Overview
I. Abstract
Over the last decade, corporate human rights litigation against companies has evolved at a rapid pace. The most prominent ground of such claims in the US was long the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),[1] which provides for federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate torts based on violations of 'the law of nations.' Since 2013, however, the US Supreme Court has limited the ATS's reach in a series of decisions,[2] which has encouraged claimants to look for other avenues in US federal and state courts—as well as in other countries.[3] Two recent landmark jury verdicts—In re Chiquita Brands International and Kashef v. BNP Paribas—suggest an alternate route to corporate human rights liability in US courts drawing on human rights-related sanctions violations. This piece highlights the implications of the two cases for corporate human rights liability, potentially opening the door to an array of civil claims leveraging underlying compliance failures.
II. Sanctions and Civil Liability: General Principles
In the United States, civil liability for admitted sanctions violations generally does not provide victims with a private right of action for damages. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which authorizes presidential sanctions authority, provides for civil penalties enforced exclusively by the government. As a general principle, "where a statute expressly provides for a civil remedy … no private right of action arises."[4] The DC Circuit has held definitively that "there is no private right of action for violation of United States banking sanctions under the common law."[5] This reflects the broader principle that sanctions statutes administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) do not create implied private causes of action. In the wake of Chiquita and Kashef, however, plaintiffs may be able to leverage sanctions violations for more creative causes of action, independent of statutory authority, to seek significant potential damages from companies.
III. Chiquita: Terrorist Finance and Civil Liability
From 1997 to 2004, Chiquita Brands International, through its Colombian subsidiary Banadex, made payments totaling over $1.7 million to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a right-wing paramilitary group. In 2001, the AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist.[6] Chiquita continued payments for three years after the designation, even after receiving formal legal advice to cease. In 2007, Chiquita pleaded guilty to federal charges and paid a $25 million criminal fine.[7]
On June 10, 2024, a federal jury in the Southern District of Florida found Chiquita liable for the wrongful deaths of eight Colombian men murdered by the AUC and awarded $38.3 million in damages.[8]On October 18, 2024, the court rejected Chiquita's post-trial motion to reduce the award to approximately $50,000 per plaintiff, entering judgment for the full amount.[9] Chiquita has appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
IV. Kashef: Financial Institutions and the Sanctions-Genocide Nexus
In October 2025, BNP Paribas (BNPP) was held liable in the Southern District of New York in a class action filed by victims of Sudanese government violence and genocide. The civil case follows a 2014 US Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation which charged BNPP with conspiring to violate two US human rights-related sanctions regimes and concealing its transactions with sanctioned Sudanese entities, including Sudan's government.[10] BNPP pled guilty, agreeing to the DOJ's statement of facts—including that it played a critical role in Sudan's economy by financing oil exports—and paid a penalty of over $8.9 billion.[11]
Sudanese refugees filed a civil suit in May 2016, relying on BNPP's guilty plea in the DOJ investigation to allege that BNPP enabled Sudan to commit genocide.[12] The case was governed by Swiss law.[13] Most of the claims were initially dismissed by the district court due to timeliness and the act of state doctrine, which prevents US courts from passing judgment on the actions of a foreign government.[14] The Second Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the genocide was an official government action and that, in any event, genocide violates jus cogen norms—fundamental norms of international law—so can never be considered an official act of state.[15]
A class of over 20,000 Sudanese refugees and asylees was certified in May 2024.[16] Trial on the claims of three bellwether plaintiffs commenced on September 11, 2025. On October 17, a unanimous jury awarded them $20.75 million. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for prejudgment interest under Swiss law at 5% per annum, which, if granted, would bring the three-plaintiff judgment to approximately $40.483 million.[17]
V. Significance and Practical Implications
The two rulings are subject to multiple appeals. For now, however, they have five significant implications for the design of corporate sanctions compliance programs and potential human rights-related corporate liability in the US.
1. Foreign Substantive Law as the Basis for Liability
Arguably the most important doctrinal feature of these cases is the law underpinning the liability analysis. In Chiquita, after the ATS, Torture Victims Protection Act, and state common law claims were dismissed,[18] the only surviving claims were under Colombian tort law, the jurisdiction of harm. Applying this law, the jury found Chiquita liable for failing to exercise due care, thereby creating a hazardous situation.[19] In Kashef, Swiss law was applicable law under New York's choice-of-law rules because the relevant tortious conduct (the compliance decisions and transaction processing) occurred through BNPP's Geneva and Paris offices.[20] Depending on the facts and the specific allegation, this creates a significant tactical option for plaintiffs when selecting the forum: in addition to relying on US federal or state law, they may invoke the tort law of the place of injury or the defendant's principal operational jurisdiction.
2. The Sanctions Nexus with Civil Liability
The underlying violations in Chiquita (terrorism finance) and Kashef (transacting with sanctioned entities) did not directly give rise to civil liability. Rather, they served an evidentiary role regarding (i) foreseeability of harm and (ii) the standard of care. The jury specifically found that Chiquita "knowingly provided substantial assistance to the AUC to a degree sufficient to create a foreseeable risk of harm to others."[21] Similarly, BNPP's admitted knowledge that US sanctions on Sudan were designed to prevent human rights abuses, combined with its knowledge of ongoing atrocities in Sudan, limits the bank's ability to argue that harm was not foreseeable. This dual function suggests that the civil liability was not dependent on the underlying violation—in theory, both foreseeability and breach of the standard of care could be found independently, albeit with more evidentiary challenges. The risks related to sanctions compliance program failures must now be evaluated not only against potential OFAC civil and criminal enforcement, but against the civil class litigation exposure that Chiquita and Kashef have made operationally real.
3. Foreign Corporate Defendants May be Liable under US Law
Kashef's notable doctrinal contribution beyond Chiquita lies in the fact that BNPP is a French corporation. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Jesner v. Arab Bank,[22] foreign corporations cannot be defendants under the ATS. Given Kashef's framing, however, the ATS is not implicated and Jesner is no defense. In its narrowest framing, a foreign financial institution with US operations and US-court personal jurisdiction—established, for instance, by routing relevant transactions through the US—can be sued in US courts by victims of the regime it financially enabled.
4. Criminal Guilty Plea as Civil Evidentiary Lever
Plaintiffs moved to estop BNPP from introducing evidence contradicting its guilty pleas to the DOJ investigation in federal and state court.[23] The court agreed and granted the motion; BNPP was not able to introduce evidence challenging admissions it had made in the statement of fact accompanying its guilty pleas.[24] This principle potentially transforms the weight of OFAC-related guilty pleas: a company that pleads guilty to sanctions violations may foreclose re-litigation of the core facts in subsequent civil proceedings. DOJ prosecutions may thus function as evidentiary springboards for civil class litigation. This tension between regulatory resolution efficiency and civil litigation exposure will require careful management in any major sanctions enforcement matters going forward.
VI. Conclusion
The lasting implications of these cases are uncertain. Neither case is final: Chiquita is before the Eleventh Circuit; Kashef faces post-verdict motions and a similar appellate gauntlet. BNPP has petitioned the Supreme Court on the Rule 23(f) class certification question.[25] Applied across a certified class of over 20,000 refugees, the three-plaintiff bellwether verdict of $20.75 million implies potential aggregate liability in the billions. The question of whether US courts will sustain massive civil liability to foreign plaintiffs for injuries caused by sanctions violations may remain unsettled for some time. In the meantime, a potential new avenue for corporate human rights liability applying foreign tort law appears to have opened, leveraging sanctions pleas as evidentiary springboards to seek civil remedies for extraterritorial human rights harms.
[1] Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); originally enacted as the Alien Tort Claims Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73
[3] Lindsay, Rae, 'Multinational Human Rights Litigation from the Perspective of Business', in Richard Meeran, and Jahan Meeran (eds), Human Rights Litigation against Multinationals in Practice (Oxford, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866220.003.0011, page 285.
[4] Howarth v. Rockingham Pub. Co., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 959 (W.D. Va. 1998)
[5] Mary Ofisi v. BNP Paribas S.A., 77 F.4th 667, 2023 WL 4378213 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
[6] The AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2001. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189; Executive Order 13,224.
[8] In re Chiquita Brands International Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholders Derivative Litigation, No. 08-MD-01916 (S.D. Fla.). The bellwether jury verdict was returned on June 10, 2024.
[9] In re Chiquita Brands International Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholders Derivative Litigation, No. 08-MD-01916, Post-trial Order (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2024). The court rejected Chiquita's argument that Colombian law capped damages at approximately $50,000 per plaintiff.
[10] United States v. BNP Paribas SA, Information (S.D.N.Y. 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/information.pdf
[11] United States v. BNP Paribas SA, Plea Agreement (June 27, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/plea-agreement.pdf. Note that the investigation and findings involved BNPP's actions related to US economic sanctions against three countries, Iran, Cuba, and Sudan. The financial penalty against BNPP reflected the entirety of its actions; however, most illegal payments involved sanctioned entities in Sudan. See "BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to U.S. Economic Sanctions," Press Release No. 14-686, US DOJ Office of Public Affairs (February 6, 2025).
[12] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Amended Complaint at 120, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2017).
[14] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018).
[15] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228 (2d Cir. May 22, 2019).
[16] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Class Certification Order (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2024) (certifying class of over 20,000 Sudanese refugees and asylees).
[17] "Kashef v. BNP Paribas: plaintiffs move for an award of prejudgment interest that could increase the judgment for three Sudanese refugee plaintiffs to $40.483 million," Press Release, Hausfeld LLP (Oct. 27, 2025)
[19] The Colombian tort theory applied was one of general negligence permitting liability where a defendant fails to exercise due care and thereby creates a hazardous situation. See Just Security, "The Chiquita Verdict Expands International Human Rights Liability for Corporate Conduct Abroad" (April 29, 2025).
[20]The choice-of-law analysis under New York's rules identified Swiss law as governing the claims because the relevant tortious conduct — the compliance decisions and transaction processing — occurred through BNPP's Geneva and Paris offices. See Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020).
[22] Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. 241 (2018).
[23] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Opinion and Order Regulating Proceedings (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 2025). Addresses cross-motions in limine on collateral estoppel effect of BNPP's guilty pleas in United States v. BNP Paribas and People v. BNP Paribas (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct., Crim. Term).
[24] Kashef v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 1:2016cv03228, Order Regulating Proceedings (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2025).
[25] BNP Paribas SA v. Kashef, No. 24-628. Petition for certiorari filed December 2024 raising the question of whether courts of appeals have discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) to grant interlocutory review solely because a class-certification order is manifestly erroneous.
