Overview
More than two months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s future remains unclear. Israel’s occupation of Syria’s southwestern demilitarized zone in close proximity to the Golan Heights (which Israel previously left in 1974 and opted to retake in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster) may remain a permanent feature in the Middle East landscape for years to come. Despite international condemnation, Israel enjoys the strong backing of the Trump administration, which will not force a withdrawal but rather support continued Israeli presence on Syrian soil for the foreseeable future. As Iran and Hizballah have been severely weakened in recent months as a result of Israel’s attacks in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran’s regional proxies, and with the new Syrian leadership focused on consolidating its power and control throughout the country, there is no serious security threat or challenge to Israel’s continued presence there.
Israel’s Response to Assad’s Fall
On December 8, in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, Israel invaded the buffer zone in southwestern Syria, adjacent to the Golan Heights, and conducted aerial strikes against Syrian Army targets across the country, specifically targeting its military capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that in light of the fall of the Assad regime, the 1974 Israeli-Syrian border agreement was null and void, ordering the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take over control of the demilitarized zone from which it withdrew in 1974. Soon after, Netanyahu laid out Israel’s military objectives in Syria which include securing the full occupation and control of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) buffer zone; establishing a security zone extending beyond the buffer zone and focusing on removing all heavy weaponry and terrorist infrastructure which pose a threat to Israel (while establishing contacts with local Druze communities); preventing the establishment of Iranian arms smuggling routes through Syria to Lebanon; and continuing the effort to destroy Syrian heavy strategic weaponry throughout the country (including air and missile defense systems).
As a result of Israel’s operation, Syrian Army units vacated their positions along the UNDOF buffer area. Today, Israel controls a further several hundred square miles of Syrian territory, establishing Israeli-controlled territory within twenty miles of the capital, Damascus. The campaign further decimated the Syrian Army’s navy and military capabilities, eliminating the entire Syrian naval fleet and the majority of its airplanes, as well as some of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles.
Israel’s Logic
After almost 14 years of a bloody civil war in Syria, the prospects for a process that will lead to a more stable situation in the war-torn country seem greater than under Assad, but it will take longer to assess whether the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government will bring about the desired changes. While many countries around the world have welcomed the statements and actions of the interim government so far, sending senior representatives to Damascus to meet with interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa or exploring the easing of wartime sanctions, Israel remained doubtful and suspicious of the HTS’s plans and intentions. While Israel certainly took advantage of the chaotic situation surrounding Assad’s fall, it was genuinely concerned that events in Damascus would spill over and destabilize the Syrian-Israeli border area. Particularly, HTS’s Jihadist ideology added to Israeli concerns and to a sense that the interim government is “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” However, the risk did not only come from the interim government: Israel was likely worried that the power vacuum outside the capital could provide cover for Iran and its proxies to assert control in strategic areas, providing an even closer launchpad for attacks against Israel.
After taking control of the buffer zone, the IDF moved to change the reality on the ground, opening new routes between the border and the outposts in the buffer area and removing forests, thus allowing greater visibility and ability to effectively control and monitor the situation in the area. The IDF also invested efforts in upgrading the outposts vacated by the Syrian Army, bringing in new technological capabilities that will allow it a long presence there. In recent days, Israel has identified that Syrian units under the direction of the interim government have entered towns and villages near the Syrian-Israeli border, but so far there have been no clashes between these forces and the IDF. In response, Netanyahu said earlier this week that Israel will not allow Syria’s new army or members of HTS to enter “the area south of Damascus," newly emphasizing the extent of the control Israel intends to exert over the region. On February 25, the Israeli Air Force attacked a wide range of targets in central and southern Syria to reinforce its message. Syrian interim president Sharaa stated publicly he respects the 1974 armistice agreement signed by Israel and Syria, which established the pre-December 8 border and which Netanyahu has considered null, and clarified that he does not want a war with Israel.
The Trump Factor
Despite wide international condemnation of Israel’s invasion and attacks (especially from Europe and the Arab world) and statements by senior officials in Damascus that Syria does not seek a war with Israel, Netanyahu stated in December that Israel plans to remain in Syria at least until the end of 2025. Nonetheless, Israel’s approach towards its continued presence in Syria changed soon after President Donald Trump’s inauguration, with Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz vowing in January that the “IDF will maintain its presence in Syria indefinitely.”
The shift in Israeli statements reflects the understanding in Jerusalem that President Trump does not want to continue spending US resources and energy on Syria and is seriously considering returning to the plan he entertained during his first term to withdraw the remaining US troops entirely from northeastern Syria. As such, Israel’s newly established presence is viewed by Washington as complementing US policy by reinforcing deterrence against Iran, Hizballah and other militias in Syria. In this context, senior Israeli officials believe the Trump Administration will support Israel in maintaining the buffer zone in Syria for years to come. While continued pressure from the EU and the UN is expected, as long as the US supports Israel’s presence, it will remain in place. Israel is confident the administration understands its suspicions regarding the new interim government in Syria. Since Syrian interim president al-Sharaa has not committed to a concrete timeline to hold elections, Israel can argue that the true colors of the regime will not be clear before the end of 2025.
Finally, as Iran and Hizballah have been severely weakened in recent months as a result of Israel’s attacks in Iran, Syria and its war in Lebanon, and with the new Syrian leadership focused on consolidating its power and control throughout the country, no serious security threat or challenge can be seen to Israel’s continued presence there.
Regional and Global Impacts
The impact of Israel’s presence in Syria for businesses is limited initially, as the Syrian economy remains almost entirely disconnected from the Western financial system. More broadly, Israel’s presence in Syria extends its success in the last year in degrading the capabilities of its regional rivals, which has included a fairly decisive victory against Hizballah and the decimation of Hamas’ capabilities in Gaza. On one hand, Israel’s incursion into Syria and other operations have taken place in, and contributed to, a region that is in a historic state of flux. Taken together, there will be significant uncertainty in the regional operating environment for the foreseeable future as the region reorganizes itself. There are risks that a more audacious Iran, perceiving itself backed into a strategic corner, could seek a nuclear weapon more quickly; the Israel-Hamas war and regional proxy activity could flare-up, including currently dormant maritime attacks by the Yemeni Houthis; and tension in Israeli-Arab relations could increase, potentially straining economic and diplomatic ties.
On the other hand, if Israel’s presence is accepted as a “temporary” stabilizing force, this may encourage interest by international businesses in Syria's reconstruction. The basic infrastructure of the country, from water treatment to transportation to manufacturing, has been destroyed. Regional states, such as Turkey and the Gulf countries, are expected to contribute to reconstruction, which will further rebalance regional political dynamics. Europe will also provide reconstruction financing, encouraging the adoption of western standards for projects and planting seeds for a more western-oriented Syria. For businesses, however, security will be a top risk until the country accepts a new constitution and rule of law and citizens decide to invest in a better future.
