Overview
Chris Dantes is an Intelligence Fellow with Steptoe’s Global Strategic Engagement Team, with a focus on developments in geopolitical and security challenges across Africa. Part of the Global Strategic Engagement Team’s Intelligence Fellowship for graduate-level students, Chris will receive his Master’s in National Security and Intelligence from Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service in May 2027. Chris provides market intelligence and political risk analysis in support of client legal proceedings and strategic advising.
Chris sat down with Stepwise Editor-in-Chief Anni Coonan to discuss his takes on ongoing developments in Africa:
Africa often receives less attention in business and policy circles than other regions of the world. Why is it important to understand Africa, and what are the US' strategic interests on the continent?
Many recent discussions regarding the US’ Africa strategy have revolved around intensifying US-China competition and growing demands to reduce vulnerabilities in critical mineral supply chains. The continent holds roughly $29.5 trillion in mineral wealth, giving it an outsized role in supplying the raw materials used in electronics, defense systems, EVs, and other technology. Several African countries are notable suppliers of crude, LNG, or refined products, with Libya holding Africa's largest proven oil reserves.
The Trump administration's strategy has largely centered on investment, trade, and defense cooperation in exchange for these resources. However, numerous obstacles remain. In addition to countering Chinese engagement with the region, which has become well entrenched across the continent, the US and its partners must understand the internal politics and drivers of instability in African countries. This understanding is essential for tailoring assistance to African governments' needs and, in turn, gaining leverage to negotiate mutually beneficial economic agreements. For example, many African governments are considering or implementing laws mandating that foreign companies allow local processing of minerals before they are exported. Understanding the politics of Zambia, Zimbabwe, the DRC, and other prominent suppliers of critical minerals on the continent can help businesses and governments navigate these regulatory changes.
Moreover, ongoing civil conflict and terrorism continue to pose substantial risks to economic interests and assets. US Africa Command’s 2026 posture statement identified al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-aligned groups as the continent’s greatest security threats. The effectiveness of US intelligence and security cooperation with African partners will therefore be an important factor in determining the long-term reliability of US-backed economic projects. Current efforts have enhanced partner capabilities in some respects, but my concern is that terrorist groups, particularly through their increasing use of suicide drones, are developing capabilities faster than our partners can adapt.
The Iran war has disrupted global energy markets and pushed many countries to diversify their energy suppliers. How has this played out in Africa?
The disruption has highlighted Africa's potential to become a more important alternative source of petroleum and LNG. Nigeria is the clearest example. The Dangote refinery is now operating at 650,000 bpd, up from 500,000 bpd in January, and Nigerian petroleum exports have increased significantly. For West African governments that are net energy importers, this has played an important role in mitigating the impacts of the Iran war. Most recently, the conflict has renewed European countries' interest in previously delayed projects, such as Tanzania's LNG export plant.
There is also a push to develop regional refining capacity. Despite past regional tensions that have stalled energy cooperation, East African governments are now discussing a refinery at Tanzania's Tanga port that could process crude from South Sudan and the DRC and supply it to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, reducing the region's dependence on energy from the Middle East.
Of course, many structural and security challenges remain. Many African countries struggle with poor infrastructure, ethnic conflict, weak governance and accountability (made worse by recent expansions in authoritarian rule, such as in Tanzania), and other drivers of instability that create a turbulent environment for foreign investors. The US International Development Finance Corporation is seeking to make African energy, critical minerals and rare earths projects more attractive to foreign investment, but it remains to be seen how successful these initiatives will be.
How is competition among external actors reshaping Africa's security environment?
To me, a very interesting development is the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and how this has translated into greater competition in Africa. Whereas Riyadh largely favors the political status quo across East Africa and the Horn, Abu Dhabi's own regional alignments are increasingly viewed by Saudi-aligned African states as destabilizing. The UAE's deepening economic cooperation with Somaliland and reported support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudan conflict, for example, have upset African countries and disquieted Saudi Arabia. Chad, a security partner of the UAE, is now seeking to renew security cooperation with France. That shift appears to stem in part from recognition of the limitations of its relationship with Abu Dhabi, in light of recent RSF attacks on Chadian forces. So, as middle power competition between Gulf states intensifies, African countries are quietly aligning with preferred partners or rebalancing their partnerships, further fragmenting the security environment.
An aspect of US-China competition in Africa that I feel is less discussed is China's involvement in the security cooperation sphere. While Beijing's preferred method of engagement has been lending or financing major infrastructure projects, it has surpassed Russia in terms of arms sales. Chinese defense companies have supplied drones, artillery, and other advanced weapons to multiple African governments, including Rwanda, the DRC, and the Sahelian states. An unintended consequence, however, is that these arms caches are frequently looted or diverted by third parties, ultimately ending up in the hands of al-Qaeda affiliates, M23, and the RSF. This poses a major challenge for the Trump administration's efforts to resolve the Sudan civil war, M23's insurgency in the DRC, and other regional conflicts, as the constant flow of arms reduces incentives for negotiation.
What emerging security challenges should businesses look out for over the next one to three years?
In my view, the primary risks to businesses in the near term are transnational terrorism and crime, the latter of which has already caused disruptions to Red Sea commerce. There has been a notable uptick in Somali piracy. Last week, Somali pirates hijacked a cargo vessel reportedly carrying Turkish weapons bound for Somalia, a close security partner of Türkiye. The vessel was intercepted by Turkish forces, but the hijacking underscores two concerns: first, that these incidents are increasing and could further disrupt global supply lines, and second, that the threat of illicit arms trafficking could expand and potentially intersect with terrorist networks. In recent years, the al-Qaeda affiliated group al-Shabaab has collaborated with Somali pirates to obtain funding, raising the possibility that some of those weapons could have been diverted to terrorists.
In the longer term, the threat of regional conflict or civil war looms over the Horn of Africa, which I wrote about in my most recent report. Somalia's federal governing structure is arguably facing its greatest test in recent memory. If the country’s political system collapses, al-Shabaab, Islamic State Somalia Province, and criminal groups are likely to consolidate greater territory and influence, raising the possibility of cross-border terrorist attacks into Kenya and posing additional threats to vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Sudan and Somalia both joined Saudi Arabia's maritime defense coalition, but with the ongoing Sudanese war and the potential for a civil war to happen in Somalia, I am doubtful that either has the capacity to make substantive contributions to future freedom of navigation operations.
