Overview
From the alphabet soup of multi- and mini-laterals increasingly defining the fragmented global power landscape, a relatively new grouping is sparking international concern: CRINK, or China-Russia-Iran-North Korea. The loose grouping – sometimes also called the “axis of upheaval” or the “quartet of chaos” – is underpinned by a desire to push back on the US-backed, Western world order, and has emerged as an economic, diplomatic and, in some cases, military boon for the members. Strategic partnerships and mutual defense agreements in the last several years have cemented these bonds: in January, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year defense pact deepening military ties (although notably excluding any mutual defense commitment); last June, Tehran and Pyongyang inked a mutual defense pact; in 2022, China and Russia pledged a “no-limits” partnership; and in 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic partnership.
Despite these arrangements - and other evidence of growing cooperation, like the 11,000 soldiers North Korea sent to Russia last year – giving rise to anxieties surrounding an ascendant CRINK – an “axis of evil” for the new era – Iran’s routing in the recent 12-day conflict with Israel belies a different reality. While ideologically aligned in terms of what they do not want – Western dominance – CRINK members are far from a cohesive strategic unit, with competing aims and priorities that will likely keep the axis from function as much more than a helpful economic arena.
What CRINK Can Do for Each Other
Emerging largely out of Russia’s rising isolation following its further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, CRINK’s ideological framework is a simple one: member states are interested, for various reasons, in curbing the power of the US-led, Western international order. Member states are united by their exclusion from that system, to varying degrees – China, the world’s second-largest economy, is of course not remotely as diplomatically and economically isolated as Iran or North Korea. The strengthening CRINK alliance serves as a vehicle to dilute the impact of Western sanctions by developing an alternative economic forum, providing diplomatic and rhetorical support against Western censures or accusations, and, to varying degrees, bolstering each other’s military efforts against Western competitors.
Military and strategic cooperation between CRINK nations has sparked the most concern in the West, and between some states that collaboration has been robust: North Korea has deployed at least 11,000 soldiers to Russia to bolster its war in Ukraine (with reports that it may send up to 30,000 in the coming year), alongside huge quantities of munitions. Iran sends Shahed drones and other technical details that are laying the foundation for more Russian drone manufacturing, while Russia has provided Tehran with aircraft, technical aid to its space and missile programs, and domestic surveillance technology. North Korea and Iran have collaborated on ballistic missile technology for decades (Tehran’s Shahab missiles are largely based on Pyongyang’s Hwasong series). China, on the other hand, avoids direct military support for its CRINK partners, but has long sold goods that the US consider dual-use, like electronic components for drones. The exception to this rule is North Korea, with whom China has its only mutual defense agreement.
Economic partnership is likely the most impactful element of the CRINK alliance, however. Shut out of the Western economic system to various degrees, intra-CRINK trading has kept the economies of Russia and Iran afloat under crushing Western sanctions. China buys 90% of Iran’s oil exports and almost half of Russia’s exported oil, providing crucial state revenue as the US and Europe have piled on sanctions and restrictions to curb the flow of oil from both countries. China has, in turn, ramped up its export of consumer goods to Russia that it can no longer source to the West. In exchange for military support from North Korea, Russia has allowed in thousands of North Korean workers, who earn hard currency for a regime that has little access to it. China remains North Korea’s most important economic partner, however, accounting for 98% of Pyongyang’s trade with the outside world. Much of this trade is increasingly undertaken in yuan and rubles, advancing a geopolitical bogeyman for the US – de-dollarization of trade. Decreasing international reliance on the dollar as the trade and reserve currency of choice, although by no means imminent, would limit the US’ power in the global markets and further dilute the impact of Western sanctions.
Limitations of the CRINK Alliance
Support for fellow CRINK states is far from unconditional, however, as Iran discovered last month. After years of overt military support for Russia in its war with Ukraine, Tehran likely expected more than purely rhetorical support from Moscow during the 12-day aerial bombardment by Israel – but that is all it got. Similarly, China and North Korea issued statements condemning Israel’s attacks, but made no moves to provide more concrete support or demand a ceasefire. Although all three states are deeply concerned with what they consider a dangerous Western move to legitimize intra-state conflict, all opted to stay uninvolved. The tepid reaction illustrates CRINK’s limits as a strategic unit.
Both China and Russia were considering their other relationships in the Gulf when they opted to avoid entanglement in the 12-day war. Russian President Vladimir Putin has a relatively warm relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and even if those ties have been increasingly complicated by Israeli alignment with the US, Moscow was not willing to give up the friendship. Gulf Arab states have been a crucial diplomatic conduit for Moscow as its geopolitical isolation has grown - Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have played significant roles in mediating prisoner swaps and deals to protect energy infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine, and none of the Gulf capitals have imposed international sanctions on Moscow. The regional Sunni monarchies, who have in recent years mostly established détentes with Tehran despite wanting an end to Iranian nuclear enrichment and proxy activity, valued avoiding escalation to protect market stability, oil prices, and their own economic transformations. In signing its January partnership agreement with Iran – which did not include a mutual defense pact – Russia clearly foresaw some escalation, and already knew it was not interested in intervening even if Moscow had wanted to, though it likely would not have been able, overstretched as it is in Ukraine. Despite significant Russian interests in keeping Syria’s Assad dictatorship stable, Moscow ultimately opted to let the regime collapse in December rather than divert resources from Ukraine to aid Syrian regime forces and Iran in repelling rebels.
China, similarly, was unwilling to risk its important economic relationships with Middle Eastern states to support Iran against Israel. China receives about half of all its oil from Middle Eastern sources, mostly moved through the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Further regional conflict or, as was feared, Iran’s closing of the Strait to impose costs on Israel and the US, would have spiked global oil prices and had disastrous effects on Chinese energy supply. Chinese nonintervention also aligns with its longstanding foreign policy objectives in the Middle East; Beijing has no interest in taking up the mantle of regional enforcer and has long been happy to remain a primarily economic partner (although it has made diplomatic forays as well – such as its role in mediating the Saudi-Iranian détente in 2023).
North Korea, less constrained by bilateral diplomatic and economic relationships, is the wild card here. Pyongyang did little but condemn Israeli attacks – in an announcement immediately following a call with Russia – which is largely attributable to North Korea’s more constrained military resources, and inability to withstand retaliatory attacks from the US or Israel. But some worry that Pyongyang may help Iran rebuild its decimated nuclear weapons with technology and fissile material from its own program. However, Israel’s attacks on Iran may impact North Korea’s behavior with regard to its own arsenal – some analysts predict the Kim regime will accelerate production, having seen the decimation of a not-yet-fully-armed nuclear program. Others argue that the strikes could open a window for Pyongyang to engage the US on a long-desired denuclearization agreement, seeing more to gain from that avenue now that the US has demonstrated its willingness to drop bunker-busters on rogue nuclear states.
Ultimately, the CRINK “alliance” falls short of genuine strategic or military alignment. The anti-NATO it certainly is not. The underlying CRINK ideology – pushing back on Western hegemony – is fairly thin: member states agree on the ultimate goal, in theory, but the means they are willing to use and risks they are willing to take diverge wildly. While China and Russia value their non-CRINK economic and diplomatic relationships over the defense of CRINK partners, non-economic coordination will remain limited. Some CRINK member states may also not see benefit in strengthening CRINK: while China appreciates Russian and Iranian assistance in keeping the Kim regime in North Korea stable, greater economic help – especially from Moscow – threatens to dilute Chinese influence there.
Despite the limits of CRINK’s strategic alignment, however, their existing cooperation will continue to pose risks for the Western-led rules-based international order and the global business community. CRINK is working, successfully, to establish a non-Western economic arena where states targeted by the US and EU can operate without the cost and inconvenience of sanctions. The CRINK economy has already diluted the impact of sanctions and their viability as a tool to compel behavior change, and is accelerating the fragmentation of the global economy that will create uncertainty and complexity for businesses in the coming years as regulations, currencies, and approved trading partners shift. While CRINK is not a permanent feature of the international order – a Russian ceasefire with Ukraine and the lifting of Western sanctions would, for example, significantly reduce Moscow’s reliance on the grouping – the formation of a “West vs. the rest” global economy is likely to be a long-lived trend.
