Overview
The European Commission has effectively rejected the established telecoms network operators' calls for their networks to be "subsidized" by edge providers. Concerns about so-called "Fair Share" proposals have been central to debates about the reform of the regulatory framework for electronic communications in the EU, especially in anticipation of the Digital Networks Act (DNA). These claims were notably voiced by the established telecoms network operators to ensure that content and application providers, such as digital platforms, using these networks because they do not have their own transmission infrastructure, contribute financially to the network costs. These claims have resurfaced repeatedly over past years, often framed as addressing traffic-driven market failures, and have been discussed under labels such as "sender pays," "fair share," or "cost sharing".
The edge providers have argued that their bits travel over the telecoms networks because of demand from consumers, who pay established telecom network operators hefty sums for Internet access and for these bits to be delivered by them. That view has prevailed in Brussels. But the incumbents have resorted to other theories to achieve such subsidies, and one recent German court decision should be of concern to edge providers.
On January 21, 2026, the European Commission adopted its DNA proposal and submitted it to the European Parliament and the Council under ordinary legislative procedure. While the proposal acknowledges the importance of network cooperation and investment, it does not contain any straightforward Fair Share provision. It imposes no explicit obligations on intensive network users to contribute to network costs. By contrast, the existing net neutrality principles are preserved in Articles 93 and 94 of the proposed DNA via the embedded Open Internet Regulation.
There are only a few indirect provisions in the proposed DNA with potential impact on this issue. Article 191 requires the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC) to publish guidelines "facilitating cooperation on technical and commercial matters between network operators and undertakings in closely related sectors." Article 192 establishes a "facility for voluntary conciliation" and Article 193 mandates a Commission review of "ecosystem cooperation." Even if these complex processes were to survive the complex legislative process, which is highly uncertain, they are unlikely to produce the results expected by the network operators.
The Commission sees a risk that negotiations between content and application providers and telecom operators may increasingly lead to disputes over IP interconnection agreements. It is therefore considering a dispute resolution mechanism under Article 189 of the proposed DNA, potentially covering both technical and commercial terms. This could ultimately allow national regulators to determine fees for IP connectivity to telecom operators' end users.
A German court has recently shown a way how civil law enforcement can help such claims to materialize. On February 10, 2026, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf ruled that the incumbent German network operator Telekom Deutschland GmbH ("Deutsche Telekom") was entitled to request payment of more than €30 million from Edge Network Services Ltd. ("Edge"), a subsidiary of Meta, in remuneration for peering services related to the exchange of IP traffic. Peering in this context refers to the direct interconnection of two networks to exchange internet traffic between their users, rather than routing it through a third-party transit provider.
Depending on traffic volumes and commercial arrangements, such interconnection may be settlement-free or subject to payment. The dispute centers on whether, and under what conditions, compensation is owed for the interconnection of Edge's Network – through which major Meta platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp are delivered – with Deutsche Telekom's infrastructure. Deutsche Telekom claimed remuneration against Edge for a period of more than three years.
Under a prior contract, Deutsche Telekom established 24 private interconnection points at seven locations for Edge, routing nearly all its traffic into Telekom's IP backbone and on to end users or third-party networks. It had charged a bandwidth-based fee for providing and carrying this traffic. The parties were in dispute as to whether and to what extent Deutsche Telekom was entitled to payment claims after this contract in 2020. Deutsche Telekom assumed that paid IP transit continued, while Edge regarded the arrangement as settlement-free peering and continued sending data through Telekom's private interconnection points into its IP backbone.
In 2024, the first tier Regional Court of Cologne upheld a contractual claim amounting to over €20 million, assuming that a contract for consideration had been concluded because Edge had continued to use the interconnection of the two networks (peering), thereby implicitly concluding a new contract between the parties. The court rejected Edge's argument that the contract was void due to an alleged abuse of dominance, since Edge had such countervailing power that Deutsche Telekom was unable to exercise its market power.
Edge contested the Regional Court's decision at the higher instance, while Deutsche Telekom filed a cross-appeal seeking an additional €10 million for the period up to August 11, 2024, on top of the €20 million already claimed. Deutsche Telekom asserted that, after the expiry of the original contract, Edge continued to use the private interconnect connections between the parties based on a new contract offer and fed large amounts of data into the Telekom network. This resulted in a new contract for consideration being concluded through conclusive conduct. It is irrelevant that the defendant repeatedly stated that it did not want a contract for consideration. Its actual conduct showed the opposite.
Edge refused to make any payment and denied the existence of a payment obligation, claiming that under a so-called settlement-free peering arrangement, neither party can demand payment from the other. Edge considered such payment not customary when two providers simply interconnect their networks. Therefore, according to Edge, its conduct cannot be regarded as implied acceptance of an offer, because Deutsche Telekom does not provide any services and Edge merely made the data available at the interface between the two networks with their transmission being initiated by the end customers. By forwarding such data to its end customers, Deutsche Telekom was merely fulfilling its contractual obligations, for which it received remuneration from the end customers. In addition, Edge claimed that the amounts demanded by Deutsche Telekom were excessive, in violation of competition law.
The Higher Regional Court upheld the earlier ruling, confirming that Edge accepted Deutsche Telekom's interim agreement by continuing to use its services after the original contract expired. From the perspective of a reasonable, objective contractual partner, Edge Network's behavior should be interpreted as acceptance of the written offer. Edge's stated reservations about concluding a paid contract are irrelevant in view of the clear explanatory value of its actual behavior, because Edge Network also had the option of not using these services.
The Court did not consider Deutsche Telekom's conduct to be an abuse of a dominant position, and thus the contract is not void. As subsequent developments in the case showed, Edge had the option of terminating the direct bilateral data exchange between the two networks by having the data exchanged via a third-party provider. In addition, the Meta services affected almost all consumers and thus also Deutsche Telekom's end customers. Deutsche Telekom was therefore under pressure from its customers to ensure that the Meta services were available in sufficient quality.
The German court ruling addresses a specific commercial dispute over interconnection payments rather than representing a broader shift in telecom regulation or in the Fair Share debate. Applying established principles of German contract law, the court did not address broader policy questions about platform contributions to network financing. However, the judgment confirms that the continuation of previously agreed infrastructure usage can give rise to enforceable payment claims. This principle may gain relevance as the DNA proposal introduces mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution that may create structured avenues for addressing technical and commercial interconnection conflicts, potentially influencing how costs and responsibilities are shared between network operators and major content providers.
This debate is ultimately tied to Europe's broader ambition for its digital future. As Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice‑President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, has noted: "European innovation starts with a truly connected Europe. High‑performance resilient digital infrastructure is essential in strengthening Europe's leadership in innovation, competitiveness and digital sovereignty." The challenge for policymakers, regulators, and industry alike is to reconcile commercial realities with this strategic vision ensuring that the networks underpinning Europe's digital future remain economically sustainable, open, and capable of delivering transformative services to all. The outcome of the Fair Share debate will not only shape cost allocation models but also determine whether Europe's connectivity can truly fulfill its promise as the backbone of innovation.
For further guidance on these issues, please turn to the authors of this blog post or to another member of Steptoe's Antitrust team.
