Overview
Nearly five months after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey, and Israel find themselves at odds in a conflict of interests that runs the risk of becoming a military confrontation. The Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led government in Syria is facing many challenges. While Turkey is eager to help, Israel’s continuous attacks in Syria complicate Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s efforts to stabilize the country. Turkey is engaged in efforts to reach a defense pact with the Syrian interim government and wants to play a role in Syria economically and politically. Israel, driven primarily by its desire to address threats to its security, is concerned that the HTS-led government is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” that may destabilize the Israel-Syria border. Further, it is wary that Turkey will replace Iran as the dominant force in Syria and will lead a regional “Muslim Brotherhood” axis which will replace the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”
Efforts to establish deconfliction in Syria are being made, as talks between senior-level Israeli and Turkish delegations were held in Azerbaijan in early April. Nevertheless, as tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem run high, there is a need for third-party involvement, a context in which the US may play a key role in future Israel-Turkey de-escalation.
Turkish Interests
Since Assad’s fall, Turkey no doubt emerged as the winner in Syria, due to its close ties with and influence on HTS, and with Russia, Iran, and Hizballah capabilities weakened. Primarily, Turkey wants to see a centralized and stable Syria emerge after 14 years of civil war and chaos. To that end, Turkey is prioritizing work to secure a defense pact with the new Syrian interim government, which will allow it to provide military training, deploy troops in more areas across Syria, and take over some of the military bases formerly used by Assad.
Moreover, Turkey wants to be involved in Syria economically and politically and create a broader coalition that includes Gulf states to rebuild and rehabilitate Syria. On the way toward Syria’s reconstruction, partner countries will have to overcome the obstacles posed by the international sanctions regime. While the UK and EU have taken steps to ease sanctions on Damascus to lessen pressure on what they hope will be a fledgling democracy, the US has reportedly set out stringent requirements for sanctions easing, including cracking down on terrorism. Even from London and Brussels’ perspective, however, Al-Sharaa has a long to-do list that needs to be completed in order to bring the sanctions regime to an end. The Turkish-Syrian defense pact, currently being discussed, is the next big step for Ankara and will reveal a lot about the future Turkish role.
Israeli Considerations
For its part, Israel has been active in Syria since December 8th, attacking Iranian and Syrian military targets, taking over control of the UN buffer zone in southern Syria established in 1974, and reaching out to minorities (Druze and Kurds) in Syria. In recent weeks, Israel has stated its intention to remain in southern Syria indefinitely to curb security risks from armed groups.
Israel’s current policy stems from three elements: historically perceived threats and the need to counter them; post-October 7 trauma; and a sense that the country can—and should—capitalize on the strategic moment to maximize its gains amid regional disorder and military victories against other regional rivals. Israel wants to prevent threats to the border and counter emerging threats, including preventing Syria from becoming once again a conduit of instability into Lebanon.
In the past, Israel defended and acted against the Syrian army in the country, and later against Iran and Hezbollah, as well as ISIS and other Jihadist groups. The latest HTS-led Syrian government is seen as a new incarnation of the actors Israel faced in the past. While Israel can live with an effective centralized regime in Syria or work against a weaker regime with spheres of influence, operationally, Jerusalem feels that it needs a deeper buffer area—a buffer zone in southern Syria and a demilitarized area south of Damascus. Its primary goal is to prevent emerging threats and continue with cross-border outreach to local Syrian communities.
Deconfliction
Senior officials in Damascus stated on several occasions they do not want war with Israel and expect Israel to abide by international agreements, namely the 1974 Syria-Israel armistice agreement. Al-Sharaa has chosen his words very carefully and deliberately signaled to Israel that Syria poses no threat to Israel. Syrians feel it was made clear that the country has no intention of challenging Israel, nor does it have any plan to provoke or attack Israel. On the other hand, Israel feels it cannot ignore the threats posed by an unstable neighbor without consistent security within its borders—regardless of promises from Damascus. Al-Sharaa has also asked Turkish leaders to relay the message to Washington that the new Syrian government does not pose a threat nor intends to attack US or Israeli interests. In a way, Israel’s attacks have brought Turkey and the HTS-led Syrian government closer.
Turkey wants to re-centralize Syria and in the long term wants to “flip” Syria from being its most problematic neighbor into its ally. From Israel’s standpoint, either of these developments are undesirable. Israel’s aerial attack on April 3 on the T4 airbase in Syria, formerly used by the Assad regime, was designed to send a message to Ankara that Israel will not tolerate Turkish attempts to take over Syrian bases in an effort to achieve Turkish domination of Syria.
Nevertheless, Turkey-Israel deconfliction in Syria is possible and there is certainly a role for the US to play as the two countries find it difficult to deal with each other directly. While Turkey has its own interests to consider, Israel is mistaken to consider Turkey to be as similar to Iran—Tehran ultimately wants to destroy Israel, while Ankara, despite significant strategic misalignments, would like to coexist with Jerusalem. Israel should not ignore that Erdogan sees Turkey as a global actor and understands that to maintain this status and role he cannot entirely break off relations with the Jewish state.
Trump’s Role
The US is well-placed to mediate between its two close allies as President Donald Trump has close relations with President Erdogan and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Trump has already offered to help: in his April 7 meeting in the Oval Office, Trump made it clear to Netanyahu he could help vis-a-vis Erdogan, but disappointed the Israeli PM by stating “I have a very, very good relationship with Turkey and their leader…so I hope that [Turkey] will not be a problem [in Syria]” and added “I happen to like him (Erdogan)…and he likes me and we’ve never had a problem.” Erdogan wants to see the Syrians establish a military force that would also fight ISIS, gain US recognition, and yield political, economic, and political gains for Ankara. If it gains US recognition, it may lead to a decision by Trump to pull the remaining US troops out of Syria, as Washington is reportedly considering cutting US presence in the region by half. Israel is against such a move for strategic reasons but also because it would make Syrian Kurds (who Israel is cultivating relations with) more vulnerable and exposed to pressure from Turkey, which has historically had difficult relations with its ethnic Kurds.
Despite room for de-escalation, no breakthrough in relations between Turkey and Israel is likely under the current leadership. Given the current state of tensions, a Turkey-Israel escalation in Syria could occur as a result of an unintended miscalculation or provocations. Nevertheless, third-party mediation may begin, in which the US is possibly best positioned to support such a direction. This would help the two countries deconflict over Syrian airspace and also reach an understanding over redlines and areas of influence.
For the global business community, a flare-up of Turkish-Israeli tensions in Syria could have damaging effects on the regional economy as chaos rises. While Syria remains largely cut off from the global economic system, heightened tensions in the region could heighten regional and global uncertainty, as well as strain regional trade relations. On the upside, however, Syria’s reconstruction will offer business opportunities for multinationals with a higher risk threshold as the country’s natural resources reenter the global commodities market, and the country reopens to Western imports. Beyond Israel-Turkey, however, the largest factor in reopening Syria’s economy will be sanctions easing. Prospects for easing do not look promising in the near term, given the US and Israel’s expectations that Damascus first prove it will be a responsible government and adhere to international laws, dismantle its WMD program, and deport terrorists.
