Overview
While Poland has emerged as a leader in European defense policy in the last several years, last month’s flare-up in the country’s long-running political crisis threatens to undermine Warsaw’s defense ambitions and investment plans. While defense policy has historically been an area of consensus among Poland’s dominant political parties, that consensus has fractured this year amid severe political polarization and new tensions in a long-running crisis over judicial independence. New political gridlock could undercut Warsaw’s ability to signal its long-term priorities and create clarity on its approach to defense policy, creating uncertainty for the defense industry and Poland’s international partnerships. However, any future government will continue to support high defense spending, investment into Poland’s domestic defense industrial ecosystem, and the bilateral relationship with Washington.
Poland’s Emergence as a Leader in European Defense
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Warsaw has undertaken an extraordinarily rapid defense modernization and investment program. In 2022, Poland’s defense budget amounted to slightly over $15 billion. For 2026, Polish defense spending stood at 4.8% of GDP, totaling $53.8 billion, positioning it as NATO’s largest defense spender relative to economic size. Moreover, under the country’s Homeland Defense Act of 2022, the government is obligated to maintain defense spending above 3% of GDP, locking in defense spending well above NATO’s former 2% target.
The speed and scale of Poland’s defense buildup has involved expanding international defense partnerships, including with Germany, the United Kingdom and other neighbors. Warsaw is cooperating with the UK on upgrading its naval capabilities, such as obtaining a new class of frigates, and Warsaw and London signed the Northolt Treaty in May to build out their defense cooperation. Polish defense companies have expanded their ties to neighbors like the Czech Republic, and Warsaw updated its defense cooperation agreement with Berlin over the summer. Poland has also developed new partnerships with countries outside Europe. Earlier this year, Poland upgraded its relationship with Seoul to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” With the US, historically Poland’s most important security partner, Warsaw has opened large procurement projects for Abrams tanks, F-35 jets, air defense systems, and precision strike capabilities.
Simultaneously, Poland is investing heavily i its own domestic defense industrial ecosystem to profit economically from its defense buildup and to reduce external dependencies. Warsaw’s spending with domestic companies rose approximately 300% between 2022 and 2025. While Poland is still importing many big-ticket capabilities, the focus on the domestic industry still includes spending on larger procurement projects like tanks and surface ships; Poland is partnering with the UK and South Korea on the domestic production of frigates and main battle tanks, respectively.
Warsaw has also directed funding into innovative resilience and defensive projects like Warsaw’s East Shield initiative. East Shield, which Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced in 2024, is a network of fortifications, logistics centers, warehouses and air defense capabilities on Poland’s eastern border. East Shield also incorporates Europe’s largest anti-drone capabilities and space-based elements, such as PIAST. Warsaw has coordinated this program with the EU and its neighbors like the Baltic states and Germany and has also involved the US through specific procurement projects like the purchase of systems for rapidly constructing infrastructure facilities.
Poland’s Political Crisis and the 2027 Parliamentary Elections
Since 2015, Poland has been mired in a slow-rolling crisis between the country’s two dominant political parties over judicial institutions. In late October, long-running fighting between the two parties, the governing centrist Civic Coalition (KO) and the opposition populist-right Law and Justice (PiS) (by which President Karol Nawrocki is supported), has boiled over into a full constitutional crisis. Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, a newly elected judge on the Constitutional Tribunal, took charge of the court and suspended its PiS-appointed President, Bogdan Swieczkowski, for refusing to seat five new judges elected by parliament, which KO’s coalition controls. The KO-led government supported Korwin-Piotrowska’s move, and riot police were deployed at the Tribunal. Both KO and PiS have accused the other side of subverting the rule of law and Poland’s democracy. The crisis has deepened in recent weeks, as the opposition and government have dug in and adopted increasingly hardline stances.
The crisis comes ahead of 2027 parliamentary elections and against the background of increasingly hostile relations between Poland’s KO-led government and President Nawrocki, who is backed by PiS. Nawrocki, who took office in August 2025, has worked to build his office’s powers and to stymie the government’s legislative agenda through broad use of his constitutional authorities – Nawrocki has used his veto power more in his first year of office than any other Polish president. The KO government, which ran on an anti-corruption and pro-EU platform in the last parliamentary elections in 2023, lacks the necessary majority to override a presidential veto and has therefore struggled to pass much of its agenda.
While Nawrocki has succeeded in acting as a consistent block on the current government, Poland’s nationalist-populist parties have struggled for years due to a fractious party landscape and internal disagreements. PiS’s public support is at its lowest level in years following a rift within the party earlier this summer, which led to the creation of a new party called Development Plus under the leadership of Poland’s former Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki. Other Polish parties, such as Confederation Freedom and Independence (Konfederacja) and Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP), also attract electoral support. Taken together, all four parties currently poll at around 51%, in comparison to only 32% for KO and 8% for its largest coalition partner, Lewica (the Left).
While Poland’s nationalist-populist parties have struggled in the past to find common ground, the current crisis potentially creates momentum for them to unite in opposition to the KO-led government and its moves regarding the Constitutional Tribunal. PiS, Development Plus, Konfederacja and KKP have all sharply condemned the government’s approach to the court, with many figures referring to the decision to suspend Swieczkowski as a coup d’état. Moreover, in August, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, called on Nawrocki to bring the right-wing opposition parties together in advance of elections to form a united front against Donald Tusk’s KO.
Cracks Are Growing in Poland’s Defense Consensus: Risks and Outlook
Historically, defense and security policy have been an area of rare consensus between rivals KO and PiS; both are hawkish towards Russia and supportive of a muscular security posture and of high levels of defense spending. However, growing political division has put that consensus under pressure. Earlier this year, Nawrocki attempted to block plans by the government to participate in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program of cheap defense loans, with the justification that it would undercut Poland’s sovereignty and indebt Poland to Brussels. While the government rerouted the SAFE loans through Poland’s Armed Forces Support Fund (FWSZ) to circumvent Nawrocki’s opposition, the veto and the government’s workaround complicated Warsaw’s participation in SAFE.
A highly polarized election campaign and growing hostility between the president’s office and the government increase the risk that, even though defense spending itself is not controversial, its modalities are becoming political footballs. This could include where money should be spent, what procurement projects should be prioritized, and the country’s approach to overall national security strategy and partnerships. For example, PiS and other opposition parties are suspicious of cooperation both with Brussels and with Berlin, which they see as wielding too much power inside the bloc. Instead, PiS prioritizes cooperation with Washington as the ultimate foundation of Polish national security policy and opposes deep cooperation within EU frameworks. A lack of clarity over the next government and growing political dysfunction amid presidential and parliamentary gridlock worsens the uncertainty surrounding how exactly Warsaw will choose to shape its defense policy going forward.
Regardless of the election outcomes in 2027, Nawrocki will remain president until 2030, meaning that even if the current government wins in the next parliamentary elections, it will still be constrained without a sufficient majority to override a veto. Alongside Poland’s long-running judicial crisis and a growing deficit, this could undermine the overall business environment in Poland if Warsaw becomes too politically unstable to manage a fast-growing deficit at 7.3% of GDP in 2025. And if Poland’s fiscal situation becomes more unstable, that could undermine faith in Warsaw’s ability to maintain its defense aspirations at their current levels and to fund future projects. Moreover, gridlock would likely remain the norm, with the president and government unable to unify around a common vision of defense policy.
However, there are also potential areas of upside risk. Regardless of government, defense spending will remain a national priority. Moreover, both the current government and the opposition are emphasizing support for Poland’s domestic defense industry, so foreign investment in Poland from trusted partners will retain significant political support. Relations with Washington will also be a priority for any future government in Warsaw, even if a PiS-led coalition would emphasize bilateral ties with the US more than the current pro-EU government. Ultimately, there will be a strong place for transatlantic relations in Poland regardless of the election outcomes.
