Overview
The Sudanese civil war and its dire humanitarian consequences are funded, in part, by the illicit gold trade, and growing sanctions pressure on the illicit market is exposing risks for global supply chains. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused by foreign governments, international organizations and civil society groups of operating gold mines to fund weapon imports and pay troops. International smuggling networks have proven resilient to shifting geopolitical dynamics and tightening sanctions regimes. The pervasive presence of conflict gold in the global market also puts legitimate gold refiners and trading firms at risk of unknowingly handling illicit gold. Gold’s role in diverse manufacturing processes, from telecommunications to aerospace to medical devices, potentially exposes a wide range of businesses to the reputational and compliance impacts of Sudan’s illicit gold trade. The US, UK and EU view sanctions on Sudan’s gold exports as an effective way to degrade the SAF and RSF war efforts. Despite recent signs that Western actors are willing to impose increasingly muscular sanctions on Sudan’s gold economy, they are unlikely to be willing to expand this effort to the degree necessary to significantly disrupt the warring parties’ funding apparatuses.
Geopolitics Drives Shifting Exports
Sudan’s deteriorating relationship with the UAE over the last few years has prompted a significant shift in Khartoum’s official gold export policy. In 2024, the SAF-backed Sudanese government officially shipped $1.97 billion of gold ore to the UAE, representing almost half of the country’s total recorded exports. In August 2025, following repeated allegations from the SAF that the UAE supported the RSF, the UAE announced a ban on all commercial flights from Port Sudan and ordered a halt to all maritime traffic via UAE ports to and from Sudan. Sudan’s official and informal gold exports to the UAE relied extensively on these air and maritime links. The de facto trade embargo led to a significant drop in the value of Sudan’s currency and drove much of Sudan’s gold exports into the black market. In November 2025, the head of the state-owned Sudanese Mineral Resources Co. (SMRC) estimated that 80% of Sudan’s gold exports were smuggled out of the country.
In an effort to revive revenues from official exports, SMRC announced in January that it would sell gold to the state-owned Saudi Gold Refinery Company. There is limited information on the status of this export deal, though the Saudi firm claimed that it was ready to start buying Sudanese gold immediately. African business media linked the gold deal to a Saudi-financed $1.5 billion arms sale from Pakistan to Sudan. However, it is unclear whether the arms sale was carried out, as Reuters reported that the Saudi-Pakistani-Sudanese arms deal was terminated in April after pushback from unspecified Western governments.
Gold Sanctions Target War Financing
Since the outbreak of civil war in 2023, the US, EU and UK have attempted to use sanctions on the country’s gold trade to disrupt both RSF and SAF funding efforts. The US designated al-Junaid Multi Activities Co. Ltd., the holding company for the RSF’s Darfur gold mines, in June 2023. The EU sanctioned the same entity in January 2024 and directly accused the RSF of using the gold produced by the Darfur mines to finance its military activities and “secure military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE)…and from the Wagner Group.” The US and UK both subsequently designated the Sudan-registered al-Fakher Advanced Works Co. Ltd. for conducting the RSF’s gold export business to fund weapons purchases.
Gulf-based gold trading firms have also come under US, UK and EU sanctions for purchasing gold from these RSF-controlled mines, including the UAE-based al-Zumoroud and al-Yaqoot Gold & Jewellers. UAE authorities said that the sanctioned gold trading firms operated in the UAE without active business licenses.
The EU and UK recently escalated their campaign against Sudanese gold smuggling. On July 13, the EU announced a total ban on the purchase, import or transfer of gold originating in Sudan as well as the sale, supply, transfer or export of gold mining chemicals to the country. The EU accused both the SAF and RSF of using gold sales to fund their war effort. On July 16, the UK announced sanctions targeting the Sudanese gold trader Abu Dharr, characterized as a “notorious RSF financier and procurement facilitator” with operations centered in Hong Kong and Dubai. The UK sanctions also designated two Sudanese state-owned mining firms accused of benefitting the SAF as well as one state-owned firm accused of channeling gold revenues to both the SAF and RSF.
Existing Source Tracing Frameworks Struggle with Gold Smuggling
Western sanctions supplement existing international regimes governing conflict-derived minerals, though these frameworks struggle to adequately address gold smuggling. The intergovernmental Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) classified Sudan as “conflict affected” and “high-risk,” automatically flagging any gold exports from the country. Refiners and buyers are therefore required to verify that gold sourced from Sudan does not fund armed groups. This is difficult when both the Sudanese government and the RSF have been repeatedly accused of relying on gold sales for their war efforts. Additionally, once gold has been refined into bars, it is often impossible to chemically trace it back to where it was mined. Investigators have identified refineries in Europe and the Middle East melting down bars of Sudanese gold and combining them with gold sourced from non-flagged jurisdictions, effectively “laundering” the illicit gold to no longer appear conflict-affected.
The UK is scheduled to host an international summit on illicit finance in December, where it plans to announce new multinational partnerships to combat the illicit gold trade and strengthen source tracing guidelines. However, the physical limitations of gold’s traceability impose limits on how effective any multinational anti-trafficking effort can be.
Strategic Limitations for Sanctions
While sanctions may effectively cut the gold trading firms off from much of the global financial system, they will likely fail to significantly disrupt Sudan’s gold trade. Sophisticated smuggling networks have operated under severe sanctions in Sudan since they were first imposed on the government of Omar al-Bashir during the 1990s. High international gold prices remain a significant pull factor for local miners to brave sanctions violations, especially in the face of Sudan’s dire economic and humanitarian circumstances.
As the UK prepares for its summit on illicit finance in five months, it will likely seek to build an international coalition for stronger governance of the international gold trade. The UAE, which is scheduled to host the 15th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in two months, will also likely announce new measures to rein in the illicit gold trade in response to growing global attention to Dubai’s gold markets. However, the US, EU and UK are unlikely to expand their Sudanese gold sanctions beyond SAF and RSF officials and their direct international representatives, limiting their effectiveness. In the medium term, the wide array of industries with supply chains requiring gold face escalating reputational and compliance exposure to Sudan’s conflict-derived gold exports.
