Overview
At the start of 2025, Israel finds itself in a Middle East in which turmoil is at a historic high - and set to continue. Regional conflicts show little sign of abating, and instability is increasing. A major ongoing regional dilemma is also the proliferation of non-state heavily armed actors/militias: in an unprecedented historical expansion, there are five regional states at this writing that do not have a state-run monopoly of power within their own borders: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen. Palestine, while not yet a state in the traditional sense, also faces the same challenge. This development alone will complicate solutions. Reversing this trend is not a given.
The Trump Administration and its regional allies will have unprecedented challenges this year. Priorities will not remain static. The multiple ongoing conflicts, including Gaza, Yemen, Sudan, and Iran, coupled with the consequences of government collapse in Syria and Gaza, will require costly – perhaps too much so – multi-year efforts. US hesitation to directly participate will remain, given echoes of Iraq and Afghanistan. Conflict mitigation looms large for internal actors (such as HTS’ Sharaa, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority) as well as regional actors seeking to influence (like Saudi Arabia, UAE, the Qatar, and Turkey). Great power competition, and major conflicts in other regions will continue, likewise hindering the ability to reach solutions.
The War in Gaza
Fifteen months after October 7, 2023, prospects for winding down conflict in the Middle East will be shaped by the situation in Gaza and a fragile truce in Lebanon, accompanied by an Israeli focus on Syria. Nevertheless, the Israel-Hamas deal announced on January 15 possibly presents opportunities for de-escalation in the Gaza Strip and other parts of the Middle East, which in turn may lead to an end of the war in Gaza, the beginning of a process of stabilization and reconstruction there, and progress toward the broadening of the Abraham Accords, with an emphasis on a possible Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement.
No doubt Israel’s focus in the first half of 2025 will be on the implementation of the first phase of the agreement with Hamas, scheduled to begin on January 20. If successfully implemented, over the course of the next six weeks, 33 Israeli hostages will be released, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will halt the fighting and withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip, as Israel will begin releasing hundreds of Hamas prisoners. If successful, the second and third phases of the agreement will involve the release of more Israeli hostages and Hamas prisoners being released and the ceasefire extended, allowing for increased humanitarian assistance entering into Gaza and the beginning of stabilization and reconstruction efforts there.
It is certainly too early to assess the chances of success of the Israel-Hamas deal, which will be tested over time. Iran and its proxies have vowed to continue the fight against Israel as long as the war in Gaza continues and it is not clear how they will react to the Israel-Hamas deal.
Lebanon
In contrast with the news of a ceasefire agreement with Hamas, Israeli PM Netanyahu faced little domestic political risk to an agreement in Lebanon. Israel’s objectives were more limited against Hizballah, and a ceasefire did not threaten his government’s stability. It is an open question whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will be able to fulfill the intent of UNSCR 1701 or 1559 (UN Security Council resolutions that seek to curtail Hizballah activities). The elements that might foster a more deliberate LAF effort against Hizballah do not yet exist: despite the successful presidential elections on January 9, and days later the pick for prime minister after a two-year hiatus, Lebanon’s political leadership and structures remain weak. The extent to which Gulf countries will invest in strengthening Lebanese institutions remains to be determined, regardless of warm congratulations by Gulf leaders to President Joseph Aoun, who has served as LAF commander since 2017. Although much diminished, Hizballah’s influence in Lebanon remains. To the south, the IDF promises to be very aggressive in defending its northern border security interests. Some analysts view Hizballah’s capitulation to alternate Lebanese powers as a result of their current wounds and loss of Syria’s Assad. Perhaps. But the history is clear on their ability to reconstitute if nothing fundamental changes in Lebanon.
Syria
All eyes will be on Syria in 2025. Where will it trend given the region’s multiple sectarian fissures, cultural pressure points, and Sharaa’s own HTS centered vision? Will Russian security forces remain? The prospects are captivating, but the dust has not remotely settled. HTS does not control all of Syria. Sharaa and his team have made several smart yet cautious moves early on, undoubtedly with a view towards neighboring Iraq’s recent history. Ultimately it may be difficult to prevent HTS’ fundamental Islamic beliefs in determining Syria’s new state. Opposition will continue in key parts of the country. Israel has already made its interests clear through its actions. Turkey will be directly involved in what it has consistently termed an existential fight against Syrian Kurds. Complicating Turkey’s interests is the fact that the US is teamed with the same Kurdish group in its fight against ISIS and in support of their role as ISIS’s jailers. Again, it remains to be seen what the Trump Administration will consider, but Turkey cannot be ignored. What will be needed mostly in 2025 will be space for Sharaa and his team to maneuver, which at this point it is not clear whether Israeli decision makers will be willing to allow HTS that space. In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall , Israel took control of an area in Syrian territory which has served as a buffer zone between the two countries since 1974. Israel has no intention of leaving this buffer area anytime soon, despite strong rebuke from Turkey and some Arab countries. Israel will keep a watchful eye on developments in Syria to ensure its red lines are not crossed. Navigating the constant demands of regional and international actors will test HTS’ patience and abilities.
Iran
Policy toward Iran will be high on the Israeli (and American) agendas in 2025, as President-elect Trump and his team seek to capitalize on the setbacks Iran’s national security strategy suffered at the hands of Israel’s offensives against Tehran’s regional allies, and from the fall of the Assad regime. Israel’s policy vis-á-vis Iran in 2025 will depend much on what approach the Trump Administration adopts. As 2025 begins, and to the alarm of incoming Trump officials as well as Israeli leaders, high-ranking Iranian figures are arguing for recouping Iran’s recent losses by walking back its longstanding public insistence it would not construct an actual nuclear weapon. Defending his first term Iran policies as having narrowed Tehran’s options, Trump has vowed to reimpose the “maximum pressure” strategy centered on strict enforcement of comprehensive economic sanctions on all sectors of Iran’s economy. Importantly, Trump himself has suggested he sees the policy as intended not to try to deter Iranian aggression but rather to encourage Iran to negotiate a resolution of all outstanding bilateral issues.
How the second Trump Administration might respond to any Iranian offers of talks might depend on his team’s assessment of the extent of Iran’s likely concessions. In his initial term, Trump withdrew the US from the landmark 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) on the grounds that the agreement required lifting economic sanctions, left in place Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, and did not address Iran’s support for its “Axis of Resistance” partners such as Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah.
Yet, Iran has for decades refused any agreement mandating full dismantlement of its enrichment capability or curbs on Iran’s support for its regional allies. The wide gulf in Washington’s and Tehran’s perspectives makes any new deal unlikely. At the same time, the new Trump team will face, on the one hand, pressure from Netanyahu to take military action to cripple Iran’s nuclear program decisively, and, on the other hand, likely efforts by Tehran to rebuild its “Axis of Resistance” to its former levels of potency. At the very least, the Trump Administration would likely not assertively dissuade Jerusalem from striking Iranian nuclear facilities, even if the US might decline to join the assault – and despite the potential for any such Israeli action to set off significant regional warfare.
Yemen
As Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel has suffered major setbacks during 2024 (i.e., Syria and Lebanon), the Houthis in Yemen remain a challenge for Israel, as they continue to exploit – for their own unclear purposes – the Gaza conflict, not ceasing the firing of missiles and drones into Israel. The Houthis will continue to receive support from – but not necessarily act on the direction of – Iran. Operation Prosperity Guardian and Israeli retaliatory strikes have so far not deterred their continued attacks. It is unclear if the Trump Administration will be prepared to dedicate the resources and energy necessary to unify regional and international actions – including conflicting Saudi and Emirati ambitions – in a comprehensive peace effort in Yemen. The White House is likely to take a hard initial line, including intensifying military action in coordination with Israel; re-designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and stepping up efforts to interdict Iranian and Russian weapons/technology flows. Israel will continue to act in its interests, turning to the Houthis as a priority. The ceasefire in Gaza would be a key first step in voiding the Houthis’ asserted justification for Red Sea attacks.
Arab-Israeli Normalization
The chances for progress toward the broadening and deepening of the Abraham Accords will be tied to an effective and successful implementation of the Israel-Hamas agreement, but that will not be enough. Arab countries will not be willing to provide significant resources to rebuild Gaza or agree to strengthen, let alone forge, relations with Israel absent broader progress toward a Palestinian state. PM Netanyahu, however, continues to insist statehood is off the table. Similar to other issues, the role of the incoming Trump Administration will no doubt be crucial. Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners remain firmly opposed to any compromises vis-á-vis the Palestinians. A change in the PM’s approach may be possible if Trump is willing to use leverage or offer Netanyahu “carrots” if he agrees to make compromises.
Saudi-Israeli normalization remains a coveted prize for the US and Israel. Trump and his team are likely to try to reestablish the close relations they enjoyed during his first term with HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and UAE President and Abu Dhabi Ruler HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. Administration goals will be to advance a “maximum pressure” policy on Iran and expand the Abraham Accords, particularly seeking normalized Saudi-Israel relations. On recognizing Israel, the Kingdom’s current demands will be high hurdles. Moreover, MBS’s firm insistence on substantial progress toward Palestinian statehood is reported as a non-negotiable element towards normalization.
