Overview
On February 10, 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority of the United Kingdom (CMA) announced that it had "secured commitments from Apple and Google to improve fairness in app store processes and enhance iOS interoperability," which would "deliver immediate improvements to the way UK developers publish apps and how they access Apple's tools."
This is important for several reasons:
- This is the first "decision" under the CMA's new Digital Markets Competition Regime (DMCR). The DMCR gives the CMA wide-ranging powers to regulate large companies supplying "digital activities" in the UK and follows the Digital Markets Act of the European Union (DMA), which takes a similar, albeit more prescriptive, approach. The app stores (or ‘mobile ecosystems') investigation was one of only two investigations launched under the DMCR so far.
- The decision follows a roadmap of proposed interventions in app stores published in July 2025, which – as we previously discussed in this blog – had already represented a retreat on previous CMA proposals to allow competing app stores and third-party payment solutions to be used on Apple and Google phones.
- Many have criticized the CMA's decision to accept non-binding commitments as being too lenient, while others have questioned whether this augurs a regime designed to target US tech companies and give UK and European companies an advantage in the digital space.
- There is also a question about use of resources – the DMCR requires over 100 staffers and the SMS process alone involved hundreds of interested parties. From beginning to end, this process has lasted over six years and included a market study, two CA98 investigations and huge public and private expense. When regulators are under the spotlight to show value for money, there is a genuine question about whether the CMA is allocating resources to maximize impact and whether the DMCR is worth the investment.
A Recap
The DMCR was introduced on January 1, 2025, and is a wide-ranging tool. Once a company is designated as having "strategic market status" (SMS), the CMA has the power to impose tailored "conduct requirements" (CRs), without passing any additional legal test, provided they are proportionate and for the purposes of fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency. The CMA can also pursue "pro-competitive interventions" (PCIs) to remedy an established "adverse effect on competition" arising from that company's behavior on the market, which can in principle include divestiture of business units.
But there is a sting in the tail.
The DMCR only applies to companies that generate either £1 billion or more in revenue in the UK or £25 billion globally. This disqualifies most UK and European companies from consideration and places the regime's sights squarely on big US tech companies, like Apple, Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft. And to date only two investigations have been launched (the first, into Search and Search Advertising, and the second into App Stores).
While a regime that focuses almost solely on US companies might have been politically tolerable in the past (and in line with the approach of the European Commission in its gatekeeper designations under the Digital Markets Act), events in the last year have made clear that such an approach will be viewed extremely negatively by the US government. Given this harsh reality, it's unsurprising that the CMA's shiny new tool has got off to a rough start, arriving at a time when the practical reach of the CMA to take decisions that affect markets broader than the UK (particularly the US) is very much in doubt.
The Commitments
The CMA has framed its agreement with Apple and Google as a "step change" in how developers can request interoperable access to the iOS and iPadOS mobile operating systems, giving greater certainty over how they can deliver innovative new products. The CMA has also stated that the agreement will be underpinned by robust monitoring and reporting by the CMA to ensure compliance.
Apple and Google have committed to ensure their store rankings and reviews operate fairly, and to safeguard data collected from developers. And developers will also be able to request access to more features in Apple iOS to create competing products, for example related to digital wallets or live translation.
A Light-touch to Big Tech?
Given that the CMA had found that Apple and Google were operating an "effective duopoly" in regard to app stores, many have expressed disappointment with its decision in this case. The UK's app economy is the largest in Europe, generating an estimated 1.5% of the United Kingdom's GDP and supporting around 400,000 jobs. Thousands of businesses rely on Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store to review and distribute their apps, and many have complained the process is unclear and inconsistent. From the consumer perspective, use of these app stores is ubiquitous.
The outcome was clearly a win for Apple and Google, and this was reflected in their reported press statements in response to the CMA's decision:
"Apple faces fierce competition in every market where we operate, and we work tirelessly to create the best products, services and user experience," an Apple spokesperson said.
Google said while it believed the existing practices for developers on its app store Play were fair and transparent, "we welcome the opportunity to resolve the CMA's concerns collaboratively."
Yet some see these voluntary undertakings as little more than codifying processes that already exist, albeit with greater transparency. They also question whether review functions that are overseen by the parties themselves will ensure independence and whether the parties are left with too much latitude. These arrangements are compared unfavorably to the approach under the EU's DMA, which mandates changes to improve transparency, fairness and choice for users and to make services interoperable with rivals. Most critically, the voluntary agreement doesn't impact the commission Apple and Google charge for purchases, subscriptions, and in-app purchases or allow for third party payment providers.
Some have reasonably asked whether, if the CMA doesn't impose CRs in this space, why would it do so in any other market?
Bowing Out or Biding Time?
The CMA needed to avoid any overt negative publicity associated with its actions. It has championed in its 4P framework its commitment to proportionality and can present these commitments in that light. It has got something – albeit limited – on the board and without a protracted appeal. In this new world, it can therefore chalk these up, just barely, as a win.
It is true that both Apple and Google remain designated as SMS, which means that for the next four years or so, the CMA could in principle seek to impose formal CRs if the voluntary commitments don't deliver on what was promised. The decision does allow this, with the announcement noting that "[s]hould the companies fail to implement the commitments effectively, the CMA would expect to move swiftly to impose formal "conduct requirements"."
Whether the CMA would do this in practice will depend on a number of factors, including the domestic and international political climate and the extent to which evidence emerged of sufficiently serious breaches of the voluntary agreements now in place.
The Next SMS Investigation
Aside from the rights and wrongs of this outcome, many in the UK competition community are asking whether – in light of the modest concessions the CMA has extracted from Apple and Google – the cost to get to this point is justified (and particularly the opportunity cost of enforcement activity foregone across the CMA's other functions, including consumer protection, cartels and market monitoring). The DMCR is administered by a Digital Markets Unit supported by over 100 personnel, which have been ring-fenced from a voluntary exit program undertaken in 2025, a year that saw many departures (some high-profile) from the agency in other departments.
If the CMA is prepared to seek voluntary commitments in place of formal processes, there is a question as to whether these be achieved up-front with candidates without the need for prolonged and expensive SMS investigations. As the CMA stated in its app store press release: "The commitments reflect the pragmatic and flexible design of the UK's digital markets regime, delivering immediate benefits to UK businesses and consumers without the need for a formal and lengthy process." That same logic could be applied to the likely next SMS investigation into cloud, which the CMA again hinted at in January of this year.
In that case, the CMA has already undertaken a huge amount of work in understanding the industry and the key players. Its cloud market report last July identified a number of specific remedies, including removal of egress fees for moving data from one cloud operator to another, interoperability and technical standards, software licensing reform, and increased transparency. Taking the approach with app stores as a bar, the CMA could focus on slimmed down versions of some of these remedies (for example, seeking a reduction in egress fees, more upfront engagement on technical standards and some movement on license portability). Having already done the preparatory work, it would seem much more proportionate and impactful to seek these concessions now rather than after another 12 to 18 months of investigation.
In the meantime, it is clear that the DMCR is – barely a year after its introduction – already a much-reduced tool in the CMA's arsenal.
