Overview
On March 24, 2025, the US House of Representatives passed House Resolution 1318 – The United States Research Protection Act. The Act was introduced by Republican Representative Mike Kennedy (R-UT) and Democratic Representative Haley Stevens (D-MI) and is a bipartisan effort to clarify and update language in the 2022 CHIPS and Sciences Act in order to further protect US research and technology from exploitation by foreign adversaries. The potential new legislation comes amid growing efforts by the US to protect American innovation and intellectual property, and particularly to target Chinese progress in critical tech industries implicit in its Civil Military Fusion program.
The United States Research Protection Act
As explained in Congressional press releases concerning the bill, Malign Foreign Talent Programs (MFTPs) are sponsored by countries of concern, including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, in order to obtain American scientific research and technology by incentivizing or coercing American researchers to act on their behalves. The CHIPS Act includes provisions to prohibit US government and academic institutions from partnering with such programs, but the CHIPS Act’s current definition of Malign Foreign Talent Programs only includes programs that “directly provide” incentives and benefits to researchers to participate, leaving out other methods by which foreign malign actors could provide indirect benefits to researchers to induce their cooperation. The new bill eliminates this loophole.
The bill’s current language clarifies that MFTPs are programs that are sponsored by a foreign country of concern, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and broadens the definition of MFTPs to include programs that also provide “indirect benefits,” ensuring foreign adversarial nations cannot use indirect mechanisms to evade U.S. research restrictions.
The bill has been received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) and Senator Jose Padilla (D-CA) have issued statements strongly supporting the bill, indicating probable strong bipartisan support.
In Context of the US-China Innovation Race
This likely update to MFTP restrictions comes amid a broader innovation race between China and the US that has involved two general fronts: an increase in R&D spending in both countries, and an effort by the US to curb alleged high levels of corporate and academic espionage. As both countries race to produce the leading high-tech economy of this century, allegations of Chinese intellectual property infringement have been a persistent concern: a widely-cited estimate produced by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property in 2017 estimates that the annual cost of to the US of stolen trade secrets, pirated software and counterfeiting is between $225 to $600 billion per year. The United States Research Protection Act—if passed—will be a broadening of US efforts to prevent academics from contributing to the theft of American trade secrets of sensitive scientific advancements.
The impetus for the focus on non-monetary incentives is unclear. Virtually all publicly available reporting on instances of participants in Malign Foreign Talent Programs make reference to monetary compensation, and statements from lawmakers involved with The United States Research Protection Act did not provide examples of non-monetary incentives. The step may be largely precautionary—an attempt to head off potential moves by countries of concern to circumvent relatively new CHIPS Act rules—or a response to examples of these incentive structures that are not public knowledge.
Critics of these limits, however, have regularly argued that overly broad restrictions can damage US R&D efforts by fostering xenophobia in academic circles and imposing unfair restrictions on foreign-born scientists. Chinese media has characterized the effect as a “reverse brain drain” in which Chinese-origin scientists in the US are leaving the country for positions in China. China, for its part, has regularly denied that its talent programs represent any malign influence, arguing that their talent programs—such as the well-known Thousand Talents Plan—are legitimate efforts to incentivize Chinese-origin STEM students to return to China (reversing an early-2000s trend in which they were likely to remain in the US). Regardless, in recent years the US has built a firm bipartisan consensus around the risks of Chinese access to American research and trade secrets.
Business Risks
The potential passage of the United States Research Protection Act should be viewed among broader efforts to restrict US-Chinese interactions that stand to benefit Chinese progress in critical industries, especially STEM fields crucial to Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion policy. American efforts to counter Chinese advancements there will likely only gather momentum during the Trump presidency. US academic institutions and US businesses partnering with such institutions should exercise caution and conduct appropriate due diligence when engaging with any foreign talent programs in order to ensure compliance with current US law and implementing regulations. Further, in anticipation of the US Research Protection Act’s likely passage by the Senate and Presidential approval, affected US entities should begin now to develop best practices when dealing with foreign research partners that help to ensure that an MFTP is not providing indirect benefits to US researchers via third-parties.
