Overview
Ian Cameron is an analyst and researcher with Steptoe’s Global Strategic Engagements Team, with a focus on US foreign policy, international security, and European and Russian geopolitics. Ian provides forward-looking analysis on domestic and geopolitical developments for international clients, providing assessments and key takeaways to guide strategic decisions and stakeholder engagement plans. He speaks and researches in German and Russian.
Ian sat down with Thomas Goldstein, the team’s other lead Europe analyst, to discuss current developments in European politics and security.
What do you believe are the most important trends to watch regarding the Russia-Ukraine war? What should businesses know or expect?
I think there are three particularly important areas to watch now: the homefronts, Ukraine’s management of its partnerships, and the potential for the US to reengage on negotiations.
Currently both sides are leaning on targeting the other’s economic infrastructure. Kyiv has leveraged its defense tech capabilities to strike Russian ports, energy infrastructure, and large businesses, and Russia has retaliated in kind. This will likely get worse for Ukraine during winter since Kyiv lacks the defenses to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. At the same time, I see both sides facing political challenges. Ukraine experienced major protests after the firing of the country’s defense minister, and the government has been hit by corruption and mismanagement scandals. Moscow will have parliamentary elections this year that, although stage-managed, could create potential for displays of public anger. This is especially true if the Kremlin follows through on the reports that it is considering another mobilization. On the other hand, mobilization could also give Russia a much-needed edge in its war effort.
For Ukraine, relationships with Europe and the US are also essential. Kyiv has put a lot of emphasis on EU accession. While there’s plenty of support from inside the EU, there are real concerns about what enlargement to include Ukraine would mean for the EU in concrete terms. There are also political challenges, like the recent spat between Warsaw and Kyiv, and EU concerns about the corruption scandals I mentioned earlier.
The US-Ukraine bilateral relationship has seen remarkable improvements over the last year. However, there have also been setbacks; Trump recently walked back a commitment to let Ukraine manufacture Patriot missiles, for example. Trump’s negotiating team has also been preoccupied with Iran, pushing Ukraine talks further down its agenda. It’s unclear when they’ll be able to reorient towards mediation between Kyiv and Moscow and how Washington’s position might shift in active negotiations. Earlier this year I wrote about how Moscow has tried to use economic and natural resource deals to sway Washington, which the Kremlin could try again.
I think the main message for businesses is that with no clear end to the war on the horizon, instability in European and global business environments is here to stay. This can take several forms: continued disruption in global commodities markets, an evolving sanctions and compliance landscape, and potential for Russian cyber and hybrid actions against critical infrastructure and private companies. Moreover, in any negotiations, much will depend on how the US stance evolves and if Kyiv can maintain its streak of military successes. Additionally, it’ll be important to watch how Ukraine manages the politics of EU accession and its path for long-term economic recovery.
France and Germany have pledged to develop a joint roadmap on trade policy with China by September. What do you expect that roadmap to look like and how can it contribute to a more unified European approach to China?
The EU’s relationship with Beijing is one of the bloc’s biggest ongoing foreign policy challenges. As I’ve written in the past, it’s an issue where consensus has been particularly elusive. The Franco-German roadmap will come in advance of a European Council meeting scheduled to discuss China policy in October, and although there is momentum for a more forward-leaning policy on China, there are also many challenges.
To me, Paris’ view of China has developed consistently in recent years with a distinct focus on European sovereignty, security and industrial policy. Even with 2027 elections that will mark the end of Macron’s time in office, Paris’ posture on China will stay consistent. I see the real uncertainty lying with Germany. Berlin’s view of China has become more hawkish in recent years as Beijing’s exports rapidly gain more global market share and eat into Germany’s industrial base. On the flip side, many major German companies remain very active in China, which leaves Germany open to retaliation if it takes a tougher line. This has left Berlin vacillating between engagement and security as it tries to balance its concerns against economic and political pressures. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition will likely lose a set of regional elections later this year, and Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, has struggled with low approval ratings and dissatisfaction in his own party. Ultimately, I think Berlin is signaling it will move somewhat towards Paris, but how far and how resolutely remains to be seen.
Depending on how hawkish the Franco-German roadmap comes out, it could position them closer to the European Commission. That said, I think there will be strong counter positions from others. Italy, Poland, and Spain all have national elections in 2027, and Madrid has staked out an approach that prioritizes partnership with Beijing. All told, there will be momentum for progress on China policy, but there will also be pressure on capitals to stick to their guns on their core priorities.
What have you been following lately regarding Europe’s defense industrial base and military modernization? What are the trends to watch going forward?
Coming off NATO’s Ankara summit in July, when I wrote about defense industrial deals being a major focus, I think there’s still very good US-European cooperation happening in defense industrial policy. Air defense and missile systems stood out in Ankara as capability areas with notable European interest. While European states want to build their own capabilities, like the “European Long Range Strike Approach” (ELSA), partnering with the US provides a more readily available solution.
Despite that, I also see several factors weighing on US-European defense industrial cooperation. Historically, European NATO allies have been major procurers of American defense products and have participated in large-scale programs like the F-35. However, the US’ repeated efforts to establish control over Greenland have shaken faith in Washington to an extraordinary degree, and that is coupled with concerns about unreliability in American defense industrial availability. On the other side, European capitals want the industrial and economic benefits from defense spending to accrue to their own countries rather than the US. Where European capitals see cooperation with Washington as their best and fastest option, they will be ready to partner. However, there will be an underlying trend toward minimizing dependency and developing domestic alternatives wherever possible.
To me, the big trends to watch will be the European Commission’s ability to steer defense procurement and the success or failure of major multinational development projects like ELSA and the Franco-German next-generation Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). Those will be good indicators of the direction of travel for European defense integration and cooperation.
What is a topic you want to write about soon but have not yet?
There are several major elections either this year or in 2027, and I am particularly looking forward to writing about polls in France, Poland and Germany. While the German elections are only regional, they have the potential for an outsized impact on Germany’s national politics depending on how well the populist right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is polling very well, does on election day.
I also hope to keep writing about the future of European defense policy and European economic security. Europe is in a transitional process of defining its approach to an international order that places more emphasis on power and less emphasis on rulemaking, and the future of European defense industrial policy, energy security, and trade policy are all hotly contested. Those policy areas will determine how and where capitals spend their growing defense budgets, what energy infrastructure they’ll invest in for the coming decades, and how Europe balances its promotion of free trade with industrial policy and economic security.
