part of a widespread perception in the Middle East that American partnership comes with strings. The UAE, which signed a 123 Agreement with the US in 2009, is the only regional state subject to Gold Standard enrichment prohibitions. Egypt and Türkiye, for example, initially considered partnering with America to develop nuclear power but balked at a permanent enrichment ban. Both states now house nuclear reactors administered by Russia. Jordan similarly resisted US efforts to institute an enrichment ban and constructed a training reactor in partnership with the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute in 2016. In 2025, Iraq announced deals with Russia and China to explore nuclear cooperation on small nuclear reactors.
The potential breakdown of the Saudi nuclear deal is also taking place against the backdrop of a changing security architecture in the Middle East. Almost six months into the war in Iran, regional powers are accelerating their efforts to diversify their strategic partnerships, and the American-led order of the past several decades is deteriorating. Regional powers are not abandoning US partnership, but they are spreading out their options: the UAE, for example, decisively sided with the US- and Israeli-led bloc in the war against Iran, conducting several airstrikes against Iran and its proxies, leaving OPEC+, and doubling down on the US partnership via economic partnership. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has distanced itself from the US position, blocking a US-led effort to open the Strait of Hormuz over retaliation concerns and bolstering its other relationships. Just last week, it broadened the mutual defense agreement signed last year with Pakistan to include Türkiye, part of a newly-formed “R4” bloc with Egypt. All four countries have embraced more direct relations with Iran, staunch support of Palestine, and growing wariness of American strategic leadership in the region.
But strategic partnerships are not splitting cleanly: the UAE, Qatar, and other Gulf countries are openly engaging with Iran to promote a negotiated end to the conflict, or at least secure bilateral détentes (likely already including under-the-table Strait of Hormuz tolls, against American efforts). While the US will never cease to be a primary partner to Middle Eastern allies, its days as the central security guarantor and sole arbiter of norms and security architecture are over. The resulting landscape will leave the US with less responsibility as the sole security guarantor (a longtime American goal), but also with less influence on the region’s strategic direction.
