Overview
The presence of US forces in Latin American counternarcotics operations has entered a new chapter as the Trump administration steps up engagement with Shield of the Americas partners to authorize direct land strikes and joint operations with US military personnel to combat cartels. The US has historically supported allied anti-narcotics operations in the region through equipment and intelligence sharing. The new model being deployed in Ecuador represents a shift to more direct involvement, which the Trump administration seeks to replicate across the region. This model has been welcomed by some right-wing governments, but comes with legal and geostrategic downside risks, including that strikes over the past year have failed to meaningfully achieve their intended purpose of reducing drug trafficking to the US. Still, the recent US actions in Ecuador appears to be setting a new model for US military involvement across the Western Hemisphere.
Ecuador Raids Target Transnational Groups with US Boots on the Ground
Last week, 50 US troops from USSOUTHCOM and members of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) collaborated with 320 Ecuadorian police officers in the coastal city of Guayaquil to dismantle a criminal network with ties to Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). The CJNG is one of 21 Latin American gangs designated by the Trump administration as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a designation historically dominated by groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State. The designation of transnational criminal organizations like the CJNG, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Tren de Aragua, Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho, and Ecuadorian gangs like Los Choneros, Los Lobos and Los Chone Killers as FTOs has set the stage for unprecedented US military engagement in the region.
The recent US-Ecuador joint operation resulted in the arrests of 30 individuals allegedly tied to the CJNG following an eight-month investigation. The group was accused of organizing the distribution of drugs from Colombia to Central America, the US and Europe through the ports of Guayaquil. Ecuador sits between Colombia and Peru, the world’s two largest producers of cocaine, and around 70 percent of the world’s cocaine flows through Ecuador. As homicide rates in Ecuador have skyrocketed in recent years, the conservative government of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has engaged closely with the Trump administration to crack down on cartels. Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Roberto Kury praised the results of recent cooperation between the US and Ecuador at the UN General Assembly last week, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio highlighted the integration of elite US forces in Ecuador during his recent visit to Quito.
Ecuador as a Test Case for a New Regional Model
In addition to deploying US forces, the Trump administration is also seeking to expand direct airstrikes on land in allied Latin American countries. In March, a US-Ecuador joint airstrike under operation “Total Extermination” targeted a suspected drug trafficking camp near Ecuador’s border with Colombia using a combination of aircraft, watercraft and drones. In June, a US airstrike in Venezuela’s Bolívar state killed Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores ("Niño Guerrero"), the head of Tren de Aragua. The Pentagon is more frequently using high-tech drones in the region to map drug smuggling routes and increasingly sees land strikes as an option to disrupt trafficking networks. Within the Pentagon, Joint Task Force Southern Spear, which has been leading the strikes on marine targets in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific over the past year, has now been incorporated into the broader Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM), suggesting an expanded scope of operations.
With the recent addition of Chile, 20 countries across the Americas are now members of the Shield of the Americas, also known as the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C). Of these, multiple have made agreements with the US allowing some form of US troop presence on their territory. Last year, Ecuador’s national assembly even approved the establishment of a US-installed military base on Ecuadorian territory. Noboa had campaigned to change Ecuador’s constitution to reverse a ban on foreign military bases dating back to 2008, but the effort was blocked in a referendum late last year.
The US is expanding its military footprint across the region, recently signing an agreement with Colombia on August 12 to enhance military cooperation. The agreement allows US joint military operations to target narco-terrorist networks on Colombian soil. The new administration of Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella is seeking to realign his country’s security posture with the Trump administration, reversing course from his predecessor’s “Total Peace” policy of negotiating with remnants of the FARC. Colombia has historically been one of the US’ closest regional security partners, especially through the Plan Colombia initiative that was launched in 1999 to advance counternarcotics, military aid and economic development. However, even during that period, US troops only played a supportive role that didn’t come close to the degree of direct involvement currently taking place in Ecuador.
US Security Cooperation Terms Remain Uneven Across the Region
Beyond Ecuador and Colombia, the US is more broadly expanding its security footprint, although to varying degrees. Panama has become a regional security hub, especially as it prepares for spillover effects from the new Colombian government’s offensive against cartels. Panama’s role includes hosting Panamax canal defense exercises and jungle operations training with the US after signing a 2025 MoU authorizing US forces to operate from three key Panamanian facilities — Rodman Naval Station, Howard Air Force Base, and Cristóbal Colón Naval Air Base — with Panamanian oversight. The US had signed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) agreements with additional countries including Paraguay and Jamaica, which formalize the terms under which US forces may be present on another country’s territory for approved activities. The US military and Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) have engaged in joint training exercises and officials met to discuss security cooperation at the A3C Forum in Panama in August. Paraguayan President Santiago Peña signed a SOFA agreement with the US in March; however, the terms of that agreement only allow joint training and military cooperation, prohibiting joint combat operations or permanent US military bases on Paraguayan soil.
In some cases, ambiguity remains around the degree to which Latin American countries have consented to US military operations on their territory. Speaking from Panama in August, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras had agreed to allow US military operations on their soil. Hegseth’s statement was disputed by the Guatemalan government, which denied reaching such an agreement. Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo has previously called for security cooperation with Washington but insisted that any joint counternarcotics operations with the US would require congressional approval.
Limited Results and Risks to Regional Stability
The US’ intensifying defense cooperation in Latin America and its patchwork of security cooperation frameworks presents new risks. As Joint Task Force Southern Spear expands beyond maritime strikes to new jurisdictions, the risk of reputational, operational and legal challenges may amplify. Criticism of the strategy is rising: last week, the UN released a report stating that US boat strikes could plausibly constitute crimes against humanity, and the US-Ecuador joint land strike in March was subject to a New York Times investigation alleging that the target was not a drug lab, but rather a dairy farm. Noboa has granted immunity from criminal prosecution to US military personnel engaged in counternarcotics operations in Ecuador. Criminal liability for extrajudicial killings may eventually be sought at the international level, although US forces are de facto immune from international prosecution due to US law and the US’ non-membership of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The US has also urged Latin American allies to leave the body; Venezuela filed its exit notice in July.
In addition to prompting negative sentiment, US military expansion also creates additional risks for US strategic and commercial interests by multiplying potential targets for disruption by US adversaries. The US presence in Panama, for instance, interferes with the Panama Canal’s status as a neutral zone. To reinforce this, Panama has invited more than a dozen new countries to join the Protocol to the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, reflecting the Panamanian government’s continued desire to maintain the official neutrality of the Western Hemisphere’s most vital piece of infrastructure. Still, as the US pilot model in Ecuador continues to gain traction in more countries across Latin America, both state and non-state actors may also see a proliferation of potential targets. Increased hostility by bad actors towards American assets in the region, human and fixed, would alter the calculus for businesses interested in investing in Latin America. Meanwhile, reports indicate that US strikes over the past year have not meaningfully reduced the smuggling of drugs into the US, casting doubt on whether the results of direct military involvement outweigh the risks.
