Overview
Welcome to Dissent Channel, a new Stepwise segment in which Global Strategic Engagement Team analysts will debate the impacts of geopolitical developments. Today, Germany: in September, three regional elections occurred in the German states of Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Berlin. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the party of current chancellor Friedrich Merz, experienced disastrous results. The CDU’s vote share in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern was the worst in the party’s history, reaching just 4.9%, below the threshold to enter regional parliament.
The CDU’s decline has raised questions about Merz’s survival as chancellor or whether he will be forced to step down. Our team’s Europe analysts, Ian Cameron and Thomas Goldstein, debate Merz’s future.
Ian Cameron – Merz will survive the fallout of the recent regional elections, but he is losing the ability to govern effectively
Despite the disastrous outcomes for the CDU in recent regional elections, Merz will hang on as chancellor for now. While Thomas makes several good points, Merz ultimately has enough working in his favor to outlast the crisis of the elections. While Merz is deeply unpopular – his approval rating is 13% – he is unwilling to resign, and there is both fear of political instability and no consensus on how to replace him. Merz will thus stave off any emergent leadership challenges. However, he has been weakened and is losing the ability to govern effectively.
For one, Merz would have to be convinced to resign. He has consistently rejected stepping down, and Germany’s constitution makes it difficult to oust a sitting chancellor. Shortly after initial results revealed the CDU’s worst-ever state election result in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Merz called for “backbone, steadfastness, and patience,” which he promised to demonstrate as chancellor. He was also reportedly considering challenging party leaders on election night, asking if he still had their support, and if not, who would replace him.
Merz has clearly understood that he’s facing real dissatisfaction within his party, and that, as Thomas notes, he risks dragging down members of his party, including state premiers. However, the CDU’s national profile would likely suffer from a public and contested fight over the government’s future, which could in turn damage them as well. They have also, at least for the moment, largely refrained from challenging him in public. In mid-September, all eight CDU premiers issued a letter preemptively forestalling “personnel discussions.” And despite Merz’s general unpopularity, only 21% of Union voters want him to resign.
Within the CDU, there is no consensus on a replacement chancellor, and there is almost no way to replace Merz without having identified his successor in advance. Hendrik Wüst and Markus Söder, the premiers of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Bavaria, are both seen as potential successors. However, Wüst shows little interest currently, especially with NRW’s critical April 2027 elections approaching. Wüst also signed the state premiers’ letter. Söder, while potentially interested, leads the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and likely lacks the necessary support. Other candidates would be temporary figures with little ability to restore the CDU’s image, and they wouldn’t solve the issue of still needing to identify a true replacement for Merz.
Thomas’ example of Sir Keir Starmer’s resignation in the UK does not necessarily map well onto Germany. Labour could force Starmer to resign and then conduct a leadership contest, whereas the CDU would need to identify a successor before replacing Merz. Starmer also began publicly losing support within his government after his election losses, such as Health Secretary Wes Streeting’s resignation, while Merz has had no such public defections. Labour also governs alone and did not have to factor in the interests of a coalition partner.
From the perspective of the coalition, neither the CDU nor its partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), can afford instability in Berlin. Both parties are polling very badly at the federal level, and replacing Merz could unleash pressures both want to avoid. The populist right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) is demanding Merz’s resignation and wants new federal elections. A new chancellor would likely result in a government reshuffle, and potentially negotiating a new coalition agreement, fueling the AfD’s case. Thomas is right that the SPD will likely be emboldened to push back on the CDU’s reform agenda, but there are real limits on how far they can push given their polling numbers and need to avoid a coalition break. The CDU and SPD’s safest route forward is the status quo.
The election results have damaged Merz, though. His government rests not on his own popularity and authority, but rather on the lack of viable alternatives. The government will struggle to implement the reform agenda Merz has championed, and going forward Merz risks a feedback loop in which his weak position creates crises he will struggle to contain. New federal elections are not due until 2029, and it is entirely possible, perhaps even probable, that he will not survive until the end of his term. However, for the moment there is simply not enough consensus within the CDU on how to replace him and no suitable candidate has yet appeared who can realistically step into Merz’s place.
Thomas Goldstein – Merz may resist stepping down, but his Chancellorship appears terminal
There is a serious possibility that Merz steps down before 2027. Merz’s saving grace is that, under the German system of a constructive vote of no-confidence, the only feasible way to replace Merz is if he resigns and the narrow governing majority renegotiates its coalition mandate. Ian is right to emphasize that this makes a party revolt challenging and costly. However, Germany’s institutional idiosyncrasies mask the political reality: The CDU ranks are deeply dissatisfied. Without command of the party, Merz is at the helm of a sinking ship. Presented with bad options to recover political capital, the CDU could convince itself to replace the captain.
If Merz’s unpopularity threatens the political livelihoods of CDU leadership in federal states, the party may well pressure him out. Merz probably finds this threat credible, which is why he canceled his planned visit to the UN General Assembly to instead consult regional leaders and the CDU caucus in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament. The CDU’s result of 4.9% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania has ejected the CDU from a regional parliament for the first time in Germany’s postwar history. According to recent national polling from Infratest Dimap, only 15% of voters are satisfied with the government, comparable to Olaf Scholz’s “traffic light” coalition before its collapse in November 2024. Only 42% of CDU voters approve, suggesting little enthusiasm for Merz’s reforms.
Merz’s bet is that his policies can repair the German economy and reverse his fortunes. This is unlikely to occur. First, Merz’s unpopularity could embolden the SPD to renegotiate the reform agenda, risking political gridlock. Second, Merz’s policies are unlikely to change sticky perceptions, with 79% of Germans viewing the economy poorly. The most ambitious projections of economic growth, such as 1.2% in 2026 from the German Economic Institute, have been attributed to frontloaded exporting amid the Iran war’s energy disruptions (i.e., the bump is temporary). Merz’s structural reforms—such as gradually raising the retirement age—are not popular, would take time to translate into budgetary flexibility, and will not address the decline of Germany’s export-oriented manufacturing sectors. Without solving Germany’s economic malaise, voters will continue to shift support away from the political center.
Ian’s strongest argument is that there is no one who appears willing to challenge Merz. As of writing, regional and parliamentary leaders have all bent the knee. No ministers have resigned. However, these pledges of loyalty are meant to project cohesion; if a viable alternative appears, a desperate party can quickly abandon Merz. There is ongoing conversation to replace Merz as head of the CDU while he is still Chancellor, which is not normal after 16 months of governance. There are also several figures in the party that are more popular than Merz. At the federal level, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has solid name recognition and is the second most popular politician in the government behind Boris Pistorius, making him a potential transition figure. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, although a member of the sister CSU, has similar ratings. To avoid a messy government reshuffle, Thorsten Frei, the CDU Bundestag caucus chief, could also take the reins.
Merz now finds himself where former UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer did in May 2026. In that case, a wave of poor election results convinced the Labour Party that Starmer, although defiant, had a terminal premiership threatening to take down everyone. An initial revolt from Wes Streeting failed to trigger a party leadership contest, but Labour bigwigs consistently applied pressure in the background, enabling a parliamentary outsider, Andy Burnham, to perform a bloodless coup despite the rational risk of a government reshuffle backfiring. Ian points out institutional differences, but the political dynamics are remarkably similar.
The question for Merz is whether he can prevent a party revolt. This will make the difference between a zombie Chancellorship or induced resignation. Either outcome is the same: Merz’s leadership appears terminal. Consequently, Berlin could lose authority to steer EU policy, including support for Ukraine or bloc-level stimulus.
