Overview
First Tuesday Update is our monthly take on current issues in commercial disputes, international arbitration, and judgment enforcement. This month, we highlight the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX S.A.[1], concerning the reach of Title III of the Helms-Burton (or LIBERTAD) Act.
Title III creates a private right of action for US nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government in the early 1960s. It allows them to sue any person or entity that "traffics" in that confiscated property, including Cuban agencies and instrumentalities. Despite the statute’s language allowing for suits against Cuban entities, in the seven years since Title III became operative, most Title III litigation has been directed at private companies doing business with Cuba rather than at the Cuban state-owned enterprises that control and benefit from many confiscated assets. A key reason for the hesitancy to sue Cuban instrumentalities was the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which, if applicable, would subject plaintiffs to years of threshold litigation over the FSIA's limited exceptions to sovereign immunity before reaching the merits of their claims. For many claimholders, that uncertainty and expense posed a substantial obstacle to bringing suit against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities at all.
The long-awaited Exxon decision removes that obstacle. The Supreme Court held that Congress, through the Helms-Burton Act, unequivocally authorized suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities and did not require plaintiffs separately to satisfy a FSIA immunity exception. The ruling substantially increases the practical viability of claims against Cuban state-owned enterprises and resolves one of the most important questions confronting Helms-Burton claimholders since Title III became operative. For certified claimholders and others pursuing recovery for property confiscated by the Cuban regime, the decision represents a clear confirmation of the statute's broad utility and potential reach.
With our colleagues at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Gibson Dunn LLP, Steptoe has had the privilege of representing ExxonMobil in this matter.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises from the Cuban government's confiscation of Exxon’s assets following the Cuban Revolution. In 1960, Cuba nationalized substantial petroleum-related assets owned by Exxon. The confiscated assets included, among other things, a refinery, distribution infrastructure, and service stations. Exxon subsequently obtained a certified claim through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, valuing its claim at more than $70 million (now over $1 billion, including interest and statutory treble damages).
Although Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, Title III's private right of action remained suspended for more than two decades through successive presidential suspensions. That changed in 2019, when the Trump Administration allowed Title III to take effect.
When the suspension expired, Exxon filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, including Corporación CIMEX (CIMEX), Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), and, later, CIMEX’s Panamanian alter ego. Exxon alleged that the defendants had trafficked in confiscated property by continuing to exploit, operate, and derive commercial benefit from the confiscated assets.
The defendants moved to dismiss under the FSIA, arguing that as agencies or instrumentalities of the Cuban state they remained immune from suit absent satisfaction of one of the FSIA’s statutory exceptions. Exxon countered that it did meet two of the statutory exceptions: the expropriation exception[2] and the commercial activity exception.[3] But it also argued that the Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the defendants’ sovereign immunity, rendering compliance with the FSIA’s exceptions unnecessary.
The district court concluded that the Helms-Burton Act did not itself eliminate sovereign immunity but held that Exxon had plausibly invoked the FSIA’s commercial activity exception with respect to at least one defendant. The DC Circuit largely agreed, holding that Title III plaintiffs must satisfy an FSIA exception before proceeding against Cuban state-owned entities and remanding for further consideration of whether the commercial-activity exception applied. Judge Randolph wrote separately, dissenting from the panel's decision that the Helms-Burton Act did not directly abrogate sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari—after hearing from the United States, which supported Exxon's position—to resolve whether Congress, through the Helms-Burton Act, independently abrogated foreign sovereign immunity for Title III claims notwithstanding the FSIA.
The Supreme Court's Analysis
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court reversed and held that Title III itself abrogates the sovereign immunity otherwise available to Cuban agencies and instrumentalities.
Initially, the Court looked to the statutory text—observing that Title III creates a cause of action for any US national whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government and authorizes suit against "any person" who traffics in that property.[4]Because the Act expressly defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," the Court held that Congress specifically contemplated suits against Cuban state-owned entities.[5]In the Court's view, Congress could not simultaneously create such a cause of action and preserve immunity that would effectively prevent those claims from being heard. Congress's intent to abrogate these entities' sovereign immunity was, thus, sufficiently "discernible from the sum total of Congress's work."[6]Indeed, "[o]nly a few other laws" take the "highly unusual step" of expressly creating causes of action against foreign agencies and instrumentalities.[7]
The Court was not persuaded by the Defendants reliance—embraced by the DC Circuit below—on prior Supreme Court precedents suggesting that the FSIA is the "'sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court.'"[8] The Court reasoned that this "'general language in judicial opinions’ does not control the 'quite different circumstances that the [Amerada Hess] Court was not then considering.'"[9] Rather, the subsequently enacted Helms-Burton Act controlled notwithstanding the FSIA because “one Congress cannot bind another." Congress thus remained free in 1996 to modify or override the immunity framework established by the FSIA in 1976.[10] The Court concluded that Congress exercised that authority when it enacted Title III.
The Court concluded that the plain language of the statute alone "strongly indicates" that the Helms-Burton Act abrogates sovereign immunity. However, the Court found support for that conclusion in three additional "features of the Helms-Burton Act."
First, the Court relied on statutory structure and purpose.[11] Justice Kavanaugh observed that Congress enacted Title III to provide a meaningful remedy to claimants whose property had been confiscated by Cuba. Requiring plaintiffs to separately satisfy an FSIA exception would, in the Court’s words, "largely negate" that remedy because the comprehensive embargo against Cuba meant that many claims would rarely fit within existing the FSIA exceptions. The Court reasoned that Congress "does not ordinarily enact self-defeating statutes."[12]Moreover, consistent with the Solicitor General's Office's reasoning in support of Exxon's position, applying the FSIA to Helms-Burton suits would "create a 'gross mismatch' because Cuban agencies and instrumentalities were the Helms-Burton Act's 'main culprits.'"[13]
Second, the Court emphasized that Congress expressly provided that Title III actions arise under the general federal-question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1330, the FSIA jurisdictional provision that governs suits against foreign states.[14]In the Court's view, that choice further confirmed that Congress did not intend Title III claims to be conditioned on satisfying one of the FSIA's immunity exceptions. The Court also found it significant that Congress selectively incorporated certain FSIA provisions into the Helms-Burton Act—most notably, the FSIA's service-of-process rules—while omitting others. That targeted approach, the Court reasoned, demonstrated that Congress knew how to borrow specific FSIA provisions when it wished to do so and did not intend to import the statute wholesale, including its immunity provisions.[15]
Third, the Court found support in the statute’s delegation of authority to the President to suspend Title III actions based on foreign policy considerations.[16] The Court viewed this mechanism as inconsistent with the notion that Congress intended FSIA immunity to remain a threshold barrier to suit. Instead, Congress entrusted foreign-policy management of Title III litigation to the Executive Branch through the suspension mechanism itself.[17]The Court reasoned that it would make little sense to "craft numerous provisions granting gatekeeping power to the President if very few (if any) suits would satisfy one of the FSIA’s exceptions."[18]
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. The dissent argued, among other things, that Congress did not speak with the "unmistakable clarity" ordinarily required to abrogate foreign sovereign immunity.[19]
Implications for Helms-Burton Litigation
The Court's decision marks a turning point in Helms-Burton litigation and is likely to reshape the next generation of Title III cases.
Most immediately, Exxon clears the path for more claims against the Cuban agencies and instrumentalities that are controlling, operating, and benefiting from confiscated property day-to-day. As several amici supporting Exxon observed, the FSIA framework threatened to "close the courthouse doors" to many Title III plaintiffs by imposing costly, time-consuming, and uncertain jurisdictional battles against Title III's "main culprits" before a court could ever reach the merits.[20] Exxon itself illustrates the point: the parties spent years litigating sovereign-immunity issues before the courts could begin to address the substance of the claims. The Supreme Court has now confirmed that this is not—and never was—the framework Congress intended when it enacted Title III.
The Court also answered a key question raised by the Cuban defendants in opposing jurisdiction, which will have significant consequences in future litigation. Defendants argued that FSIA must apply because, under Exxon’s theory, it would still have to satisfy personal jurisdiction by demonstrating defendants’ minimum contacts with the United States—an inquiry quite similar to the FSIA's commercial activity exception. But, adopting the position of Exxon and the United States, Exxon confirms that personal jurisdiction in a Helms-Burton case is satisfied by service of process under the statute’s service provision, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(c)(2). The Helms-Burton Act's "service-of-process rules define when a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign agency or instrumentality. See 28 U. S. C. §1330(b)."[21]This reasoning is consistent with the Court's recent decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, where the Court held that compliance with federal service of process rules is consistent with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, obviating the need for a showing of minimum contacts.[22]
Along with its earlier decision this term in Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., the Supreme Court has sent a powerful signal about the breadth of the remedy Congress created. Havana Docks endorses a broad range of conduct that may give rise to liability under Title III. Exxon makes clear that Cuban state-owned entities cannot avoid those claims by invoking the FSIA. Taken together, the decisions substantially strengthen the position of Title III claimants and are likely to encourage new litigation involving both private companies and Cuban agencies and instrumentalities.
At the same time, important questions remain. As additional cases are filed and existing cases proceed, courts will continue to confront disputes concerning the scope of Title III’s trafficking provisions, the availability and contours of statutory defenses, the calculation of damages, and the mechanics of enforcing judgments. Developments in US-Cuba relations and sanctions policy may likewise influence both litigation strategy and the practical risks faced by companies operating in or connected to Cuba.
For now, however, one point is clear: the Supreme Court has removed a significant cloud that had loomed over Title III litigation since it became effective in 2019. As lower courts begin applying both Havana Docks and Exxon, the contours of Helms-Burton liability will continue to develop, and the coming years are likely to see a new wave of litigation testing the full reach of the statute.
As always, we will continue to monitor these developments and provide updates as the next chapter of Helms-Burton litigation unfolds.
[1] No., 24-699, 609 U.S. ___ (2026)
[2] 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)
[3] 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
[4] Id. at 8-10.
[5] Id.at 9.
[6] Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture Rural Dev. Rual Housing Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 55 (2024) (citation modified).
[7] Id. at 10.
[8] Id. at 19 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 439 (1989)).
[9] Id. at 19.
[10] Slip op. at 7.
[11] Id. at 11-13.
[12] Id. at 12 (citing Quarles v. United States, 587 U.S. 645, 654 (2019)).
[13] Id. at 13 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 39).
[14] Id. (citing 22 U.S.C.§ 6082(c)(1)).
[15] Id. at 13-14.
[16] Id. at 17-20.
[17] Id. at 19.
[18] Id. at 17.
[19] Dissent at 3-5.
[20] Brief of Amici Curiae King Ranch Inc., Vertientes Camaguey Sugar Company, and Grant Manheim in Support Of Petitioner at 12-13.
[21] See id. at ___ ("§6082(c)(2) addresses service-of-process rules for foreign agencies and instrumentalities—that is, how to obtain personal jurisdiction over those foreign government entities.")
[22] 24-983, 606 US ___ (2025).
