Overview
Today's Deep Dive is 1,239 words and an 8-minute read.
Joe Biden wrapped up what is likely his final trip to Europe as president of the United States last week. On the agenda was supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia, containing the Middle East conflict, securing the Indo-Pacific, bolstering trade, and making democracies more resilient. The visit was in many ways a celebration of the end of an era – the last Atlanticist American president.
The transatlantic relationship has been a foundational element in post-World War II geopolitics. The underpinnings, however, have eroded over time as challenges to peace and security shifted away from Europe to other corners of the world and American expectations for the partnership increasingly went unmet. Looking ahead, there are opportunities to renew and strengthen the partnership, and great risks if a shared path forward is not found.
President Biden: The Last Atlanticist
Biden grew up in a political context where the ravages of World War II were present and the threat of the Soviet Union and communism to European security and Western liberal democracy keenly felt. The United States had been drawn into two world wars because of European conflict and was determined to forestall a third by rebuilding Europe, creating multilateral institutions and building an international system around a set of values in support of respecting sovereign borders, human rights, free trade – what is today collectively called the Western liberal order or international norms. Biden’s long career in Congress on foreign affairs committees, then in the Executive Branch, put him at the center of the US partnership with Europe, which he championed.
In July, Biden withdrew from the US presidential race, in acknowledgment that he was out of step with the Democratic party base, viewed as disconnected to the ills troubling the middle class. His age was an issue, and not just a question of his ability to do the job, but his suitability to lead the American people.
In November, Americans will be choosing between two candidates with radically different backgrounds, politics and values. It is an election that is too close to call even though it is only weeks away. Neither candidate, however, shares Biden’s innate affinity for Europe – making the future of the transatlantic relationship an open question for the first time in generations.
Changing Views among Americans on National Security
Americans do not remember World War II. The majority of Americans in the workforce, Millennials and Generation X, were young or not yet born, when the Soviet Union fell. For these generations, Middle East wars are their lens on national security, but even these conflicts are distant as America now has a professional military (without conscription) and citizens have become more focused on economic security, immigration, energy transition and a wide assortment of social and cultural values (the so-called culture war).
Candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump represent their political bases. On foreign policy, the Ukraine war is one of the predominant issues, and there is a deep partisan divide. According to Pew Research polling from July, 62% of Republicans say the US does not have a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion. This stacks against the 62% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents who say the US does have a responsibility.
Informing these views is the issue of European responsibility for managing its own security and the risks of spillover on US security. Both Republicans and Democratic leaders have been critical of European underinvestment in defense, contributing far too little of their GDP, domestically and to NATO commitments, although many Democrats including Harris characterize NATO as the greatest military alliance the world has ever seen. Today’s Republicans are more inclined to believe that European nations should be footing the bill to arm Ukraine, not the US, because US national security risks rest elsewhere - namely emanating from China. Democrats are more inclined to focus on the risks to the rest of Europe and to less tangible values like freedom and democracy, should Russia defeat Ukraine. Democrats too are worried about risks from China but are not (yet) willing to trade primacy for one over the other.
China, Security and Trade
There is a bipartisan consensus in the US on the risks China poses to US military superiority, economic security and global influence. The first Trump administration and the Biden administration have invested in developing US military capabilities and partnerships to contain Chinese power projection in the Indo-Pacific. Both administrations have adopted tariffs and export controls to counter dumping and state subsidies, measures designed to protect US industries. Under Biden, industrial policy is now supporting the research and development of technologies in industries deemed critical for the future of the US economy and building secure manufacturing supply chains.
Regardless of who wins the White House in the November elections, the next president will be looking to European leaders for greater alignment on China and more leadership out of Europe on this front. For a future Trump administration, this could be a key differentiator in how the new team treats bilateral relations with European countries. For Harris, she will have the benefit of starting from a stronger position compared to Biden at the beginning of his term, vis-à-vis Europe, but will still need to demonstrate to all Americans that the transatlantic relationship is an equal partnership, with the US continued investment in European security manifesting in European investment in American security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
Risks for Businesses
In 2023, the US was the largest partner for EU exports of goods (19.7 %) and the second largest partner for EU imports of goods (13.7 %). The trading relationship is growing, with governments on both sides of the pond working to manage disagreements and identify shared opportunities for mutual benefit. The US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), established during the Biden Administration, provided a forum that is helping to bridge gaps and focus forward on standards and regulations of technologies and industries that will be central to future economic growth, such as AI, quantum technologies, and 6G wireless communications systems. While the TTC does not receive much attention outside of government circles and among policy wonks, it has been successful in aligning some trade and technology policies, bridging disputes over industrial policy and providing a technical forum to discuss challenging issues such as investment screening and outbound investment security.
Should US trade relations with Europe sour over a new round of tariffs and counter tariffs targeting both sides of the Atlantic, the risks include not only increased costs of doing business and new non-market barriers (such as rules of origin, import licensing and other administrative hurdles), but reduced cooperation on promoting sustainability and new opportunities for trade and investment. With the historical affinity no longer providing a strong guardrail in the US as it once did, US business leaders may be pressed to assume higher-profile roles to advocate for transatlantic economic interests, which can present political and reputation risks in what is likely to be a polarized political environment post-election.
Regardless of whoever wins the presidency next month, the transatlantic relationship is in uncharted territory. With diminished popular support for a robust US presence in European defense, and pressing security concerns elsewhere in the world, the era of European primacy in American foreign policy consideration may be coming to a close. A shift would have significant repercussions for the international community and the private sector if support for the transatlantic relationship is not consolidated with new commitments.
