Overview
First Tuesday Update is our monthly take on current issues in commercial disputes, international arbitration, and judgment enforcement. This month we highlight the first US Supreme Court decision to interpret the text of the Helms-Burton (or LIBERTAD) Act. On May 21, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (No. 24-983), one of two cases currently before the Court involving Title III of the Helms-Burton (or LIBERTAD) Act. Title III provides Americans whose property was confiscated by the Cuban regime a private right of action against any entity that "traffics"[1] in that property. The second case pending decision, following argument in February, is Exxon Mobil v. Corporacion CIMEX (Cuba), et al, which we will report on next month. That case involves the relationship between the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Helms-Burton Act. Steptoe represents ExxonMobil in that case.
In the Havana Docks case, the Court issued an 8–1 decision authored by Justice Thomas, by which it vacated the Eleventh Circuit's judgment and adopted a broad interpretation of what it meant to "traffic" in confiscated "property" under Title III, significantly expanding the statute's potential reach. The Court held that a plaintiff need not establish that a defendant trafficked in the precise property interest the plaintiff originally held; it is sufficient that the defendant used the underlying property confiscated by the Cuban government and to which the plaintiff owns a claim. The decision is a significant victory for holders of certified claims arising from Cuba's post-revolution expropriations and is likely to shape numerous pending cases. But the decision left unresolved certain defenses to be raised upon remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arose from the expropriation of port facilities at the Port of Havana following the Cuban Revolution.
In 1928, Havana Docks Corporation acquired from the Cuban government a usufructuary concession to develop and operate certain docks and related facilities at the Port of Havana. Pursuant to that concession, Havana Docks constructed a terminal building and three piers and operated the facilities for several decades. The concession was scheduled to expire in 2004, at which point the Cuban government would reassume possession of the facilities. The governing concession agreement also provided that Havana Docks would be compensated if the government expropriated the facilities before the concession expired.
That compensation never came. Following Fidel Castro's rise to power, Cuban authorities expropriated Havana Docks' rights without compensation.
Havana Docks subsequently filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), which certified approximately $9 million in losses, plus interest to accumulate and run since the confiscation, placing the current value of the claim in excess of $100 million.
For more than two decades after Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, however, Havana Docks and other claimholders could not pursue Title III claims because successive presidents continuously suspended the statute's private right of action. That changed in 2019, when the Trump administration permitted Title III to take effect.
After the suspension expired, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, alleging they had trafficked in confiscated property by using the Havana port facilities between 2016 and 2019. During that period, the cruise lines transported nearly one million passengers to Cuba and used the disputed docks to embark and disembark passengers while generating substantial revenues from Cuban itineraries.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered summary judgment in favor of Havana Docks and awarded damages exceeding $100 million against each defendant. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that Title III required courts to examine whether the challenged conduct would have interfered with the plaintiff's property rights in a hypothetical world where no confiscation had occurred. Because Havana Docks' concession would have expired in 2004 even absent expropriation, the Eleventh Circuit held that the cruise lines' use of the docks between 2016 and 2019 did not constitute trafficking in Havana Docks' property.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that question.
The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court ground its analysis in the text of the statute, emphasizing that "property" includes both physical property and interests in property. Slip op. at 9-10 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)). It rejected the Eleventh Circuit's counterfactual approach (which required courts to assess whether a defendant's conduct would have interfered with the plaintiff's rights in a world without expropriation), explaining that Title III instead operates as an anti-trafficking regime triggered by the historical act of confiscation. Once property is confiscated, it becomes effectively "tainted," such that subsequent commercial use of that property may give rise to liability to any claimant holding a valid claim. [2]
The Court also rejected the cruise lines' contention that Cuba confiscated only Havana Docks' concession and not the docks themselves. Because the statute defines confiscation to include the seizure of "ownership or control" of property, the Court concluded that Cuba's physical takeover of the facilities constituted confiscation of the docks regardless of the formal ownership arrangements that existed before the seizure.
Notably, the Court expressly declined to address a number of defenses that remain pending in the litigation. Those issues, including the scope of Title III's exception for transactions incident to lawful travel to Cuba, were left for consideration on remand.
The Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Sotomayor joined the Court's opinion in full but wrote separately to emphasize concerns about the scope of Title III's remedial scheme. Although she agreed that the statute's text compelled the majority's interpretation, she noted that the decision may permit multiple defendants who separately traffic in the same confiscated property to face liability for the full amount of a certified claim. Justice Sotomayor observed that this result could produce substantial aggregate damages that far exceed the value of the underlying claim and suggested that Congress, rather than the courts, is best positioned to address any resulting policy concerns. Her concurrence thus underscored the potentially far-reaching consequences of the Court's interpretation while reaffirming that the statutory text governs the analysis.
Justice Kagan dissented, viewing Title III through a narrower lens. In Justice Kagan's view, the only property confiscated from Havana Docks was its usufructuary concession—a limited right to use and operate the docks until 2004. Because Havana Docks never owned the docks themselves, the dissent reasoned that the physical facilities could not constitute the confiscated property relevant to the Title III analysis.
Under that approach, liability could arise only if defendants trafficked in the specific property interest that had been confiscated. Since Havana Docks' concession would have expired in 2004, the cruise lines' use of the docks more than a decade later could not constitute trafficking in that property interest.
The dissent criticized the majority for effectively transforming time-limited property rights into perpetual claims capable of supporting liability indefinitely. Justice Kagan argued that Title III should be interpreted to respect both the spatial and temporal limits of the claimant's original property interest and warned that the Court's interpretation substantially expanded the statute beyond what Congress intended.
Implications for Helms-Burton Litigation
Although the specific issue before the Court arose from the unusual facts of Havana Docks' concession agreement, the decision has broader implications for Title III litigation.
The Court's interpretation significantly expands the statute's reach by decoupling liability from the temporal and structural limits of the claimant's original property interests. Under this framework, once property has been confiscated, later users of that property may face liability regardless of whether the claimant's underlying interest would have expired or otherwise terminated.
This approach materially increases litigation exposure for companies operating—directly or indirectly—in Cuba, particularly where business activities involve infrastructure or assets subject to certified claims. At the same time, as Justice Sotomayor's concurrence underscores, important questions remain unresolved, including the scope of Title III's "lawful travel" exception and the potential for overlapping or cumulative liability across multiple defendants. These issues are likely to shape the next phase of Helms-Burton litigation.
More is certainly to follow from the Court. As Justice Sotomayor's concurrence confirms, there remain a number of fundamental questions of statutory interpretation—including, for example, its "lawful travel" exception—that were not answered expressly by the Court's opinion.
In addition, the Trump administration's increased sanctions have had a material impact on commerce in Cuba as some foreign companies pull out from doing business there. Further potential actions by the administration and their impact will remain ongoing issues.
[1] Defined broadly to encompass a range of activities, including use and commercial benefit. See 22 USC § 6023(13).
[2] "This is not to say that property interests are irrelevant for Title III. A plaintiff can argue that the defendant trafficked in a confiscated property interest by, for example, purchasing, selling, or transferring the interest [under 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(i))." Slip op. at 11.
