Overview
With the war with Iran grinding on as talks stall and allies split, hope is dimming for a quick, favorable end. Over the last several weeks, the US has publicly messaged a shortened timeline of two to three weeks for the end of fighting, citing productive negotiations with Tehran and a series of military victories. Meanwhile, the US and Iran appear far apart in ceasefire negotiations. On the ground, the conflict has widened and the Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed, belying the promised winding down of the war. Diverging interests in Jerusalem and Gulf capitals further constrain US options to de-escalate. A “good” end to the Iran war – one that sees US, Israeli, and Gulf objectives achieved, minimizing further damage to the global economy – is difficult to envision in the near term. As it stands, a more protracted conflict or an exit that leaves US war aims unfinished risks longer-term instability in the region and global energy markets.
Have the US’ Shifting War Aims Been Achieved?
US goals have been shifting. At the outset, the US stated four objectives: eliminating Iran’s ability to project power and threaten the region by destroying Iranian missiles and the infrastructure to manufacture them, destroying the Iranian navy and preventing Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. The US wants negotiations, or better yet, capitulation. Despite earlier suggestions of aiding Iranian protestors, regime change is not an enumerated goal. In recent weeks, Washington has appeared to narrow or walk back its earlier aims, potentially to make it easier to declare victory and find an off-ramp. US officials now talk about “damaging” or “reducing” Iran’s capabilities, rather than destroying. President Trump has stated that opening the Strait of Hormuz, i.e., ending Iran’s ability to project power in this strategic waterway, is not a US military objective.
While the US and Israel have done significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and security architecture, it is not clear that any of these objectives have been decisively achieved – at least to an extent that would force Tehran to the negotiating table. Despite significant damage and slowing of rates and intensity of attacks, Tehran continues to fire missiles, as well as make extensive use of drones to deliver payloads, making it difficult to ascertain the extent of damage. The US and Israel have destroyed Iran’s conventional navy, but the IRGC retains naval units and the capability to shutter the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s ability to coordinate with and project power through its proxies clearly survives. Pro-Iran militias are continuing attacks in Iraq. Yemeni Houthis retain capacity to close the Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint. Hizballah is escalating fighting in Lebanon. Finally, Iran still holds about 970 pounds of highly-enriched uranium, enough for up to a dozen bombs, and an even larger amount of medium-enriched uranium that could be converted to weapons-grade in a matter of weeks or months, depending on postwar capacity.
The half-completion of these goals leaves Iran with leverage, complicating American efforts to force negotiations and de-escalate the conflict. While progress on some of these goals – like further destruction of Iran’s missile launching and production capability – will place additional pressure on Tehran to seek an end to the war, some goals are more difficult. The destruction of Iran’s capacity to influence and direct its regional proxies, for instance, will be challenging. Tehran’s relationships with these groups is more than a transactional supply of arms, funds and intelligence, and even if Iran’s ability to supply those resources is eliminated, ideological and strategic alignment means that proxy threats will persist at some level. The proxies themselves cannot be eradicated without opening separate fronts – like a renewed Yemen war. Most problematically, elimination of Iran’s nuclear program is all but unachievable – while it is possible to physically destroy nuclear sites and material, the desire and know-how to develop a bomb cannot as easily be eradicated. While the Islamic Republic of Iran exists, the strategic underpinnings of its longstanding desire to establish nuclear deterrence will likely only be strengthened by a resounding tactical defeat.
Despite mixed conditions on the ground, the US is messaging that negotiations are underway and productive. But are they? Reports from US-Iran talks indicate that there is little overlap in their negotiating positions. The US’ 15-point ceasefire plan, delivered via Pakistan, includes a one-month ceasefire, a complete future prohibition on nuclear activities, limits on Iranian missile activity, and an end to proxy activity, potentially in exchange for security guarantees and the lifting of some sanctions. In public ceasefire demands, Iran has variously included permanent security guarantees from the US and Israel, administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz, payment of reparations and the closure of all US bases in the region.
Israel and the Gulf Get a Say
Even if an off-ramp is clearly visible from Washington, the decision to end the Iran war is not entirely the US’ call. Both Israel and the US’ Gulf Arab partners have serious stakes in how and when the conflict ends. Israel, for whom the current conflict represents a generational opportunity to defang its most dangerous rival, is more motivated than the US to pursue regime change and to ensure an end to the war that sees Iran not merely degraded but fundamentally changed. The US, already narrowing its war aims and predicting a medium-term end to the conflict, is signaling its willingness to accept a less decisive military victory than Israel likely feels it can survive. And Israel, unlike Gulf Arab states, can continue some operations if the US declares the war over but Jerusalem does not find the ceasefire terms favorable. Iran seeks a durable end to the war, and the US does not have the cards to ensure this without Israel on board.
Meanwhile, the Gulf position on continued hostilities has shifted rapidly. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, Gulf capitals – heavily dependent on oil export revenues and many in the middle of costly economic diversification projects - were vocally opposed to conflict. Indeed, Iranian airstrikes on public and tourist infrastructure and, to a much greater extent, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have been a disaster for Gulf economies. The region has seen an aggregate GDP contraction of 1% after one month of conflict, with wholly Strait-dependent exporting states like Qatar and Kuwait suffering a potential contraction of 14% for the first half of 2026. But the Gulf states want more than reopening the Strait, seeking a postwar reality that will not leave them exposed to a desperate Iran.
A similarly dire outcome for the Gulf would be a failed Iranian state, which successor proxies and armed groups could use as a staging ground for continued destabilization in the region. Here, Gulf capitals likely diverge from Israel. Jerusalem may assess that a failed state in Iran, like Syria or southern Lebanon in previous eras, is historically manageable. Notably, the Gulf has less sway here than Israel, being a junior partner in the conflict without the willingness or ability to constrain Iran alone if the US withdraws. While Gulf partners have advanced militaries and a mounting interest in participating in US operations (the UAE this week was seeking out a UN resolution that would allow it to join a multinational force in the Strait), they are largely uncoordinated and are far from capable of replicating US naval and air dominance.
More Obstacles than Off-Ramps Remain
Despite these constraints, US rhetoric has continued to predict a near- to medium-term end to the war in Iran. The US is, by all measures, the superior military force – and could likely achieve the goals it has set. But the key question is how quickly and at what cost. The US still has significant coercive options available in order to raise the pressure on Iran, such as an oft-discussed ground operation to destroy or seize Iran’s Kharg Island oil hub. Iran, for its part, does not believe that Washington is seriously committed to a diplomatic track and will continue to seek leverage until a deal is a real possibility.
The White House is clearly sensitive to domestic criticism of the war and the global economic impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state-affiliated media is claiming that the country is prepared for at least six more months of war. While this is certainly posturing, the claim speaks to Iran’s evident belief that the conflict is a war of attrition that Tehran is better-suited to wait out than Washington. Given the US’ repeated claims that the war could end in two or three weeks, this mismatched perception for timelines is at the core of the inability of both parties to find the compromises needed for a negotiated settlement.
The exact pathway from open conflict to a negotiated settlement is unclear. Heightened American appetite to wrap up the conflict in response to domestic and macroeconomic pressures risks a less-than-ideal end to the war that leaves American and Israeli objectives incomplete. The risks for regional powers and the global business community in this scenario are that the Iran war is left half-fought, with intractable strategic issues – like the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, or its desire to project power throughout the region – unsolved and likely to resurge. A “bad” end to the Iran war could foment years of structural instability, permanently building geopolitical risk premiums into the global energy market, stunting regional logistics, and proliferating conflict risks throughout the Middle East.
