Overview
Following Nirmal Lorick's guilty plea to a count of bribery in connection with a program receiving federal funds, he was sentenced to a year of probation, 1,000 hours of community service, and $142,000 in restitution. The restitution was to be paid in monthly installments of "at least" five percent of his gross monthly income.
As of August 2025, Lorick had paid $73,600 toward his restitution obligation and owed $72,147 more (including interest). That same month, the government filed a motion for an order directing the City of New York Deferred Compensation Plan to turn over the full liquidated value of Lorick's non-tax-exempt property. Lorick objected, arguing that an order to turn over the funds in the account would be contrary to the Court's restitution order, which required him to pay restitution in monthly installments.
In a recent order, the Court agreed with Lorick. Though it held that the government had an interest in the funds held in the account as a judgment creditor pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ยง 3613, and that the government was entitled to possess the funds, the Court also held that the government failed to "show[] why those funds must be paid immediately instead of in monthly installments, as ordered at sentencing." The government argued that the "at least" language in the Court-ordered restitution payment schedule meant that five percent of Lorick's gross monthly income was the floor, not the ceiling, for restitution payments. But the Court found persuasive the logic of United States v. Burko, in which Judge Karas noted that "almost all other Circuits to address the issue have held that the Government cannot enforce a lien where the restitution order does not make the entire amount of restitution due immediately upon sentencing."1 Although Burko did not involve a payment schedule with an "at least" qualifier, in Lorick, Judge Torres interpreted "at least" as a floor on what the defendant may pay, but a ceiling on what the government may collect, each month, holding that "the Government has failed to persuade the Court as to why a lump sum payment is warranted in place of the established payment schedule." If the government wanted a lump-sum payment, it could have sought one at the time it entered the certificate of restitution or at sentencing. It did not.
The Court also distinguished the Second Circuit's holding in United States v. Walker that the significance of a payment schedule "is diminished . . . by the fact that the victim may convert the restitution order into an abstract of judgment for the full amount of the restitution order,"2 on the ground that here it was the government, not the victim, seeking a lump-sum payment.
Finally, the Court noted that if some exigency were driving the government's request, the government could move to modify the payment schedule, rather than attempting to enforce its lien in contravention of the existing schedule.
The Lorick Court's order is a reminder that the government's ability to collect restitution, though broad, is not unlimited.
Read the order here.
1 United States v. Burko, No. 10 Cr. 291, 2023 WL 3195943, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023).
2 United States v. Walker, 353 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2003).
