Overview
On April 12, Péter Magyar’s center-right Tisza party secured 138 out of 199 seats in Hungary’s National Assembly, a supermajority capable of passing constitutional amendments that reverse years of institutional capture by Viktor Orbán's far-right Fidesz party. The new Assembly will convene in a little under a month and will likely approve of a Tisza-led government by June 2026. Magyar’s political legitimacy rests on two mandates: unlocking frozen EU funds through rule-of-law reforms in the short term and creating genuine economic growth in the long term. Magyar will rush to amend the Constitution, but relations with Russia and China will remain balanced in the short term. In terms of upside risks, Magyar’s constructive approach means that EU foreign policy will speak with one voice, including on Ukraine, and could create openings for Western private-sector interests. In terms of downside risk, Magyar’s reforms could become stalled, mirroring Poland’s liberal government.
Magyar’s Domestic Agenda Will Steer Hungary Back to Europe
Magyar owes his victory in part to perceived corruption in Orbán's circle, but crucially also to simultaneous frustration with Hungary’s “Orbánomics” economic model, which sought to decrease Hungary’s dependence on the EU after the 2009 financial crisis. This occurred through state-steered private investment, an “Eastern Opening” strategy towards Russia and China, and generous social spending, including on pro-natalist policies. At first, this led to high growth rates, but the system faltered. After 16 years of Fidesz, Hungarians have the least disposable income in the EU; neighbors like Croatia and Romania have surpassed Hungary in purchasing power; since 2020, prices have inflated an average 57%, twice the EU average (28%); Hungary overall has less foreign direct investment (FDI) than regional peers (about 3% of GDP); and the state invested in commodity sectors, such as automobile component manufacturing and hydrocarbons, instead of high-value sectors.
Magyar staked his political legitimacy on reversing course. The first step will be unlocking EU funds, including €10 billion in post-COVID recovery funds, €7 billion in regional cohesion funds, and €16 billion in undisbursed defense loans from the Security for Europe (SAFE) scheme. The EU budgetary funds are frozen due to Hungary’s damaged rule of law, so Magyar will aim to quickly pass reforms to return Hungary to European democratic standards by the end of August, which is the deadline to receive the post-Covid recovery funds. The undisbursed SAFE funds may be held up as a stick by Brussels to keep Magyar accountable, either to constitutional reforms or lifting Hungary’s veto on the European Commission’s Eurobond-secured €90 billion loan to Ukraine. In any case, Magyar also explicitly campaigned on a constructive rather than antagonistic relationship with Brussels, even when his conservative agenda aligns with Orbán, including on migration. Altogether, frozen EU money could represent a boost of over 10% of Hungary’s GDP.
In a post-election press conference on Monday, Magyar outlined his first steps toward institutional reform, including implementing term limits for the Prime Minister, disclosing secret bilateral treaties (like a recent 12-point pact with Moscow), joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and creating an anti-corruption office.
Hungary Will Gradually Reorient Westwards
Magyar’s leadership will shift Hungary away from Russia, ending Moscow’s bridgehead within the EU. However, this will not happen overnight: Magyar is targeting 2035 for a full phaseout of Russian fuels and will continue advocating for Hungary’s opt-out to EU sanctions. This is because Budapest dramatically increased dependence on Russian fuels under Orbán in a bid for cheap energy, exploiting the discount even after the rest of the EU severed ties. Hungary imported 61% of its crude from Russia before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but increased it to roughly 86% by 2025—a dependence of choice. The swing is also dramatic in the gas market, where Hungary increased its dependence from 57% to over 70%, and in nuclear fuels, where Hungary stockpiled 123 tons of nuclear fuel in 2023 alone, far beyond its annual consumption of 50-80 tons, for its Soviet-era VVER reactors. Moreover, Hungary received a €10 billion state loan from Moscow to build the Paks 2 power plant, composed of two VVER-1200 units that will elevate nuclear energy to 70% of electricity generation. Budapest must repay the debt into the 2040s and will not want to antagonize Moscow.
Given Hungary’s continued dependence on Moscow, Magyar may emulate Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, a conservative populist who occasionally breaks from Brussels’ line to opportunistically pursue perceived self-interests. If so, Magyar will still seek Hungarian exemptions to the EU’s Russia sanctions regime while also exploring new energy opportunities, especially since Russian energy dependence has proven to be a double-edged sword. Hungary’s crude intake capacity is constrained due to interruptions to the Druzbha pipeline, and the discount on Russian Urals has ended due to energy price swings from the Iran war and damage to Russian oil export infrastructure. Hungary’s relationship with Lukoil, its main crude supplier, remains exempt from US sanctions until November, but an extension might not occur. To secure the Lukoil sanctions exemption in November 2025, Orbán agreed to explore the feasibility of American Small Modular Reactor technology and LNG procurement; Magyar may decide to double down on this momentum and look toward France for nuclear fuel or modernizing the Paks 1 nuclear power plant.
Magyar may also be lukewarm on a dramatic switch on China. Under Orbán's opening to the East, Chinese FDI grew dramatically, especially after 2020. In 2023, 44% of China’s FDI in Europe went to Hungary, including in railway projects connecting to the China-owned Greek Port of Piraeus through the Balkans; electric vehicle manufacturing hubs for firms like CATL and BYD; and research hubs for Chinese telecommunications giants, despite warnings from the US and EU regarding communication security. During a May 2024 visit to Beijing, Orbán signed a memorandum on modernizing Hungary’s antiquated nuclear sector with Chinese tech.
The bilateral relationship between Budapest and Beijing puts Hungary on the side of protectionist skeptics, led by Germany, and this will continue under Magyar, who will seek to advance shared interests when found. However, Chinese FDI is unpopular in Hungary, so Magyar will likely be open to certain EU derisking policy or US-led economic security initiatives, including on critical minerals.
Over-the-Horizon: How Magyar Could Re-Shape EU Politics
Magyar’s first official visit will be to Poland, where he anticipates discussions with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a former European Council President, on unfreezing EU funds. However, the meeting is also significant for its implications for reviving the Visegrad Four (V4)—an informal format composed of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia that has fractured since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At one point in the 2010s, the V4 was essentially a Euroskeptic axis led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Czechia’s Andrej Babiš, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and Poland’s Mateusz Morawiecki. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a schism between Hungary and the other V4 members, largely due to Orbán’s close relations with Moscow. With Orbán out of the picture, Magyar has hinted that he is open to enabling EU support to Ukraine, including the €90 billion loan, even if Hungary does not contribute. This position is similar to Babiš, who returned to power in late 2025 and continues to direct Czechia’s joint procurement of 155mm ammunition for Ukraine, even though Czechia no longer contributes financially. Slovakia’s Fico, while soft on Moscow, also balances infrastructure cooperation with Kyiv and is unlikely to obstruct the other V4 if they articulate shared stances on the Ukraine war. Improved foreign policy alignment in the V4 could spill over to other forms of cooperation, including energy diversification, which is a uniquely coupled challenge for the bloc, if not least, less open antagonism.
Magyar’s victory also holds implications for EU foreign policy decision-making, including on EU enlargement. Orbán was the sole veto on opening EU enlargement negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, which are both moving at speed to frontload EU reforms. EU membership has reportedly been discussed between the US and Russia as a potential dimension of a postwar settlement, but the idea is not without controversy. For example, even allies like Poland and Romania will be skeptical of redistributing EU agriculture subsidies regional development funds, and Magyar himself sidestepped the issue during the campaign by suggesting future Ukrainian EU membership will be put to a referendum. But in the short term, Magyar will likely lift Hungary’s sole veto on Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations, which could open the door to Ukrainian participation in EU initiatives. Separately, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has hinted at using the opportunity of Orbán’s loss to implement some form of qualified majority voting in some or all EU foreign policy decisions. This requires unanimity—an uphill battle—as national capitals will be skeptical of losing sovereign decision-making on things like sanctions or EU enlargement.
The Risks
Magyar’s victory removes Orbán, Europe’s core obstructionist, enabling EU foreign policy to better speak with one voice. However, Hungary’s foreign policy will not dramatically shift, especially given Magyar’s former Fidesz credentials and Hungary’s continued dependence on Russian and Chinese investment. In the short term, Magyar will continue Hungary’s balancing policy while accelerating a shift westward. This creates upside risks for Ukraine—which will finally receive an anticipated €90 billion loan from the EU, fiscally enabling its defense for at least another year—in addition to American companies, which could gradually replace Russian and Chinese competitors on the energy and manufacturing sectors.
However, Magyar does not yet have the close relationship that Orbán cultivated with European and American conservatives. At best, Magyar may yet impress Washington with his transatlantic bona fides, much like Poland has under both PiS and its center-right Civic Coalition. In a downside risk scenario, Magyar’s reversal of Fidesz’s institutional capture—including the removal of funds for connected think tanks like Mathias Corvinus Collegium—could antagonize right-wing populists everywhere, preventing a close relationship to Washington. Remnants of Fidesz could attempt to emulate PiS in Poland, obstructing dramatic reform to prevent the unfreezing of EU funds. For example, Hungary’s President could refer legislation to the Fidesz-aligned Constitutional Court in the short term, and though Tisza could remove Fidesz officials from office with their supermajority, they may expend too much political capital doing so, miring their transformation agenda with lawfare battles.
