Understanding U.S. Sanctions Against the International Criminal Court

On October 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of State added the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”) to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List pursuant to Executive Order (“EO”) 14203, “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court.” The Trump administration has previously imposed sanctions on 17 individuals associated with the court, including prosecutors and judges. Designating the Court itself is a significant expansion of the program.

As a result, all property and interests in property of the ICC that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally barred from dealing with the Court unless a license or exemption applies.

At the same time, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued four general licenses (“GLs”). The licenses authorize a 180-day maintenance and wind-down period and certain ongoing activity related to telecommunications and enterprise software, pension payments, and the detention of specified individuals. The State Department explained that the 180-day license “is intended to provide time for States Parties [to the Rome Statute] to demonstrate meaningful progress on diplomatic and legal resolutions that address fundamental U.S. concerns regarding the ICC,” and that it “can be adjusted in response to the success or failure of such efforts.”

Background: The ICC Sanctions Program 

Executive Order 14203

President Trump signed EO 14203 on February 6, 2025, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the National Emergencies Act, and section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The EO states that the ICC “has, without a legitimate basis, asserted jurisdiction over, and opened preliminary investigations concerning, personnel of the United States and certain of its allies, including Israel,” and notes that it issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The EO explains that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute or member of the ICC. The President determined that “any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute protected persons… constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” and declared a national emergency.

This was not the first time ICC officials had been sanctioned. During his first term, President Trump imposed targeted sanctions on ICC officials pursuant to EO 13928. Those sanctions were later lifted when President Biden issued EO 14022 on April 1, 2021, terminating EO 13928 and revoking the sanctions program. Just days after President Trump returned to office in January 2025, Washington again moved to impose sanctions related to the ICC.

• EO 14203 blocks the property and interests in property of the person listed in its Annex, or persons subsequently designated pursuant to the order, and broadly prohibits U.S. persons from dealing with blocked persons. The order authorizes the blocking of any foreign person determined:

(A) “to have directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute a protected person without the consent of that person’s country of nationality;”

(B) “to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,” such activity or any blocked person; or

(C) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted for or on behalf of, any blocked person.

• “Protected persons” include any U.S. person (unless the United States consents to ICC jurisdiction or joins the Rome Statute) and any citizen or lawful resident of a U.S. ally that has not consented to ICC jurisdiction or is not a State Party. The EO defines “U.S. allies” as NATO members and “major non-NATO allies.”

OFAC implements the EO through the International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 528 (“ICCSR”).

Who Has Been Sanctioned, and Why

Including the Court itself, the State Department has now designated 18 persons under EO 14203. The designations have focused on two lines of ICC activity: (1) the investigation authorized with respect to U.S. personnel in connection with Afghanistan, and (2) the proceedings concerning Israeli officials, in particular the arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. Over time the program has extended beyond ICC judges and prosecutors to a UN special rapporteur, Palestinian non-governmental organizations, and senior Court leadership.

The ICC has stated that it would focus the Afghanistan investigation on alleged crimes committed by the Taliban and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) and would “deprioritize other aspects of this investigation,” including allegations involving U.S. forces, the CIA, and former Afghan government forces. U.S. officials, for their part, have said the designations respond to the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over nationals of non-State Parties.

The October 9, 2026 Designation of the ICC

On October 9, 2026, the State Department designated the ICC under section 1(a)(ii)(A) of EO 14203. In his accompanying statement, Secretary Rubio said: “We exercised discretion and deferred this designation out of respect for our relationships and in hopes that the ICC would changes course or would otherwise be restrained by States Parties. However, neither the ICC nor States Parties have yet taken meaningful steps to address our concerns.” He added that “[w]e have structured this action to provide an opportunity for States Parties to negotiate and present a solution to address our concerns,” and that “[i]f these efforts do not bear fruit, we will continue to adjust accordingly.”

ICC and European leaders responded strongly to the court’s designation. The ICC called on its 125 member states to support the Court, stating that “[t]he Court cannot stand alone. Its fate now rests also in the hands of the states that created it.” The European Union’s foreign policy chief said on social media that the six-month period “offers a window for dialogue” while Belgium’s foreign minister called for activation of the EU Blocking Statute. Reuters also reported that Court officials had spent months preparing for possible institution-wide sanctions, including by “shifting office computers from Microsoft software to open-source equivalents and making new arrangements for banking and health insurance.”

The General Licenses

On October 9, 2026, OFAC issued four general licenses under the ICCSR. Each one authorizes the use, debit, or credit of the ICC’s blocked accounts for the authorized transactions. Each one also expressly excludes transactions involving any other person blocked under the ICCSR, such as individually designated judges and officials, unless separately authorized.

GL 13 authorizes all ICCSR-prohibited transactions “that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving the [ICC],” through 12:01 a.m. EDT, April 7, 2027. OFAC provides examples of authorized transactions, including:

• continued operations, including States Parties’ payments to the ICC;
• salary payments, health insurance, and medical services for the ICC’s employees, grantees, or contractors;
• rent, utilities, taxes, insurance, and other fees;
• routine services such as subscription-based or other standard commercial services; and
• payments on invoices for authorized transactions, or for transactions incurred before October 9, 2026.

States Parties should not assume this license will be renewed. As noted above, the State Department has indicated that the license may be adjusted based on the outcome of diplomatic efforts during the 180-day window.

GL 14 authorizes certain telecommunications, internet-based communications services, and enterprise software transactions involving the ICC.

GL 15 authorizes the processing of certain ICC-related pension payments.

GL 16 authorizes certain transactions necessary to the continued detention of nine individuals held by the ICC.

Practical Implications for U.S. Persons

As defined in the EO, a “U.S. person” is “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including a foreign branch, subsidiary, or employee of such entity), or any person lawfully in the United States.” Foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. companies are not U.S. persons under this definition, but they should keep in mind the facilitation and evasion considerations discussed below. Key points include:

• Identify and block ICC property; report to OFAC. Banks, insurers, custodians, and other holders of ICC property or interests in property must block them after the expiration of the wind-down period and report to OFAC. Blocked funds generally must be held in a blocked, interest-bearing account in the United States, and setoffs against blocked property are prohibited. Unlicensed attachments, judgments, liens, and other judicial process against blocked property are “null and void.”
• Inventory existing relationships and map them to the GLs. Vendors, landlords, service providers, insurers, payroll and benefits providers, and financial institutions dealing with the ICC should determine which activity falls under GL 13 (time-limited) and which falls under GLs 14-16 (no stated expiration). Activity authorized only by GL 13 should be wound down by the April 7, 2027 deadline unless an extension is granted.
• Watch for other blocked persons. None of the GLs authorizes dealings with individually designated ICC officials, judges, NGOs, or other SDNs. A transaction that is permissible with the Court may still be prohibited if a designated individual has an interest in it.
• Reference the license. OFAC regulations advise that payments routed through the U.S. financial system in reliance on a license should reference the relevant general or specific license to avoid blocking or rejection.
• New or expanded activities may not be authorized. GL 13 covers the “maintenance” of existing operations, contracts, and agreements, together with routine and standard commercial services. However, it may not cover new or expanded activities involving the ICC.
• Individuals. U.S. citizens or residents employed by or contracting with the ICC can continue to receive “salary payments, health insurance, and medical services” under GL 13 during the license period. After the license expires, they will require a specific license from OFAC.

Practical Implications for Non-U.S. Persons

EO 14203 does not by its terms prohibit non-U.S. persons from dealing with the ICC outside U.S. jurisdiction. Non-U.S. persons nonetheless face meaningful exposure:

• Designation risk. Under section 1(a)(ii)(B), any foreign person may be designated for having “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,” any blocked person, which now includes the Court itself. This is a discretionary authority, and the general licenses do not technically apply to activities outside of OFAC jurisdiction. A non-U.S. person that continues to support the Court therefore takes on some risk of designation, although the general licenses, and particularly the 180-day GL 13, may indicate how the U.S. government is likely to view routine maintenance activity during the license period.
• U.S. nexus. Transactions that are “within (or transiting) the United States” are covered, including U.S. dollar payments cleared through U.S. correspondent banks. Payments to or from the ICC in U.S. dollars are therefore likely to be blocked or rejected unless a license applies. Non-U.S. persons that cause U.S. persons to violate the prohibitions, or that engage in evasion or conspiracy, may face U.S. enforcement.
• U.S. counterparties and service providers. Non-U.S. companies that rely on U.S. banks, cloud and software providers, insurers, or U.S.-person personnel should expect those counterparties to scrutinize any ICC-related activity. U.S.-person employees of non-U.S. companies are bound by the prohibitions, so they may need to be walled off from ICC-related matters.
• States Parties’ payments. GL 13 expressly identifies States Parties’ payments to the ICC as covered maintenance activity through April 7, 2027. Government contributors and their banks should consider how payments will be made after that date if the license is not extended.
• Conflicting legal obligations. The EU’s foreign policy chief has said the bloc “has options to ensure that (the ICC) can continue its vital work,” and Belgium’s foreign minister has called for activation of the EU Blocking Statute. If such measures are adopted, companies subject to both EU and U.S. jurisdiction could face conflicting obligations. Multinationals should monitor these developments closely.
• Travel. ICC officials, employees, and agents, along with designated persons and their immediate family members, may be subject to U.S. entry restrictions under the EO.

Looking Ahead

The State Department has tied the scope and duration of GL 13 to the outcome of diplomatic efforts, and OFAC has said it intends to expand the ICCSR. Organizations that do business with the ICC, its staff, or its contractors should promptly (1) inventory their ICC exposure, (2) confirm which activity is covered by which general license, (3) plan for the April 7, 2027 expiration of GL 13, (4) screen for individually designated persons, and (5) monitor further U.S., EU, and States Parties’ actions.

For additional information regarding these actions please contact a member of Steptoe’s Economic Sanctions Practice.