Overview
Today's Deep Dive is 851 words and a 5-minute read.
Nearly fifteen months after October 7, 2023, prospects for conflict in the Middle East in 2025 will be shaped by the continued fighting in Gaza and fragile truce in Lebanon, accompanied by a destabilized Syria. While regional actors may adopt a different modus operandi during the second year of this conflict, including possibly agreeing on a temporary halt in the fighting, the trajectory is not in the direction of conflict resolution, but rather toward conflict management.
The Trump Factor
The consequences of the Gaza and Lebanon crises will continue to reverberate through next year. US policy under President-elect Donald Trump will impact developments in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and the wider region in 2025. His national security nominations are highly supportive of the current Israeli government’s agenda, and hawkish toward Iran and its regional proxy activity. It remains an open question whether Trump will live up to his campaign pledge of “ending all wars”, and therefore apply pressure on Israeli PM Netanyahu to opt for a ceasefire-hostage release deal in Gaza and to sustain the ceasefire in Gaza.
Prospects for Gaza
With Netanyahu’s continued pursuit of “total victory” against Hamas, there are currently no clear plans for ending the war in Gaza or for the “day after.” Netanyahu faced little domestic political risk in seeking a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, as operations there had grown increasingly unpopular amid calls to settle for securing the northern border and not expend unnecessary military capital on a potentially endless conflict.
In contrast, Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners remain firmly opposed to any compromises in Gaza, and seeking an agreement with Hamas could threaten his fractious governing coalition. Finance Minister Smotrich and Minister of National Security Ben-Gvir do not want the war to end without significant gains, and oppose a Hamas prisoner swap for hostages or a ceasefire that would involve the withdrawal of IDF troops from Gaza. Ben-Gvir even threatened to collapse the government in the event of a ceasefire.
Moreover, there are reports that both ministers hope to create the conditions for reoccupying and resettling Gaza. Given the extent of international opposition and the security situation in Gaza, this may be unrealistic. Nevertheless, Netanyahu himself has been ambiguous on the matter, hoping not to anger crucial coalition members and far-right constituents, and the Trump Administration’s position going forward will be critical.
In the absence of a clear Israeli plan for the “day after” the war, the fighting in Gaza is likely to continue in a more targeted manner, mostly in southern and central areas of the Gaza Strip. In northern Gaza, the IDF will likely lay the foundations for an indefinite period of continued presence. The aim is for northern Gaza to serve as a buffer zone and a launching pad to allow for quicker operational access into other areas.
Meanwhile, ordinary Gazans will continue to live through a humanitarian catastrophe, experiencing food and water scarcity, disease and displacement. A source close to Trump was recently quoted stating the new administration (in a change from the Biden Administration’s policy) will not condition US weapon supplies to Israel on its government allowing the flow of more humanitarian aid into Gaza, signaling more robust military support for Israel and less focus on humanitarian issues.
Despite strong internal pressures to continue the war, US pressure could change Israel’s calculations. With a ceasefire in place in Lebanon, the current US administration has urged for a renewed effort to reach a deal in Gaza, involving Qatar, Egypt and Turkey. Netanyahu has also acknowledged that conditions have changed in Gaza, with Hamas isolated and leaderless, and there is pressure from further left politicians to prioritize hostage return rather than seeking a broader victory.
Trump has indicated he wants to see a deal in Gaza before he enters office on January 20, 2025. Failing to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza before that date, the degree to which the new administration will focus on Gaza will depend on US foreign policy priorities and Trump’s national security team. Trump appears to want to be a deal-making president, who during his first few months in office, ends or de-escalates the war in Gaza and brings about a ceasefire-hostage release deal. He may also want to show Arab and Muslim Americans who voted for him that he is attentive to their concerns.
Final Comment
In the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, cemented on November 27, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in recent days, resulting in the further weakening of the Iran-led “axis of resistance,” the focus in the coming months will likely shift to Gaza. The central scenario for 2025 is likely low level and targeted fighting by Israel in Gaza, accompanied by efforts to sustain the ceasefire in Lebanon.
However, 2025 could see steps toward a ceasefire in Gaza, as the Israeli government will face greater international and domestic pressure to de-escalate. Hamas’ increased sense of isolation and the elimination of its senior leadership in Gaza may increase its willingness to compromise. The role of the incoming Trump Administration will no doubt be critical on this issue.
