Overview
A little over a year ago, we wrote that the prosecution of MIT-educated brothers Anton Peraire-Bueno and James Peraire-Bueno would test the limits of traditional criminal law, specifically the wire fraud statute, in the rapidly evolving world of cryptocurrency. In United States v. Anton Peraire-Bueno and James Peraire-Bueno, No. 1:24-cr-00293-GJLC (SDNY), the brothers were accused of exploiting Ethereum's transaction-ordering infrastructure to obtain approximately $25 million in cryptocurrency, conduct prosecutors charged as wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy. The case did indeed test those limits and now poses a broader question that extends well beyond crypto: when novel technologies enable conduct that looks deceptive or wrongful, how far can prosecutors stretch existing fraud statutes to reach it? In this case, the answer was not far enough.
After a nearly four-week trial ended with a hung jury, Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke granted the Peraire-Bueno brothers' Rule 29 motion and entered judgments of acquittal on November 16, 2026. Judge Clarke concluded that, whatever one might think about the brothers' conduct, the Government failed to prove an essential element of wire fraud: a material misrepresentation. In relatively decentralized crypto markets, however, traditional rules and conventions governing market behavior may not exist, and material misrepresentations may be more difficult to prove.
The trial evidence showed that the brothers designed "lure" transactions to attract automated sandwich-trading bots, exploited a vulnerability in software used with Ethereum to expose supposedly private transactions, and then substituted different transactions that caused the sandwich traders to lose millions of dollars. But the Court concluded that those acts did not communicate a materially false representation. The lure transactions did not promise the sandwich traders that they would be included in a particular bundle, and the lure transactions were executed on the blockchain less than a minute later. Nor did signing an invalid blockheader establish fraud. In Ethereum's "permissionless" and "trustless" environment, the Government had not shown that a validator's signature represented a promise to publish a valid block rather than a commitment either to propose the block or face an economic penalty. As a result, the Court rejected the government's attempt to turn misuse of a technological system into a federal fraud offense without first identifying the material misrepresentation the statute requires. As Judge Clarke put it, frustrating the "spirit" of a system does not itself constitute fraud.
The decision follows on the heels of the recent Rule 29 decision in United States v. Eisenberg, 784 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). There, Judge Arun Subramanian set aside a wire-fraud conviction arising from Avraham Eisenberg's manipulation of Mango Markets and withdrawal of more than $100 million in cryptocurrency because the Government likewise failed to establish the requisite materially false representation. Judge Clarke's ruling in Peraire-Bueno expressly relied on Eisenberg and found that market participants' subjective expectations about how crypto systems operate do not themselves create promises or representations that can support wire fraud.
Judge Clarke also distinguished the brothers' conduct alleged here with traditional "spoofing" cases. According to Judge Clarke, spoofing can create a material misrepresentation because traders submit orders they intend to cancel on regulated markets with rules prohibiting that conduct, creating a false appearance of supply or demand. Ethereum was different. It had no comparable terms of use binding these defendants, and the evidence introduced at trial described how the software worked rather than imposing enforceable rules of conduct. It is possible that clearer exchange rules or binding terms might have brought the facts closer to those of traditional spoofing cases under Judge Clarke's analysis.
Taken together, Peraire-Bueno and Eisenberg demonstrate how quickly technology can outpace the legal frameworks investigators and prosecutors rely on. Crypto provides the present example, but the same tension arises with AI, autonomous agents, smart contracts, and other technologies whose norms and customs may not fit neatly within existing statutory illegality. For federal prosecutors and state attorneys general scrutinizing these industries, Peraire-Bueno underscores the importance of identifying specific material misrepresentations within the context of the technology at issue before characterizing novel conduct as fraud. The decision may also inform Congress and state legislators' examination of crypto and other emerging technologies as they consider potential legislation, and highlights the importance of assessing whether existing statutes reach the conduct at issue or whether new legislation is needed to more squarely prohibit conduct that involves new technical spaces and norms. For now, Peraire-Bueno and Eisenberg offer defense lawyers a developing roadmap, which includes forcing the Government to identify the misrepresentation, distinguishing technical exploitation from legally cognizable deception, and challenging prosecutors' attempts to transform norms, expectations, or perceived unfairness into federal fraud.