Overview
A new federal lawsuit challenging the Texas A&M University System's classroom-content policy may provide another important test of the constitutional limits on public universities' authority to regulate faculty instruction. The case follows the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision affirming an injunction against Florida’s higher-education provisions of the Individual Freedom Act, also known as the "Stop WOKE Act,"1 and raises similar questions about viewpoint discrimination, academic freedom, and the distinction between permissible curricular oversight and unconstitutional restrictions on classroom speech.
The plaintiffs, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and four faculty members in the Texas A&M University System (Texas A&M), filed suit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas against members of the Texas A&M University System Board of Regents in their official capacities. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and challenges the policy both facially and as applied, alleging that it violates the First Amendment by imposing viewpoint-based restrictions on academic speech and violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is void for vagueness.
Background and Legal Claims
The challenged policy is System Policy 08.01, as revised on December 18, 2025. As described in the complaint, the policy prohibits any system academic course from advocating "race or gender ideology, or topics related to sexual orientation or gender identity." The complaint further alleges that, as revised and implemented, the policy bars teaching those subjects in core curriculum courses and permits teaching them in non-core or graduate courses only with prior written approval based on a showing of a "necessary educational purpose."
In addition, the complaint challenges the policy's implementation through revisions to System Policy 12.01, which plaintiffs allege requires faculty to limit classroom teaching and discussion to the approved syllabus. Plaintiffs contend that, combined with systemwide syllabus review and an online reporting mechanism, these policies operate as a prior restraint and chill faculty speech.
The complaint asserts two constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a First Amendment free-speech claim (incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment), and a void-for-vagueness claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Plaintiffs allege that the policy is viewpoint-discriminatory because it restricts advocacy or teaching of perspectives on race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity disfavored by the state while permitting opposing perspectives. The complaint alleges, for example, that the policy allows instruction reflecting heteronormative or traditional views but restricts instruction addressing LGBTQ+ identities, systemic racism, or nontraditional understandings of sex and gender, which according to plaintiffs "leaves no question that only disfavored views … are prohibited."
Plaintiffs also allege that the policy is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define or clearly apply key terms, including "advocate," "teach," "race ideology," "gender ideology," and "topics related to sexual orientation or gender identity." They further allege that shifting guidance and inconsistent enforcement leave faculty unable to determine what materials may be assigned, what topics may be discussed, and when approval is required.
The complaint alleges that the policy has resulted in canceled courses, removed materials, and altered syllabi. Among other examples, plaintiffs allege that courses addressing ethics, race and ethnicity, religion, LGBTQ+ literature, and the history of sexuality were canceled or restricted, and that faculty were required to remove materials addressing race, gender, or sexual orientation from course syllabi.
Relationship to the Florida Stop WOKE Act Litigation
The Texas A&M challenge arises against the backdrop of the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Pernell v. Florida Board of Governors of the State University System.2 In Pernell, the court affirmed a preliminary injunction blocking Florida from enforcing higher-education restrictions that prohibited public university instruction that "espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels" students to believe certain concepts related to race, color, national origin, or sex.
Although the Texas case involves a university-system policy rather than a state statute, the legal issues substantially overlap. Both matters concern public institutions’ efforts to regulate classroom discussion of race, sex, gender, and related subjects. Both also implicate the line between ordinary curricular control and viewpoint-based censorship.
In Pernell, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that classroom instruction by public university professors may be treated simply as government speech because professors are paid by the state. The Texas litigation may require another federal court outside of the Eleventh Circuit to address similar questions, including whether and when public university policies governing course content impermissibly burden faculty speech and academic inquiry. Given the more conservative nature of the Fifth Circuit, any appeal could lead to a Circuit conflict and make a Supreme Court review more likely in the near future.
Implications for Colleges and Universities
The Texas lawsuit illustrates that public universities should exercise care when adopting policies that regulate classroom speech on controversial subjects. Institutions generally retain authority to establish curricula, set degree requirements, approve courses, and ensure instruction remains pedagogically relevant. However, policies that target particular viewpoints, use undefined ideological terms, or impose discretionary approval processes may create legal risk. Clear standards, viewpoint-neutral criteria, and ordinary academic-governance processes may reduce risk.
For institutions outside Texas, the lawsuit is worth monitoring because it may contribute to the developing body of case law following Pernell. Public universities considering or revising policies addressing DEI-related instruction, race, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or similar subjects should assess whether those policies regulate academic standards in neutral terms or restrict particular perspectives.
Private institutions are differently situated because the First Amendment generally constrains governmental actors, not private institutions, and therefore are less likely to be targets of government regulation of curriculum and instruction. Historically, states have been able to directly regulate aspects of private education, although courts have distinguished permissible educational standards from restrictions that intrude too deeply into private institutions' curricular autonomy.3 Although those decisions arose primarily in the K-12 context, private colleges and universities may face related issues based on faculty handbooks, academic freedom policies, accreditation standards, contractual commitments, and state funding or oversight regimes.
For public higher education institutions, the key lesson remains that academic-content policies should be clear, viewpoint-neutral, and tied to legitimate curricular and pedagogical objectives. Institutions should review existing and proposed policies with those principles in mind, particularly where the policies address politically contested subjects or impose approval requirements for course content.
Steptoe will continue to monitor developments involving restrictions on speech in educational settings and its implications on institutions. We remain ready to assist educational institutions to strengthen current practices and navigate the intersection of state legislation and education.
1 Individual Freedom Act, ch. 2022-72, § 2, 2022 Fla. Laws 241, 243–45 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 1000.05(4)(a) (2022)).
2 Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of State Univ., 181 F.4th 1135 (11th Cir. 2026).
3 Compare Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Schs. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423–24 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state proficiency-testing requirement applicable to private high schools), with Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298–99 (1927) (enjoining regulations that gave public officials extensive control over private schools' teachers, curricula, and textbooks).
