Overview
On September 12, 2025, the US House of Representatives' Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (the "Select Committee on the CCP"), and the Committee on Education and the Workforce, jointly issued their majority staff report, Joint Institutes, Divided Loyalties: How the Chinese Communist Party Exploits US University Partnerships to Empower China's Military and Repression. (Read about the report here). In this client alert, we provide updates on recent China-related enforcement, including the Select Committee on the CCP's letter to Columbia University urging it to end its exchange programs with China, and federal charges against three University of Michigan scholars.
Letter to Columbia University
On November 4, 2025, Select Committee on the CCP Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) sent a letter to the Acting President of Columbia University, Claire Shipman. In the letter, Chairman Moolenaar urged Columbia and its student groups "to discontinue any exchange programs that are supported by entities with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)." The letter specifically identifies a student organization called the Greater China Initiative and its planned January 2026 exchange trip to China. The exchange trip is co-sponsored by the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF). The letter cites to committee hearing testimony and describes the CUSEF as an organization that "exist[s] to promote the CCP's narratives and interests . . . and to help the CCP identify foreigners who the party could exploit." Chairman Moolenaar ends the letter by telling Columbia that it should not recognize or promote student groups that accept foreign funding or form partnerships with a foreign agent "known to be engaging in malign influence operations."
Chairman Moolenaar's letter demonstrates how the Select Committee on the CCP and other committees' investigative efforts may target activities beyond higher education institutions' own funding, hiring, and curriculum, including the activities of student groups. This broadened scope of enforcement places additional responsibility on universities to monitor and direct the actions of their student-led groups.
Prosecution of University of Michigan Scholars
On November 5, 2025, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan filed charges of smuggling biological material and making false statements to US Customs and Border Protection officers against three Chinese visiting researchers who were working at the University of Michigan (UM). These were the latest charges in a string of criminal cases stemming from the UM's research activities.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan filed criminal charges against three other Chinese scholars working at UM's Xianzhong Xu laboratory. On June 3, 2025, Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu were charged with smuggling biological material into the United States, which they said was going to be used for research at the laboratory at UM. The next week, Chengxuan Han, a Chinese Ph.D. student who traveled to the United States to work in the UM laboratory, was charged with smuggling biological materials from China to the United States. Han pled no contest in August and Jian plead guilty in November. The criminal action against Han led to UM conducting an internal investigation. According to government press releases, two of the three researchers charged this month allegedly received shipments of biomedical materials from Han and refused to attend a mandatory meeting or participate in the internal investigation.1UM then terminated their employment, making them eligible for removal by the Department of Homeland Security.
The UM cases are similar to others this year, like the prosecution of a Russian-born Harvard laboratory associate who was detained in an immigration detention center and charged with smuggling frog embryos into the United States and making false statements. This reflects the government's interest in pursuing criminal charges against university-affiliated employees with ties to China and other countries of interest. These cases exemplify the important role of universities' compliance and training programs at a time of heightened risk. Universities should ensure, to the extent they can, that researchers take extra precautions when bringing biologic materials, specimens, and other work into the country, especially if it is coming from a higher-risk country like China.
Steptoe will continue to monitor developments in this area and is available to address any client questions or concerns that may arise.
1 Moolenaar Statement on the New Charges Against Former U-M Scholars (Nov. 5, 2025), https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/moolenaar-statement-on-the-new-charges-against-former-u-m-scholars; Three Chinese National scholars from University of Michigan laboratory charged for conspiring to smuggle biological materials into the US (Nov. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-chinese-national-scholars-university-michigan-laboratory-charged-conspiring-smuggle.
