Overview
The Trump administration has confronted the demands of superpower status in its recent strikes against Houthi rebel targets, whose aggression in the Gulf and Levant have inflamed ongoing conflicts and whose attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea threaten to block a global trade artery. Despite the US’ renewed campaign against the Yemeni rebels, the leaked Signal chat revealed hesitation among administration officials, who noted the inconsistency of the US “bailing out” allies and potentially delaying a planned “pivot to Asia” for another Middle East entanglement. However, this ambivalence will likely have to adjust to a convergence of crises in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Several countries in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa may be sleepwalking into an escalatory spiral, creating heightened uncertainty that could spill over into Red Sea security and global trade. While these conflicts are not new, they are rekindling simultaneously, driven by regional hegemons interested in carving out spheres of influence. Some, like Russia, are seeking support-for-port deals, capitalizing on this moment of instability with hopes of establishing a permanent presence in the Red Sea, which oversees 30% of the globe’s annual container-based traffic and 40% of all Europe-Asia trade.
Three Interlinked Regional Hotspots, Briefly Explained
Sudan’s civil war continues: The government Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—which together seized power from Omar al-Bashir in 2019 but failed to integrate in a December 2022 power-sharing agreement—currently battle for control of Sudan in a conflict that has killed up to 150,000 since April 2023 and displaced about 14 million. The RSF displayed early momentum in the conflict with support from the Wagner Group and the UAE (its main arms supplier). However, the SAF has changed the tide with alliances with Darfuri and Islamist militias and its utilization of Turkish and Iranian drones. While the RSF may be pushed out of Khartoum, its control of western regions like Darfur and the declaration of a parallel government risks a protracted stalemate or Libya-style split of the country into spheres of influence. If both sides maintain a warfighting posture, the export of Sudan’s resources—such as gold, oil flows, or gum arabic, a vital component in consumer goods like caffeinated drinks—may face increased rents from both groups.
Sudan is a site of rivalry between regional powers including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which both have significant interests in the country. The UAE is integrated in Sudan’s gold mining sector (currently controlled by the RSF) and invested $6 billion after the fall of al-Bashir, including in agricultural projects and a Red Sea port. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, announced $22 billion in diverse investments in October 2022 under the then-transitional government. The SAF is also supported by Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Russia (who switched sides from the RSF in exchange for a promised naval base in the Port of Sudan).
South Sudan is on the brink of internal conflict: Latent distrust has persisted between President Salva Kiir and Deputy President Riek Machar since the 2018 peace agreement ending the country’s civil war, which killed roughly 400,000. Key components of the power-sharing agreement, including the integration of security forces, remain unfulfilled, and elections have been postponed until December 2026. The government is under additional pressure due to the loss of two-thirds of its state oil revenue after its export pipeline (ending at the Port of Sudan) burst in Khartoum amid fighting. It is also suspected that the SAF has transferred arms to ethnic Nuer militias in the country’s north (seen as loyal to Machar), either to apply pressure upon the RSF, who controls most of the border with South Sudan, or undermine President Kiir, who supports the RSF and depends on the UAE for financing oil exports.
Skirmishes between ethnic Nuer militias and government forces in the Upper Nile region erupted in February, culminating in the militias’ capture of a military base in Nasir and the killing of Major General Majur Dak in March. Leveraging the instability, Kiir has arrested at least 22 high-level government and military officials aligned with Machar, who himself was arrested on March 27. In response, Machar’s political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), has called the 2018 peace agreement “effectively” dead. Ugandan troops entered the country in mid-March to support Kiir.
Ethiopia and Eritrea may come to blows: Two developments have escalated tensions between the two. First, landlocked Ethiopia—currently paying Djibouti up to $2 billion a year in port fees to enable over 90% of its external trade—seeks an alternative port deal to access the Red Sea or the Horn of Africa, which Eritrea and Egypt (a close ally who opposes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) want to prevent. Through the Ankara Declaration mediated by Turkey, Ethiopia has engaged in a rapprochement with Somalia—undermining its alliance with Eritrea and Egypt—to negotiate commercial use of its ports in exchange for distancing from breakaway Somaliland.
Second, Ethiopia and Eritrea are on opposite sides of a feud in Tigray, an autonomous province in northern Ethiopia that borders Eritrea. Ethiopia backs the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA)—the governing entity meant to guide Tigray’s reintegration into Ethiopia’s federal structure as per the Pretoria Agreement, which ended a 2020-2022 civil conflict between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that claimed roughly 600,000 lives—while Eritrea, which allied with Ethiopia in the conflict, would prefer to permanently dismantle the TPLF altogether. Eritrean troops remain stationed in Western Tigray despite the cessation of hostilities, which has undermined the TIA’s authority and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. Distrustful of the TIA’s leadership, TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebramichael and allied leaders within the Tigray Defense Forces seized government buildings and a radio station in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, on March 12, in addition to other towns like Adigrat, which sits on the border with Eritrea. If the Tigray feud escalates into an interstate standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia PM Abiy Ahmed has hinted at capturing the port of Assab, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993.
To make matters more interesting, the government of Sudan is allied with Eritrea, and TPLF forces may have fought as mercenaries alongside SAF forces against the RSF. Ethiopia, although officially neutral, maintains a close investment relationship with the UAE, which supports the RSF. This omnialignment means that an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea could, in the worst case, be interlinked with events in Sudan and South Sudan. Russia has offered to support Ethiopia in rebuilding its naval forces, likely in a bid to strengthen its Red Sea presence and, if Ethiopia were to gain control of a port or naval base, strike a deal down the line.
The Risks
It remains unclear how each regional hotspot will evolve: allegiances could shift, diplomatic breakthroughs could occur, and “butterfly effects” could take time to develop. However, in the worst-case scenario—especially if Ethiopia and Eritrea engage in a formal interstate war—overlapping interests risk becoming coherent regional axes. In a more likely scenario, each conflict would be relatively contained but driven by similar foreign influences—namely, rivalries between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and between Egypt and Ethiopia.
While military outcomes are unpredictable, just the threat against safe navigation—whether rebel groups seeking ransom or states seeking exorbitant port fees, investigating commercial ships, or firing against suspected arms traffickers—may deter traffic in the Red Sea and create global inflationary pressure. To illustrate this deterrent effect, from mid-November 2023 to January 2024, Houthi attacks caused insurance premiums to rise tenfold and traffic in the Suez Canal to decrease by an average of 45%. Each ship that chose to reroute around the Cape spent an average of $1 million on additional fuel costs—prompting some shipping companies to double their rates. Further disruptions in the Red Sea could have similar knock-on effects on the global supply chain, further increasing costs for various industries as the global economy already faces new pressures from US and reciprocal tariffs.
Depending on what threats may emerge to Red Sea shipping, it is unclear how such a crisis would be resolved. The US, which had to muster political will for limited strikes against the Houthis in 2025, will seek to avoid further entanglements if it can help it. Moreover, precise strikes against a group like the Houthis might not deter a state actor, such as Eritrea, in the low probability event that they decide to disrupt waterways. Moreover, China possesses an established naval presence in Djibouti and seeks regional stability, making it the prime candidate for responding to a potential crisis in the region if US leadership is absent. While China has historically avoided getting mixed up in military conflicts in the Middle East, threats to a vital conduit for global commerce may be a sufficient enough risk to warrant a more forceful response. Although Russia is increasing its presence with the Port of Sudan deal, this will take time to come to fruition. The UK—which cooperated with US strikes against the Houthis for the first half of 2024 and maintains bases in Kenya, Cyprus, and Bahrain—could attempt to launch a mission in support of Red Sea stability.
