Overview
Despite the EU and China's October agreement to stabilize trade relations, difficult-to-resolve trade disagreements will continue to create instability in the economic relationship. Shifts within the EU, specifically a growing willingness in Germany to risk trade conflict, have enabled a more muscular strategy on trade defense policy that could empower the European Commission, one of the more hawkish actors on China policy, to act more flexibly to resolve trade imbalances. Moreover, the EU is developing new tools for industrial strategy and trade policy which are likely to meet resistance in Beijing, and US-China dynamics also add elements of uncertainty into EU-China relations. On the upside, the progress achieved in Beijing with the October agreement marks an uptick after a period of increasing confrontation over trade between the EU and China. Furthermore, while the EU’s ability to coalesce around China policy is increasing, the bloc will almost certainly prefer negotiated progress if possible as it confronts other economic and security challenges, which should lessen the likelihood of open trade conflict.
Reaching Trade Stabilization: Background to the Agreement
The early-October meeting between EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and China’s Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao in Beijing ended with a joint statement listing 16 points. Among the points from the statement were limits on Chinese hybrid vehicle exports into Europe, tariff reductions for some EU exports, and progress on export controls, including licenses on dual-use goods for China and export licenses for rare earths for the EU. The talks, which were part of the EU and China’s Trade and Investment Consultations (TIC), were shaped by shifting European politics towards trade defense issues and emerged after a period of heightened trade tensions between the bloc and Beijing.
Specifically, the agreement was preceded by an apparent crucial turn in European policy towards China: Berlin’s increasing alignment on trade issues with Paris and Brussels, which have historically favored aggressive trade defense policy. Earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had been irresolute, seeming to walk back from his prior hawkishness on China and, at one point in March, even floating a potential trade agreement with Beijing. However, he has since moved decidedly towards cooperating with Paris to promote stronger enforcement of current trade policy tools and to outline potential options for creating new mechanisms to protect the EU’s market. Shortly before the TIC meeting in Beijing, France and Germany jointly released an unofficial diplomatic paper signaling their readiness for a trade conflict with China if no agreement were reached.
For its part, Beijing’s concessions to the EU on areas like hybrid vehicles and tariffs have attempted to stall growing unity within the EU on a more hawkish China policy from turning into a full-blown trade conflict. Beijing’s willingness to make progress on areas that are narrow but deeply important to the bloc, such as hybrid vehicle imports, allows Beijing to slow momentum on bloc-wide restrictions while also trying to pull countries that are historically more dovish on trade defense away from the growing unity around Brussels and Paris’ position.
The shift in Berlin’s approach comes as Europe is facing an increasingly challenging security and economic environment. The EU’s trade balance with China has been worsening in recent years, and the bloc’s trade relationship with Beijing has become even more unbalanced in 2026; the EU’s daily trade deficit has run above €1 billion for almost all of 2026. The bloc is also facing considerable other economic headwinds such as high energy prices, a struggling industrial sector and some major European companies drawing down their presence in Europe to pivot to the Chinese market. All of these factors have pushed EU member states to get tougher on trade policy regardless of potential retaliation risks and traditional internal divisions.
Obstacles Remain for EU-China Trade Progress
While the EU-China agreement represents progress after trade tensions had progressively escalated over the summer, it is not a breakthrough; the EU and China continue to disagree over whether the growing trade imbalance is an issue and how to resolve it. The EU is committed to rebalancing its trade relationship with China, which requires either more EU exports or fewer Chinese imports. China has pushed back against adopting self-imposed export limits and has likewise repeatedly threatened retaliation against any EU efforts to advantage its own companies vis-à-vis Chinese competitors. These issues are especially important as the EU looks to develop its economic security toolkit and increasingly looks towards industrial policy as an acceptable method of economic policy.
The Franco-German non-paper’s push for stronger trade defense in October sets the stage for a more forceful European approach to trade relations with China down the line. Paris and Berlin called for the European Commission to develop a new mechanism for responding to market distortions that would give Brussels more authority to move swiftly in response without requiring support from a majority of the EU capitals. Instead, it would require a qualified majority to block Brussels’ use of countermeasures, which could range from tariffs to a full cut-off from the single market. Historically, Brussels has been one of the most hawkish European actors on trade defense policy towards China, and it has been national governments, Germany in particular, that have worked to apply the brakes to Brussels.
The European Commission plans to present its proposals for new trade defense tools in December. The new tools are expected to include measures to limit companies’ supply chain dependencies on single sources, to support regions or industries affected by external trade measures and to serve as a fast-acting response against import surges. Beijing is likely to strongly oppose these measures as targeted against its industries and exports.
Another point of tension is the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), the EU’s flagship legislation on industrial policy. The act, which focuses on energy-intensive industries, green technologies, and cars, envisions “Made in Europe” provisions for projects to benefit from public support and targeted procurement, which would further protect companies in Europe. It would also set stricter foreign direct investment rules. Beijing has repeatedly opposed the IAA, calling the draft legislation discriminatory against foreign firms and saying that it would ultimately undermine the EU’s green transition.
Another area of uncertainty is how EU policy will interlink with ongoing dynamics in the US-China bilateral relationship. The recent revelations around alleged diverted shipments of Nvidia’s controlled chips to China and allegations of espionage provided a curveball ahead of US President Donald Trump’s visit to Asia for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as have his party’s recent losses in the midterms. In multiple rounds of the US-China trade conflict, the EU was caught in the crossfire, such as when Beijing’s retaliatory export controls on critical minerals created a global supply bottleneck that disrupted European industries alongside American ones. The potential of degraded US-China trade relations could again reverberate in EU-China trade.
Risks and Outlook For EU-China Trade
The primary risk for the future of EU-China trade relations is the (non-)durability of what Beijing and the bloc agreed to in October. A withdrawal from confrontation has bought time but papers over issues rather than solving them. Moreover, developments in EU politics and trade and industrial policy, as well as US-China relations, could push the two sides towards more confrontation. Several critical elections across Europe will occur over the rest of 2026 and in 2027, including in France and Italy. For example, elections this month in Spain could usher in a change of government that would shift away from Pedro Sánchez’s support for cooperation with China. Furthermore, while Friedrich Merz survived his party’s electoral disasters in regional elections this year, his government remains on unstable ground going into more regional elections in April 2027. Regarding the implications from US-China dynamics, the proposed US MATCH Act, which may be attached to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), would increase restrictions on Beijing’s access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment by giving US allies 150 days to match US export restrictions on chipmaking equipment sales to China or else be subject to unilateral US restrictions on their equipment. This move could pull the Netherlands’s lithography giant ASML and, by extension, the EU, into dynamics outside of Europe’s control.
On the upside, Beijing and Brussels now have a trade consultation format that has produced tangible results: TIC meetings will also continue going forward, with a video conference between Šefčovič and Wang in January. Moreover, while the EU is moving towards a more unified and muscular trade stance—especially as it confronts economic headwinds—it is likely to prefer dialogue and constructive progress, if possible, instead of the fallout from a trade conflict with one of its largest economic partners.