Overview
On March 30, 2026, the Department of Justice's National Security Division (NSD) confirmed that DOJ's recently released, department‑wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self‑Disclosure Policy1 (CEP) applies to criminal matters within NSD's jurisdiction.2 This makes clear that the CEP framework now applies to DOJ enforcement decisions in national security matters, including cases involving export controls, sanctions, and other national security‑related regulatory regimes.
In its press release, NSD directed companies that identify potential criminal violations of US national security laws to submit voluntary self‑disclosures directly to the Division. The press release reiterates that NSD's jurisdiction includes violations of core export control and sanctions statutes, including the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as well as other national security‑related offenses. These include statutes prohibiting material support to, or financing of, foreign terrorist organizations and criminal issues arising from CFIUS and Team Telecom matters.
The CEP places voluntary self‑disclosure at the center of charging and resolution decisions.3 Under this framework, DOJ will generally decline to prosecute a company that (1) voluntarily self‑discloses misconduct to an appropriate DOJ component; (2) fully cooperates with the ensuing investigation; (3) timely and appropriate remediation of the identified misconduct; and (4) does not present aggravating circumstances. Importantly, the CEP does not operate as a binary, all‑or‑nothing regime. Even where a declination is unavailable—such as when aggravating circumstances are present, including serious or pervasive misconduct, significant harm, or recent recidivism—the policy materially improves expected outcomes for companies that disclose, cooperate, and remediate. In those circumstances, DOJ has committed to resolving matters through non‑prosecution agreements (NPAs), typically of limited duration and generally without the imposition of an independent compliance monitor. DOJ has also committed to substantial reductions from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines fine range, at least 50% below the bottom of that range.
NSD's confirmation of the CEP largely aligns with its prior voluntary self‑disclosure framework, set forth in the NSD Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations,4 but with an important distinction. Under the earlier NSD policy, where a company voluntarily self‑disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated, NSD stated that it would generally not seek a guilty plea and that there would be a presumption in favor of a NPA with no criminal fine. In contrast, the new CEP shifts the presumptive outcome from a NPA to a declination of prosecution, a materially more favorable result for companies.
For additional information regarding the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self‑Disclosure Policy or NSD enforcement matters, please contact a member of Steptoe's National Security & Cross‑Border Transactions team.
1 US Dep't of Justice, Department‑Wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self‑Disclosure Policy (Mar. 10, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1430731/dl?inline
2 US Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Reporting Voluntary Self‑Disclosures of Violations of National Security Laws Under the Department‑Wide Corporate Enforcement Policy (Mar. 30, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reporting-voluntary-self-disclosures-violations-national-security-laws-under-department-wide
3 The Policy builds on changes announced by the DOJ's Criminal Division in a May 12, 2025 memorandum updating its voluntary self‑disclosure framework. There, the Criminal Division expanded the incentives available to companies that voluntarily disclose federal criminal violations and cooperate with DOJ investigations. Although the changes applied at the time only to matters handled by the Criminal Division, they previewed the Administration's broader approach to corporate enforcement by emphasizing increased penalty reductions, clearer eligibility for cooperation credit, and a more transparent pathway to declinations of prosecution for qualifying disclosures. Matthew R. Galeotti, US Dep't of Justice, Crim. Div., Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White‑Collar Crime (May 12, 2025).
4 US Dep't of Justice, National Security Division, NSD Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations (Mar. 7, 2024)
