Overview
On April 7, President Donald Trump surprised many by announcing that the “[US is] having direct talks with Iran, which have started and will continue” adding that “if talks will not be successful, Iran will be in great danger.” The president made the shock announcement during a press availability in the Oval Office, and with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu—in town for his second face-to-face meeting with Trump in his second term—at his side. The US and Iran will engage in talks (it is uncertain whether they will be direct or indirect) in Oman tomorrow.
Trump’s announcement comes as the White House appears to be pursuing two divergent Iran policies: on the one hand, the administration has re-imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions, escalating efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically—including a significant buildup of military forces near Iran. On the other, the president has made repeated overtures to engage in bilateral talks to forge a nuclear agreement to replace the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) that Trump exited during his first term in 2018.
There are strong motivations on both sides to consider a deal: Iran, battered by the Israeli victories against its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, is motivated to acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence—an outcome the US and its regional partners are eager to prevent. At the same time, a weakened Iran would suffer significant losses in a direct conflict with the US and ideally would avert military engagement. The US, despite ambitions of decisively defeating Iran and its “Axis of Resistance,” is mixed on the utility or chances of success of a major US military operation in the Middle East, which at the least would be an expensive slog. However, prospects for success are uncertain. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly expressed doubt over new talks with the Trump administration and has already resisted a large-scale dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. For his part, perhaps reflecting skepticism among his foreign policy team that Iran would accept US demands in a new accord, Trump has authorized a significant buildup of military forces near Iran.
Trump’s Iran Doctrine
Since his election to a second term, Trump and his foreign policy aides have debated a US strategy to prevent the further advance of Iran’s nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assesses that at this point Iran could, within days, produce enough weapons-grade uranium (90% purity) to fuel six nuclear weapons. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified last week before the Senate Intelligence Committee and emphasized the US intelligence community continues to assess Iran is not trying to weaponize its fissile material. However, she noted a growing discussion among Iranian leaders about potentially doing so.
As Iran’s program has advanced, the administration has evaluated military options for destroying Iran’s nuclear program, while at the same time accommodating Trump’s repeatedly stated preference for a diplomatic solution in which Iran agrees to dismantle its uranium enrichment program entirely. In a March interview on Fox Business, Trump confirmed he had sent a letter to Khamenei proposing negotiations on a new agreement that would reimpose restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, as well as contain provisions limiting Iran’s missile and drone programs and its support for regional armed factions that constitute its Axis of Resistance. His letter threatened Iran with serious adverse consequences (i.e. military action) if it refused to negotiate. In initial comments after receipt of the letter, Khamenei expressed open distrust of pursuing new negotiations, repeatedly referencing Trump’s first-term pullout from the JCPOA despite Iran’s compliance with the accord.
Pursuing “Coercive Diplomacy”
As Iranian officials expressed consideration of Trump’s proposal for talks, despite Khamenei’s objections, President Trump concurrently has sought to ratchet up pressure on Tehran to agree to discussions. Shortly after taking office, he re-imposed his economic sanctions-centric “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, focused on trying to reduce Iran’s still-significant sales of oil to China (approximately 1.5 million barrels per day). Last week, the administration sanctioned a Chinese oil refinery in an effort to deter small Chinese oil traders from buying Iranian oil. Members of Congress have introduced numerous bills in the 119th Congress supportive of enhanced sanctions on Iran.
In late March, several outlets reported that the US military had redeployed major assets to bases near Iran, including six B-2 Stealth Bombers to the US base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. US officials indicated the buildup was intended primarily to support Trump’s recent initiation of a major air campaign against Houthi militant targets in Yemen—part of his efforts to strategically weaken Iran and its Axis, as well as protect trade in the Red Sea and retaliate for strikes on Israel. The US’ new strikes on the Houthis have been more sustained and included a broader range of targets, such as Houthi leadership, than the primarily retaliatory attacks by the Biden administration in response to Houthi attacks on US warships and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
Tehran Considers Its Options
Iranian officials have interpreted the US deployments—coupled with Trump’s threats of action if Iran refused a new agreement—as preparation for an attack on Iran. Seeking to deter a possible US attack, Ali Larijani, a key adviser to the Supreme Leader, said in an interview that Iran will “move toward” a nuclear weapon in response to a US or Israeli attack. Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force, which operates Iran’s missile arsenal, threatened to retaliate against Gulf state bases where US military personnel and equipment are positioned, stating: “…when one sits in a glass house, one does not throw stones at others.” The Gulf states, all key US strategic partners, have improved relations with Iran in recent years and have reportedly indicated they do not want US forces to use their bases for a pre-emptive strike on Iran, should Trump decide on military action.
Movement toward Talks, but No Certainty of an Outcome
The administration’s coercive diplomacy might have shifted the debate in Tehran toward exploring the potential for a new agreement with the US. Axios reported on April 2nd that Trump officials received Iran's formal response last week to the letter Washington had sent to Khamenei, indicating Iran would agree to indirect talks mediated by the Sultanate of Oman, but not direct US-Iran negotiations. The Axios report indicated Trump officials believe direct talks would facilitate efforts to narrow differences, but did not reject the indirect format or Omani mediation. The Omani role, coupled with the passage of Trump’s letter to the Iranians via UAE senior officials, suggests the Trump team will coordinate talks with Iran more closely than the Obama administration in the negotiations to produce the JCPOA. The Gulf states complained they were excluded from the multilateral talks leading to that accord, and its announcement was seen in the region as a significant blow to US-Gulf relations.
Nonetheless, there is also internal debate within the Trump administration whether an acceptable agreement is possible. Administration officials have stated Iran must agree to negotiate restrictions not only on its nuclear program, but also on other programs and policies the US views as destabilizing, including its long-range missile programs, its armed drones, and its support for its Axis of Resistance partners like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hizballah. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz clarified last week that the administration will demand a complete dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment program, saying it was time for Iran to “walk away completely” from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. He added: “This isn't some kind of tit-for-tat that we had under Obama or Biden…This is the full program. Give it up or there will be consequences."
Iran has long rejected ending its enrichment of uranium, claiming it is a party in good standing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has a “right” to enrich uranium for civil purposes. Iranian leaders have said a new agreement must also provide Tehran with more sanctions relief than it received in the JCPOA—a demand the Trump team is almost certain to reject. The formidable obstacles to achieving an agreement, even if talks are arranged, have reportedly prompted a debate within the Trump foreign policy team between those who think a deal is achievable and those who see talks as a waste of time. The officials who take the latter position appear to support strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, whether unilateral or in concert with Israel.
Israel’s Perspective
Trump invited Israeli PM Netanyahu to Washington for a hurriedly arranged summit on April 7, with the stated goal of discussing his new tariffs policy, which impacts Israel. While tariffs were on the agenda, Iran seemed to dominate the discussion, and certainly Trump’s announcement caught Israelis off-guard. The moment Netanyahu has dreaded arrived and after a public announcement by POTUS, the US decision will not change.
All the Israeli leader could do is some damage control, stating that Israel hopes an agreement to shut down Iran’s nuclear program is possible, but if not then a military option against Iran’s program should be pursued. The administration has moved to play down expectations, noting that the talks in Oman will be more exploratory in nature and will move in the direction of negotiations based on whether Iran is serious in its approach. In comments on Wednesday, President Trump indicated his independence from Israel’s preference, saying that “if nuclear talks fall apart, the US will go for a military option” but that while “Israel will be very much involved in that […] no one leads us. We do what we want to do.” In the meantime, preparations are underway for the meeting on April 12—tomorrow—between US and Iranian teams led by US Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
